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ABSTRACT
From Gunboats to Good Neighbors:
U.S. Naval Diplomacy in Peru, 1919-1942
Joel C. Christenson
This dissertation examines the role naval power played in the evolution of U.S. policy toward
Latin America during the interwar period, when the United States abandoned armed interventionism
in favor of the policy of the “Good Neighbor.” Specifically, it focuses on two oft-overlooked types of
naval diplomacy the United States used to exercise influence in the South American nation of Peru:
the employment of U.S. personnel as naval advisers to the Peruvian government, and the use of U.S.
naval vessels as agents of public diplomacy on “goodwill” cruises and port visits in Peruvian waters.
It argues that the United States relied on the former while interventionism remained the accepted
policy toward much of Latin America but was considered untenable south of the Caribbean (roughly
1919-1932), and embraced the latter after renouncing intervention in the interests of becoming a
“Good Neighbor” (roughly 1933 through World War II). This research demonstrates that naval
power was a much more flexible, integral part of U.S. diplomacy in Latin America during the 1920s
and 1930s than historians have recognized. And importantly, it begins to bridge a persistent gap
between the literatures on American diplomatic and naval history – neither of which captures the full
extent of the nation’s efforts at naval diplomacy in the interwar period or adequately addresses the
broader significance of those efforts to U.S. foreign relations.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the considerable role naval power played in United States
foreign relations with the South American nation of Peru from the 1920s to the early 1940s, a
period when Washington abandoned the practice of armed intervention in its hemispheric
policy in favor of what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called “the policy of the good
neighbor.”1 Specifically, it focuses on two types of non-coercive naval diplomacy the United
States used in Peru during those years to help move its Latin American policy to a more
sustainable non-interventionist basis. First, it examines the American commitment to send a
team U.S. Navy personnel to Peru as advisers (known as a naval mission) on naval affairs.
Second, it explores the frequent employment of U.S. naval vessels and personnel in highly
visible cruises and port visits to Peruvian waters for the purpose of cultivating goodwill.
Both activities were central, this dissertation argues, to American efforts to close a turbulent
period in the early twentieth century – a time when the relations of the United States with its
southern neighbors turned on the use of force, actual and threatened. Peru provides an
appropriate focal point for such a study of the interwar policy of the United States toward
Latin America because, geographically, it falls outside of the Caribbean zone where the
United States had long relied on intervention, and because, unlike countries of South
America’s east coast and southern cone, as an Andean nation on the continent’s west coast
Peru did not have socioeconomic or cultural ties with Europe strong enough to preclude it
1

In his first inaugural address in March, 1933, Roosevelt declared that “In the field of world policy I would
dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor – the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and,
because he does so, respects the rights of others – the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the
sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.” Although it was a general declaration intended to
guide U.S. relations throughout the world, the “Good Neighbor Policy” soon became associated most closely
with Latin America. See Franklin D. Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 14.
1

from developing a closer association with the United States. In short, during the interwar
period U.S. foreign policymakers viewed Peru as something of a clean slate, on which it
would be possible to chart a new, less antagonistic course for U.S.-Latin American relations.2
It was in Peru during these years, this dissertation contends, that U.S. foreign policy made
use of naval power to help alter the direction of its relations with Latin America. It is
necessary, therefore, to understand American naval diplomacy in Peru in order to
comprehend how U.S. policy in Latin America began moving “from gunboats to good
neighbors.”
APPLIED AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE

This dissertation’s focus on the intersection of foreign relations and naval affairs
makes it timely and relevant. More than any other arm of national military power, the work
of a nation’s navy is intimately connected with its foreign policy. This is true because, as
naval theorist Ken Booth notes, warships routinely perform far more than fighting functions
in the service of nations’ interests: they are “visible signifiers and representatives of a
country’s intentions and commitments,” he writes, a fact that makes them valuable adjuncts

2

All studies of U.S. relations with Latin American nations have to confront the challenge posed by the usage of
the words “America,” “Americas,” and “American.” In this study, I use the words “United States” and
“America” interchangeably, and I use the word “American” to refer to people, ideas, policies, and possessions
that have their origins in the United States. I do this not out of cultural insensitivity, but because, of all the
peoples of the Western Hemisphere, only citizens of the United States refer to themselves, their ideas, and their
national possessions as “American.” Often, I use the word “Washington” interchangeably with “United States”
when referring to decisions taken or policies pursued by the United States toward Latin America. I use the
phrases “Latin America” and “Latin American” to refer to the nations of the Western Hemisphere south of the
United States and their peoples. I do not refer to Latin American peoples in this study as “American,” because
citizens of Latin American nations refer to themselves by their respective nationalities – Peruvian, Chilean,
Cuban, and so on. I do, however, use the word “Americas” to refer to the nations inhabiting the Western
Hemisphere. For a succinct summary of the logic underlying these choices in nomenclature, see Lester D.
Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere, The United States and the
Americas (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), xvi-xix.
2

to foreign policy.3 Navies can undertake diplomatic tasks that are difficult if not impossible
for ground and air forces to perform because, unlike those forces, naval ships possess the
capability to operate independently of large foreign bases for prolonged periods of time.
Moreover, because of their range and independence relative to armies and air forces, naval
vessels possess a unique capability to respond quickly to crisis situations.
Plying the seventy-one percent of the globe covered by the oceans, naval forces have
long been just this kind of asset to the foreign policy of the United States. Indeed,
throughout its history the U.S. Navy has fulfilled a number of political, social, and
humanitarian functions – functions short of war – in support of American national policy.4
For example, from the years of the early republic throughout the nineteenth century, the U.S.
Navy devoted most of its peacetime attention to protecting the flow of American commerce
overseas.5 In the early twentieth century, as it grew in size and complexity to accommodate
expanding U.S. interests in the world, the Navy routinely engaged in intervention operations
(known as “gunboat diplomacy”) to quell unrest in Latin America and East Asia.6 During the
Cold War, when not rendering wartime service, U.S. ships often engaged in contingency
operations of a diplomatic nature, such as staging a blockade in the Caribbean in 1962 to

3

Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London, New York: Croom, Helm, Crane, Russak, 1977), 34-35.

4

The seventy-one percent figure comes from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
(NOAA). See NOAA, “Ocean.” Accessed February 10, 2013. http://www.noaa.gov/ocean.html.
4

For more on the U.S. Navy’s role supporting American commerce in the nineteenth century, see John H.
Schroeder, Shaping a Maritime Empire: The Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 18291861 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985).
5

For more on the U.S. Navy’s role supporting American commerce in the nineteenth century, see ibid.

6

On U.S. gunboat diplomacy in Latin America in the early twentieth century, see Donald A. Yerxa, Admirals
and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898-1945 (Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 1991). On similar operations in China in the early twentieth century, see Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's
Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), 193-280.
3

disrupt the flow of Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery systems to the island of Cuba.7 And,
as has become routine in recent years, American naval ships have conducted cruises in
friendly waters aimed at providing medical care to foreign populations and providing
humanitarian relief.8 Indeed, it is fair to say that the U.S. Navy, which has not fought a
major naval battle (a fleet action) since 1944, has devoted more time and effort to essentially
diplomatic missions over the past seven decades than it has to conducting combat
operations.9 This reality makes the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy a fruitful area for study.
The utility of navies to foreign policy is not limited to the global reach of ships and
hardware, however. It stems also from the diplomatic nature of naval officership.
Throughout American history, to a much greater degree than personnel from other military
services, naval officers have served as de facto U.S. diplomats overseas.10 This is especially
true in Latin America, where in the early twentieth century naval personnel frequently led
intervention and occupation operations, and where, since 1920, the United States has
dispatched naval personnel to advise foreign governments in naval affairs.11 Initially a niche
arrangement extended to only a handful of Latin American countries, U.S. naval advising in
the Americas grew considerably during World War II as the United States stepped up efforts
7

See Curtis A. Utz, Cordon of Steel: The U.S. Navy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, The U S Navy in the Modern
World Series (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1993).
8

See James Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern
Command (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2010).
9

For an excellent recent treatment of the last major (fleet-level) U.S. naval battle, the Battle of Leyte Gulf
(October, 1944), see H. P. Willmott, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2005).
10

David F. Long, Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988).
11

Among the most notable, high profile naval officers to write about his experiences as a “gunboat diplomat”
during this period was Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, whose unpublished memoir discusses the diplomatic
nature of early twentieth century naval officership at great length. See William Banks Caperton, History of Flag
Career of Rear Admiral W.B. Caperton, U.S. Navy, Commencing January 5, 1915, RG 45, ZN Box 936,
National Archives.
4

to improve hemispheric defenses. This wartime initiative had not only the strictly military
aim of improving Latin American proficiency in national defense, but also the diplomatic
objective of helping to forge an anti-Axis unity throughout the Americas consistent with U.S.
security aims. The United States remained heavily involved in naval advising in the post-war
years as the triumph of victory over the Axis Powers gave way to deep new tensions with the
Soviet Union. During the Cold War, when the United States made fighting communism a
priority of its inter-American policy, U.S. naval and military advising were important parts of
its inter-American policy.12 This presence endures today, as naval advisers serve together
with Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel in joint Military Groups (known as
“MilGroups”) throughout Latin America that establish and maintain military-to-military
contacts with partner nations, provide advice to those nations’ military establishments, and
coordinate bilateral and multilateral military training and exchange programs.13 The
persistence of the practice of U.S. naval and military advising, and its important place in
U.S.-Latin American relations, make it a fertile area for historical inquiry, as well.
This research is historiographically significant, as well. It helps to bridge a persistent
gap between the literatures on American naval and foreign relations history, neither of which
fully recognizes the important role naval power played in U.S. policy toward Latin America
during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. In this way, this dissertation is responsive to recent calls
of scholars of diplomatic and military history for a deeper, more nuanced conversation

12

See Edward C. Stewart, "American Advisors Overseas," Military Review 45, no. 2 (1965): 3-9.

13

See Tony Payan, Cops, Soldiers, and Diplomats: Explaining Agency Behavior in the War on Drugs (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2006), 100-01. For more on the expansion of U.S. military and naval advising in Latin
America during the early Cold War, see Robert O. Kirkland, Observing Our Hermanos de Armas: U.S. Military
Attachés in Guatemala, Cuba, and Bolivia, 1950-1964, Latin American Studies: Social Sciences and Law (New
York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2003).
5

between the two fields.14 Scholars of American naval history have generally devoted little
attention to the activities of the U.S. Navy in Latin America during this period, instead
focusing their attention on those decades’ broader innovations in maritime strategy and on
bureaucratic fights over the size, structure, and distribution of the U.S. fleet.15 Naval
historians who have addressed the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy have either not placed
significant attention on the Americas, or have focused their inquiries on earlier chronological
periods.16 Those few who have examined U.S. naval diplomacy in Latin America during the
interwar period have, meanwhile, largely confined their inquiries to the Caribbean area that
bore the brunt of U.S. “gunboat diplomacy” interventions, and say little about the

14

Thomas Zeiler et al., "The Convergence of Military and Diplomatic History: A Roundtable," Passport:
Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (2012): 30-37.
15

For example, Edward J. Marolda’s edited volume of essays by leading figures in U.S. naval history contains
pieces entitled “FDR at War, 1913-1921,” “Franklin D. Roosevelt and Naval Strategy, 1933-1941,” and “The
Evolution of the U.S. Fleet, 1933-1941: How the President Mattered.” See Edward J. Marolda, FDR and the
U.S. Navy, 1st ed., The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Series on Diplomatic and Economic History
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). In his history of U.S. sea power from 1890 to 1990, George W. Baer
briefly addresses the importance of Latin America to U.S. strategists during World War II, but says nothing of
naval advising or goodwill cruising in the Western Hemisphere. See George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of
Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). The same is true of
Kenneth Hagan’s classic one-volume history of American sea power from the American Revolution through
1990. See Hagan, This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power. Robert G. Albion’s classic study
of naval policy is similarly silent on the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy in Latin America between the world
wars. See Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Rowena Reed, Makers of Naval Policy, 1798-1947 (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1980). Peter Karsten’s study of the U.S. Navy officer corps in the 19th and early 20th
centuries contains one chapter on the Navy’s role in U.S. diplomacy, but devotes only eight pages to Latin
America and the Caribbean – most of which, for the period in question, address U.S. gunboat diplomacy in the
Caribbean. See Peter Karsten, The Naval Aristocracy: The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of
Modern American Navalism, 1st Naval Institute Press (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008).
16

Richard Challener’s study of the U.S. Navy’s role in foreign policy worldwide focuses its Latin American
attention gunboat diplomacy operations in the Caribbean from 1898 to 1914. See Richard D. Challener,
Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
Charles Oscar Paullin’s landmark work on the diplomatic activities of U.S. naval officers, the first study to treat
the topic, was written in 1912 and covers the period 1778 to 1883. See Charles Oscar Paullin, Diplomatic
Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1912). David F. Long’s
effort to update Paullin’s work retains his chronological scope, ending in 1883. See Long, Gold Braid and
Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883. William R. Braisted has done
innovative work on the diplomatic roles of U.S. Naval officers in China in the interwar period, but there is no
comparable work that sheds light on the vital diplomatic roles that Naval officers played in Latin America. See
William Reynolds Braisted, Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922-1933, New Perspectives on
Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009).
6

employment of naval power south of the Caribbean, where U.S. policy had long deemed
armed intervention to be impractical.17 These studies provide little analysis of the U.S.
Navy’s active agenda of goodwill cruising in South American waters during the period, and
are silent on the advising work undertaken by U.S. naval missions in Peru and other countries
throughout the period.18 This dissertation is offered as a partial corrective to these
deficiencies in U.S. naval historiography.
Historians of U.S. foreign relations in the Western Hemisphere during the interwar
period have likewise said little about the significance of naval power to U.S. diplomacy.19
Scholars of U.S.-Latin American relations whose studies focus on U.S. armed interventions,
the turn in U.S. foreign policy toward “good neighborism,” and the role of cultural
interaction in that shift have generally not acknowledged the considerable importance naval
power played in bringing about that transformation.20 Among the only works of foreign

17

Richard Millett has produced excellent work on the Navy’s Special Service Squadron, the unit established in
1920 to patrol Central American and Caribbean waters. See Richard Millett, "The State Department's Navy: A
History of the Special Service Squadron, 1920-1940," The American Neptune 35 (1975): 118-135. Donald
Yerxa has done a broader study of the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean from the outbreak of the Spanish-American
War through World War II, but says little about the Navy’s consequential involvement in affairs further south.
See Yerxa, Admirals and Empire: The United States Navy and the Caribbean, 1898-1945.
18
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relations history that does address American naval diplomacy in the hemisphere during this
period, Eric Roorda’s superb study of U.S. relations with dictator Rafael Trujillo’s
Dominican Republic, is necessarily limited in scope to the Caribbean.21 No diplomatic
histories of inter-American relations address the Navy’s engagement in goodwill cruising
during the years of the “Good Neighbor Policy” under the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration. Moreover, none recognize in this activity the origins of U.S. public
diplomacy in Latin America, something most place either during World War II or the early
Cold War.22 And aside from a brief recognition by Joseph Tulchin that the Woodrow Wilson
administration sent a U.S. naval mission to Peru in 1920 for essentially diplomatic reasons,
scholars of U.S. foreign relations history have also been largely silent on the service of U.S.
Navy personnel in advisory missions in Latin America during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.23
As a work of U.S. foreign relations history as well as of naval history, then, this study
endeavors to demonstrate the centrality of these activities to the course of U.S. interAmerican policy during this period.
Studies in Latin American history have devoted greater attention to military and naval
aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations. The landmark work in this regard is Robert L.
Scheina’s masterful, broad study of Latin American naval history, Latin America: A Naval
History, 1810-1987, which contains a brief chapter on foreign naval missions in South
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How
Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars, Yale Historical Publications
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
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America between the world wars, but which, because of its breadth and careful attention to
the institutional development of Latin American navies, does not fully analyze the
significance of those missions’ work to foreign relations.24 In its brief four-page treatment of
the U.S. naval mission to Peru during the 1920s, Lawrence Clayton’s 1999 contribution to
the University of Georgia Press’s landmark “United States and the America” series, Peru and
the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, does recognize the mission’s significance to
diplomacy between Peru and the United States. Clayton’s work, however, focuses intently
on the mission’s contributions to Peruvian aviation (certainly an important contribution) and
does not address the broad, diplomatically significant work the mission did for nearly a
decade to directly overhaul other elements of the Peruvian Navy.25 The best treatments
available on U.S. naval missions in Latin America come, not surprisingly, from a Latin
American scholar. Jorge Ortiz Sotelo, a retired Peruvian naval officer and scholar of naval
history, has written superb accounts of the work done by the U.S. naval mission to Peru
during the 1920s. Much of Ortiz’s work concentrates on naval education reforms directed by
the U.S. mission at the Escuela Naval, Peru’s naval academy.26 In addition, he has produced
work (published in Peru in the Spanish language) that sheds light on the development of the
Peruvian Navy’s submarine force and other reforms enacted under U.S. oversight during
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those years.27 Ortiz’s work is remarkable not only for its attention to the specific labors of
the naval mission in Peru during the 1920s, but because it situates that work in the flow of
Peru’s domestic politics.28 However, neither Ortiz’s work nor the work of other scholars
operating within the vein of Latin American history places explicit focus on U.S. naval
missions’ significance to the course of U.S.-Latin American relations during Washington’s
transition from interventionism to good neighborism in the interwar period. This dissertation
seeks to draw out that important connection, and in so doing, make a valuable contribution to
Latin American historiography as well.
ORGANIZING THEMES

Several themes flow throughout this dissertation and form its analytical backbone.
First, it raises questions about the nature and development of U.S. empire in the Western
Hemisphere in the twentieth century. Throughout its history, the United States has sought to
influence the shape and character of inter-American relations. In the early years of their
nation’s adolescence, for example, Americans saw their own successful revolution against
Great Britain as an example for other nations of the hemisphere struggling for freedom from
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European imperialism.29 In 1823 U.S. President James Monroe was sufficiently impressed
by his nation’s position in the Americas that he unilaterally declared the Western Hemisphere
off limits to further European colonization, staking a claim to hemispheric leadership. The
United States remained an ambitious but strategically weak force in hemispheric affairs into
the late nineteenth century, when, strengthened by an industrial boom, Washington began to
stake a more active claim to leadership. In 1889 the United States convened the First
International Conference of American States in Washington, a meeting that produced
landmark economic agreements and laid a foundation for closer cultural links throughout the
Americas.30
Americans looked anew at their neighbors to the south in the early twentieth century,
increasingly convinced that maintaining a growing, vibrant economy at home required them
to take a more active role in managing affairs in Latin America. That emerging consensus
grew stronger for military-strategic reasons after the United States began construction on an
inter-oceanic canal across Panama in 1904. Upon its completion in 1914, protection of the
Panama Canal would become a central organizing principle of U.S. national defense,
confirming that Central America and the Caribbean were the heart of the new American
empire.31 U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt underscored this strategic reality in articulating
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his December 1904 “Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that American
interests in the region were so important that the United States would employ military force
to protect them if necessary.32 It was a turning point in U.S. relations with the nations of
Latin America, in the Caribbean basin and beyond. In subsequent years, Roosevelt and his
successors – Republican and Democrat alike – demonstrated a firm resolve to uphold this
commitment. Between 1900 and 1919, the United States deployed military forces to
intervene in its new Caribbean empire on twenty-six different occasions to protect U.S.
interests and enforce order.33 The era of American “gunboat diplomacy” had begun.34
The high costs of World War I, both in blood and in treasure, caused the United
States to reevaluate the nature of its Caribbean empire. For nearly two decades the empire
had been maintained by force, threatened and actual, and by war’s end Americans were tiring
of the expensive, open-ended commitments their government was making to occupation
operations in countries like Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. They were also
increasingly convinced that, devastated by four years of savage warfare, European nations
were unlikely to pose any significant threat to U.S. interests in the region. Both the
Democratic and Republican parties read the prevailing public sentiment and quietly dropped
all approving mentions of interventionist operations from their election year platforms in
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1920.35 A consensus began to form in Washington that the United States should cultivate a
broad political stability in region favorable to its interests without resorting to force. That
consensus strengthened throughout the decade as Latin American resentment at U.S. gunboat
diplomacy mounted. That anger boiled over when the issue of U.S. interventionism came up
for discussion at the Sixth International Conference of American States in Havana in 1928,
where a chorus of “anti-American diatribes” from Latin American delegates convinced U.S.
diplomats that they had to find a new basis for U.S. policy toward Latin America, and fast.36
Thus accelerated the turn in U.S. policy away from armed intervention in Latin America that
would culminate with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s declaration of a non-interventionist
“Good Neighbor Policy” in 1933.
But at the same time that U.S. policymakers were orchestrating the beginnings of a
pullback from the Caribbean, initiating a fundamental transformation in the American
empire, they became intent on significantly expanding the United States’ commercial and
strategic influence further south in Latin America – on the South American continent. Prior
to the end of World War I, South America had been firmly on the outside of the U.S. empire.
For years the concentration of American economic and security interests in the Caribbean
and Central America had made it unnecessary for U.S. officials to contemplate extending
gunboat diplomacy missions further south.37 Moreover, in terms of commercial and military

35

Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1998), 252.
36

Langley, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere, 131-32.

37

This conclusion was reinforced by the hard reality that, for much of this time, the U.S. Navy’s capability to
project naval power around South America was severely limited. James R. Holmes notes that, in the early 20th
century, “U.S. ‘jurisdiction’ over American affairs could go only as far as the military might of the Republic
would carry it” and that noted naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan maintained that “U.S. power ebbed as the
distance from its coastlines increased, especially when there were no forward bases to support power projection.
Logistics represented a severe constraint on U.S. Navy operations south of the Caribbean Basin.” See James R.
13

influence, South America (especially its east coast and distant southern reaches) had
historically been the purview of Europe. However, the unprecedented carnage that
devastated Europe between 1914 and 1918 led European nations that had maintained military
and naval advisory missions in South America (Germany, France, Britain) to recall their
personnel for service on the western front. At the same time, European trade in the Americas
fell victim both to wartime economic dislocations and to naval warfare that made the safe
passage of commerce across the Atlantic all but impossible. Together, by war’s end these
forces produced a collapse in European strategic and economic influence in the Western
Hemisphere.
Foreign policymakers in the administration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
viewed these developments as a grand opportunity for the United States, as did American
businessmen keen on exploiting South America as a source of raw materials and as an export
market for finished U.S. goods. The question confronting Washington at the dawn of the
1920s was how best to integrate South America into the changing U.S. empire: for practical
reasons, the empire had to be kept politically stable, but the American public was
increasingly uncomfortable with using armed force to do the job. It was amid debates over
these weighty issues about fundamental national interests that a request arrived from the new,
ardently pro-U.S. president of Peru, Augusto B. Leguía (see Appendix 1, Photo 1), to furnish
his government with a team of U.S. naval officers (known as a naval mission) to “reorganize
and direct” the Peruvian Navy. As this dissertation explains, over time U.S. foreign
policymakers came to view the naval mission that followed as an almost ideal type of
solution to the challenges they confronted balancing the United States’ aspiration to draw
Holmes, Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations, 1st ed. (Washington,
D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 81-82.
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South America into its imperial fold with prevailing political realities that made armed
intervention there inconceivable. Once in place, the U.S. naval mission to Peru gave
Washington the ability to begin expanding its strategic and economic influence on the
continent while at the same time helping to cultivate political stability without having to
wield the threat of intervention.
It is in a consideration of the U.S. naval mission to Peru that this study’s second
organizing theme, closely related to the first, emerges: U.S. relations with Peru during the
interwar period are best understood as an ongoing negotiation in which both nations, despite
wide disparities in economic power, military might, and political influence, exercised
significant influence over the course of the relationship.38 On its surface this might seem an
odd assertion to make, given this study’s use of the term “empire” to describe the framework
within which the United States has pursued its interests in the Americas. But in embracing
the term, this study’s analysis rejects the simplistic view of empire as a vehicle for the
outright domination of weaker nations by stronger ones. It accepts instead a more
sophisticated view of imperial relationships in which both the stronger and weaker nations, at
various turns, succeed in advancing their own interests despite the broad and persistent
inequality in power between them.39 Such was certainly the case in U.S.-Peruvian relations
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during the eleven-year rule of Peruvian President Augusto Leguía (1919-1930), a period
know in Peruvian history as El Oncenio.
From his first few months in office, Leguía, whose Patria Nueva (“New Fatherland”)
approach to national development called for developing intimate economic and political ties
with the United States, demonstrated a keen ability to leverage U.S. power to advance his
own objectives of growing Peru’s economy, settling its borders, and strengthening his hold
on power. These concerns led him almost immediately to seek a naval mission from the
United States, something that Washington, eager to expand its economic and strategic
influence in South America in the wake of World War I, quickly proved willing to provide.
Throughout the ensuing decade that the mission served his government (1920-1930), Leguía
used it to secure new naval arms from the United States, develop a national aviation system,
and counterbalance the domestic influence of Peru’s politically active Army. This is not to
suggest that, under Leguía, Peru’s relationship with the United States was that of an equal
dealing with an equal. Nor is it to suggest that Leguía got everything he wanted from the
relationship. Certainly he did not. Leguía would undoubtedly have preferred to receive far
more than the $100 million in foreign loans he secured from the United States between 1920
and 1930. Moreover, he surely would have liked to build a substantially larger, more
powerful naval fleet than was possible given his nation’s limited fiscal resources. But as this
dissertation explains, at every turn Leguía proved to be a shrewd negotiator in his dealings
with Washington, often pushing U.S. foreign policymakers further than they wished to go in
lending him economic, naval, and political support. The things he did through that adept
maneuvering to advance Patria Nueva during his Oncenio were significant, and do not
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conform to the results one might expect had Peru experienced complete domination by the
United States.
The closeness of the relationship Leguía forged with the United States points to the
third of this dissertation’s organizing themes: that there has often been a divergence between
the ideals the United States has championed in the Americas and the reality it has helped to
create. Most often, scholars have pointed to the years of the “Good Neighbor Policy,” World
War II, and the Cold War when assessing the origins of U.S. support for dictatorship in Latin
America.40 But in the immediate aftermath of World War I, as U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson trumpeted the ideals of democracy and national self-determination and labored to
create the League of Nations, the United States deepened its relationship with Leguía even as
clear evidence emerged of his growing repressiveness and ambition to establish a longlasting dictatorship. When, very early in his rule, he began shutting down opposition
newspapers, purging high-level officers from Peru’s Army, and imprisoning political
adversaries, the United States looked the other way and continued to give him material and
political support. From Washington’s perspective, the most important thing was that Leguía
was demonstrating an enthusiasm for U.S. financial and military methods, and a desire to
attract ever-greater amounts of American influence within Peru. In that regard he was unique
among Latin American leaders of the time. Expanding economic and strategic influence in
South America was the overriding priority of U.S. inter-American policy in the early 1920s,
and Leguía was seen by U.S. foreign policymakers as a willing partner who could help them
accomplish that goal. He was a member of Peru’s mestizo aristocracy, someone, U.S. foreign
policymakers believed, whose strong hand could corral Peru’s majority-indigenous
40

This case is made most forcefully by Bryce Wood in his follow-up to his famous work on the origins of
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. See Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor
Policy, 1st ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).
17

population and lead it to a prosperous future that for reasons of racial inferiority would be
otherwise impossible for Peru to achieve. Of course, they knew, an autocrat could better
protect American interests, as well.
Accordingly, throughout the 1920s, the United States intensified its relationship with
Leguía even further. American capital flooded into Peru, and U.S. companies secured
valuable concessions from Leguía himself to exploit the country’s abundant natural
resources. Meanwhile the U.S. naval mission, whose members became integral members of
Leguía’s inner circle and constituted a vital element of broader U.S. policy in Peru, cultivated
as close an association with the Peruvian Navy as the United States enjoyed with any naval
establishment in the hemisphere. By the late 1920s, such inroads caused American foreign
policymakers to see the entirety of the U.S. relationship with Leguía as a resounding success.
However, they also obscured the harsh realities that confronted Peruvians who opposed
Leguía’s rule, and gave U.S. policymakers a false sense of security that Leguía’s popularity
among his countrymen was following the same upward trajectory as Peru’s impressive
economic growth. Throughout the decade, U.S. policy became personally tied to Leguía –
helping strengthen his rule into the entrenched dictatorship he sought – and as time went on,
this association made it increasingly difficult for American foreign policymakers to see (let
alone comprehend) the deep fissures that Leguía’s repressive rule was opening beneath the
veneer of prosperity his economic policies had created. Thus did the United States openly
back a Latin American dictator, and clearly expose itself for the first time in South America
as a nation whose professed ideals and behavior were often two very different things.
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Finally, this study adopts a broad view of naval power and demonstrates the
importance of non-coercive naval activity to relations between nations.41 That is, it
emphasizes the diplomatic significance of naval activities beyond combat operations and
gunboat diplomacy, which together have tended to dominate treatments of naval affairs in the
literatures of both foreign relations and naval history.42 Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and
into the 1940s, the U.S. Navy’s roles advising the Peruvian Navy and conducting highly
public goodwill cruises to Peruvian shores constituted a large share of the overall diplomatic
give-and-take between the United States and Peru. During the Leguía years, the American
naval mission to Peru was a primary vehicle through which U.S.-Peruvian relations were
conducted. Mission members were integral parts of Leguía’s inner circle, holding positions
of high rank and authority in the Peruvian Navy. Mission personnel, especially their chief
(who occupied the highest uniformed position in the Peruvian Navy), often enjoyed more
direct access to the president than the U.S. Ambassador in the country. Not only did this
facilitate ever-closer relations between the United States and Peru during the 1920s, it laid
the groundwork for an extraordinarily close institutional association between the U.S. and
41
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Peruvian navies that would endure for decades even as winds of politics blew in wildly
different directions.
That mutual fondness between the two nations’ navies proved vital, for example, to
U.S.-Peruvian cooperation in hemispheric security affairs as the clouds of war gathered in
Europe and the Pacific in the late 1930s. The Peruvian Navy lobbied heavily from 1935
through 1937 for the establishment of a new U.S. naval mission to replace the one that had
been withdrawn after Leguía’s 1930 overthrow. Sent to Lima by the Franklin D. Roosevelt
administration in 1938, that mission paved the way for more intimate links not only with the
Peru’s Navy, but with its aviation establishment, Army, and political leadership after the
years of drift that had followed Leguía’s downfall. In total, these naval activities helped
fashion a security partnership between the United States and Peru that enhanced
Washington’s efforts to build inter-American unity and defend the Western Hemisphere from
external threats. Before and during World War II, elements of the U.S. Fleet made goodwill
visits to the Peruvian port of Callao that gave public expression to this emerging security
partnership. Meanwhile, in Washington, the U.S.-Peruvian naval relationship (and U.S.
naval activities in Latin America more generally) was a regular topic of discussion among
high-level officials in the Roosevelt administration who were charged with hemispheric
security efforts.
This is not to suggest, however, that naval cooperation always made for smoother
relations between Washington and Lima. Indeed, especially during Leguía’s Oncenio, it
often complicated the relationship. The fact that mission personnel served as officers in the
Peruvian Navy while retaining their rank and status in the U.S. Navy, for example, raised
difficult questions about what status they should assume in the event that Leguía’s
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government went to war with another nation or moved to forcibly quell a domestic
disturbance. It also blurred lines of authority and opened the way for some officers, most
notably aviation chief Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), to develop close, personal
friendships with Leguía that made it all but impossible for the naval mission to remain
neutral in national affairs beyond the Navy. This was true in large part because the Peruvian
president made it a priority to keep the naval mission – and by extension, the Navy –
politically close. It was true also because Leguía saw the Navy as the ultimate guarantor of
Peru’s security and territorial integrity, and made its expansion a priority of his
administration. Throughout the decade he effectively used the naval mission to advance that
goal – giving naval mission chiefs prominent roles in advocating for naval expansion, using
naval mission contacts to facilitate arms purchases in the United States, and, during the 1930
revolution that overthrew him, calling on naval mission members to take an active role in
preserving his regime. In each of these instances and in others, close naval cooperation made
American diplomats’ jobs more difficult. But just as the numerous successes did, these
complications demonstrated the centrality of naval power to the U.S.-Peruvian relationship.
AN OVERVIEW OF PERUVIAN GEOGRAPHY

To appreciate why naval power was so central to the U.S.-Peruvian relationship
between the World Wars, it is important to understand the dominant features of Peru’s
geography (see Appendix 2, Map 2) as well as the basic contours of its national history since
independence from Spain. Situated mid-way down the west coast of South America, Peru
possesses a coastline of nearly fifteen-hundred miles in length that stretches from Ecuadorian
frontier in the north to the Chilean border in the south. Hugging the coast is Peru’s arid costa
(coastal) region, a narrow stretch of land that ranges, on average, between twenty and ninety
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miles in width between the Pacific Ocean and the heights of the Andean mountains which
run the length of the country and form its dominant geographical feature. Home to Peru’s
capital city, Lima, as well as most of Peru’s mestizo population (persons of mixed indigenous
and European descent), the costa has long been the country’s economic and political power
center. It is a predominantly a desert land whose main contribution to the nation’s economic
life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as a provider of exportable raw
materials, the most prominent ones being guano (the calcified droppings of coastal birds,
used as an agricultural fertilizer) and nitrates (substances such as saltpeter, components both
of fertilizers and explosives).43
Acting almost as a wall, Peru’s sierra (mountainous) region runs the length of the
country, separating the western costa from the country’s vast eastern selva (rainforest)
region. Rising to a maximum height of more than twenty-two thousand feet, the Andes
mountains constitute a formidable geographical obstacle within Peru, and throughout its
national history, their persistent presence has significantly complicated the task of achieving
the economic, social, and cultural cohesion so necessary to modern nationhood. Seat of the
pre-colonial Inca Empire, the sierra has remained home to the largest concentration of Peru’s
large, vibrant indigenous population since independence.44 Throughout its national history,
Peru has had difficulty forging socioeconomic linkages across this harsh topography. As a
result, the sierra is economically and socially distinct within Peru, as is the even more
isolated eastern selva that it separates from the costa. Comprising nearly sixty-percent of
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Peru’s total geographical area, Peru’s rainforest region is home to less than ten-percent of the
country’s total population. It is a region rich in natural resources that Peruvians and
foreigners alike have long viewed, often misguidedly, as the economic future of the whole
country.45 Accentuating the selva’s appeal has been the fact that rivers originating there
combine to form the headwaters of the mighty Amazon River, South America’s largest
navigable waterway, which gives Peru direct shipping access to the Atlantic Ocean and
solidifies its claim to be a transcontinental nation.46 Still, largely cut off from the nation’s
economic and political center in the costa, Peru’s selva remains tremendously isolated.
Peru’s geographic reality, then, is that of a nation of three largely distinct
socioeconomic regions. Over time, Peru’s challenging geography has made overland trade
with neighboring countries very difficult. At the same time, though, it has made ground
invasions of Peru difficult propositions for potential enemies, and has done much to enhance
Peru’s territorial security. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the periods vital to
any understanding of Peru’s security orientation during the interwar period, these two
realities came together to accentuate the importance of the Pacific coastline to Peru’s national
identity. On the one hand, the coast came to serve as Peru’s most important economic and
political linkage to the international community. Its foreign trade and communications with
other nations of the world were almost wholly dependent on ocean-going modes of
transportation. On the other hand, though, this dependence helped make the Pacific coastline
Peru’s greatest strategic vulnerability. The latter would be demonstrated with devastating
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clarity in the later 19th century, when Peru and Chile went to war to settle a mineral rights
dispute centered in the coastal desert that spanned the frontier they shared with Bolivia.
THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC AND ITS AFTERMATH

The War of the Pacific fought against Chile between 1879 and 1883 was the defining
experience of Peru’s first century of independence, and did much to shape its economy,
foreign policy, and strategic posture well into the twentieth century. The war’s origins lie in
both the economic and strategic realms. Economically, it has roots in Peru’s development as
a nation whose prosperity by the 1870s was tied up in a single commodity: guano. Over the
course of many centuries, the rich marine life in Peru’s coastal waters and the extremely dry
climate that prevailed in Peru’s costa region combined to preserve massive buildups of
coastal bird droppings rich in nitrogen and phosphorous on small islands located just off
Peru’s central coast. The discovery of these deposits in the 1830s, some of the largest and
richest in the world, sparked a vibrant international trade as Peru fed surging demand for
fertilizer in the United States and in Europe. Although Peru granted concessions to foreign
companies to exploit the deposits, it retained for itself a majority claim to the overall revenue
of overseas guano sales – a development that kept the Peruvian government’s coffers
relatively full as the trade boomed from the early 1840s into the 1870s. Unfortunately for
Peru’s national development, wealth from the guano trade remained concentrated in the
hands of a small group of elite merchants centered in Lima, and did not result in a balanced
economic growth whose benefits were spread throughout the whole nation. This lack of
balance ensured that Peru would be in for economically difficult times when, as was bound to
happen, disruptions in supply and demand combined to slow the trade’s frenzied pace. By
the early 1870s, exporters had all but exhausted Peru’s valuable guano deposits. At that
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same moment, a global economic depression struck that sapped international demand.
Wholly dependent on the guano trade and without other sectors capable of carrying Peru’s
economy forward, the country sank into crisis.47
By the early 1870s, however, Peruvian and foreign investors had begun to discover
large, valuable deposits of nitrates (a valuable component in the manufacture of fertilizer, as
well as explosives) in the Atacama Desert that spanned the coastal regions of southern Peru,
Bolivia, and northern Chile. At the time, national borders were imprecise in the Atacama due
to the persistence of long-unsettled claims dating back to the days of Spanish colonialism.
The discovery of nitrates ignited an investment frenzy that quickly exposed the ad hoc nature
of the three nations’ boundaries. In the span of a few short years foreign capital flooded into
the region, and the three nations, sensing that the desert’s potential riches held the keys to
their economic recoveries, immediately staked overlapping mineral rights claims. In defense
of Peru’s interests Manuel Pardo, founder of Peru’s first civilian political party (the
Civilistas) and the nation’s first civilian president, nationalized the nitrate industry operating
in the Peruvian Atacama (the region of Tarapacá) in 1875. Among the nationalized entities
were several Chilean and European companies that had been operating under contracts
previously approved by the Peruvian government. The Chilean government saw Pardo’s
move as an affront to its national interests, and the level of bitterness and rancor among the
three neighbors grew. Shortly thereafter, Bolivia, the poorest of the three, sought to solidify
its claims by enacting a small tax (ten centavos per ton) on nitrates extracted by foreign firms
from its portion of the Atacama. Again the Chilean government took exception, seeing the
tax as a violation of existing agreements that Chilean firms had made with the Bolivian
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government. With its government’s backing, the Chilean Antofagasta Mining Company
refused to pay the Bolivian tax, a move that resulted in Bolivian forces forcibly seizing the
company. To Chile, both Bolivia’s moves and Peru’s nationalizations were unjustified
provocations. By early 1879, the Chilean government resolved to apply force to end the
injustices. In February, Chilean ground and naval forces moved to seize the city of
Antofagasta. Bolivia responded with a declaration of war, and in April, Chile responded by
declaring war on both Bolivia and Peru. The War of the Pacific was on.
As important as economic issues were to the coming of the war, though, one cannot
understand the countries’ embrace of military solutions without also understanding the
strategic reality of South America’s west coast in the years before 1879. Since achieving
their independence from Spain, Peru and Chile had each attempted, at various turns, to assert
dominance on their shared coast and exercise preponderant influence over the waters of the
southeastern Pacific. Throughout the early years of their existences as independent nations,
wracked as they both were with internal political and economic problems, neither nation was
entirely successful in the pursuit. The tensions that emerged over nitrate exploration in the
shared frontier in the early 1870s raised the stakes of this long-term rivalry considerably, and
sparked efforts in both countries to enhance their security. Chile was the strongest of the
three in military and naval terms, boasting a naval fleet with faster, more modern, more
heavily armed ships than the Peruvian Navy possessed, and an army that was better
organized, better equipped, and better versed in modern techniques of discipline, combat
leadership, and logistics. Struggling under the weight of a bad economy and heavy
indebtedness brought on by years of heavy borrowing compounded by the global economic
depression, in the years before the war the Peruvian government was not in a position to
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build its naval and ground forces to quantitative or qualitative parity with the superior
Chileans. Instead, consistent with Pardo’s preference to seek security through treaties with
neighbors rather than through expensive military buildups, Peru opted to ally itself with
neighboring Bolivia in the hope that, should war come, together their military establishments
could hold the superior Chileans at bay. In 1873 Peru signed a secret defensive alliance with
Bolivia, the terms of which required each nation to come to the other’s defense in the event
of Chilean aggression. It was Peru’s delivery on this promise in the wake of Chilean
operations against Antofagasta that prompted the Chilean government to include Peru in its
April, 1879 declaration of war against Bolivia.48
The War of the Pacific demonstrates as clearly as anything in Peru’s national history
the importance of coastal security and naval forces to its overall national security, for despite
the fact that combat operations continued all the way into 1883, the war was, for all intents
and purposes, won by Chile at sea in late 1879 – less than one year into hostilities. That is
because the mountainous, desert terrain and vast expanse of the Atacama Desert made
ground invasions from one country’s territory into the other all but impossible to undertake.
The only way Peruvian or Chilean armies could fully secure the other’s nitrate-rich deserts or
capital city was if their navies could land them safely on enemy shores within reasonable
marching distance of the objective. Thus command of the sea was essential to victory.
Accordingly, in the war’s first year, both Peru and Chile put the overwhelming share of their
war efforts into achieving supremacy on the water. In April, 1879 the quantitatively and
qualitatively superior Chilean Navy initiated a passive strategy aimed at blockading Peruvian
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ports, choking off Peru’s commerce, and denying the Peruvian government a vital source of
revenue with which to sustain its war effort. The problem with this strategy was that it gave
Peru’s enterprising fleet commander, Capitán de Navio (later Almirante) Miguel Grau
Seminario, complete freedom of action. The Peruvian used that freedom to maximum effect.
Throughout much of the war’s first year, Grau was unmolested by the static Chilean Navy as
he shuttled Peruvian troops from Lima to the southern front and harassed Chilean ports and
merchant vessels.
For months Chilean naval strategy failed to adapt to Grau’s activism, ceding the
initiative at sea to the smaller Peruvian fleet. Only when Grau’s best armored frigate, the
Independencia, ran aground in pursuit of a Chilean ship off the southern Peruvian port of
Iquique did Chilean fortunes begin to turn. By historian William Sater’s estimation, the loss
reduced the small Peruvian fleet’s operational capability by almost forty-percent,
accentuating Chile’s naval superiority. Although Grau remained an active and elusive
enemy, the war turned decisively and permanently against Peru in early October. That is
when a new Chilean naval commander divided his fleet and trapped Grau’s Huáscar, the
crown jewel of the Peruvian fleet, off Punta Angamos, just north of Antofagasta. Chased by
faster, more heavily armed ships, the Huáscar struggled to return fire. One of the Chilean
volleys struck the ship’s armored bridge, killing Grau instantly and depriving the Peruvian
Navy of the strategist and tactician who had kept its war effort alive against significant odds.
In a matter of hours, despite numerous gallant but futile attempts to outrun its Chilean
pursuers, the Huáscar succumbed. Chile had completed its destruction of Peruvian naval
power, and had won command of the seas. Peruvian shores were wide open to invasion.
Within a month, the Chilean Army occupied the Peruvian province of Tarapacá. Six months
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after that, the Chilean Navy put ground forces ashore further north in Peruvian territory at
Arica, depriving Peru of its last source of vital nitrate revenue with which to fund its war
effort. With complete freedom to act at sea, in late 1880 Chile succeeded in putting more
than ten thousand ground troops ashore near Lima. Within two weeks, despite heavy
resistance from Peruvian soldiers fighting to defend their capital, the old city founded
centuries earlier by Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro fell into Chilean hands. The war
would continue into 1883 as Peruvian forces took to the mountains of the sierra to mount a
guerilla resistance. But those actions, as effective as they sometimes were in a tactical sense,
ultimately proved to be strategically fruitless. In losing the naval war, Peru had completely
lost the ability to defend its territory. With it, Peru had lost the wider war.49
Chile’s victory in the War of the Pacific was a total one, and in many ways serves as
confirmation of the old adage “to the victor belong the spoils.” The Treaty of Ancón
concluded on October 20, 1883 confirmed nearly all of Chile’s wartime gains. It forced Peru
to permanently cede its nitrate-rich Tarapacá region, and validated Chile’s absorption of
Bolivia’s Pacific coast – turning the nation named for Simon Bolivar, the liberator of South
America, into the continent’s second landlocked nation (Paraguay was the first). The Treaty
failed, however, to settle all of the belligerents’ concerns. It delayed action on the fates of
the coastal Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica, at the north end of the Atacama Desert,
and instead left them up to settlement by a plebiscite to be held within ten years. When held,
the vote was supposed to determine whether the provinces should be ceded to Chile or
returned to Peruvian control. In the meantime, over Peruvian objections victorious Chilean
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forces were allowed to occupy both provinces. As Chapter 2 will discuss, this awkward
arrangement (de jure neutrality, supervised by de facto Chilean control) virtually ensured that
no plebiscite would be held within the timeframe specified by the Treaty of Ancón. It all but
guaranteed that the issue would continue to roil Peruvian-Chilean relations well into the
twentieth century.
Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific shaped the basic contours of its foreign and
defense policies from the late nineteenth century into the twentieth. The loss of its southernmost province was a bitter pill that, for decades, steeled Peruvian resolve to hold on to Tacna
and Arica. As a result, a succession of Peruvian governments between 1883 and 1919 made
breaking the impasse over Tacna and Arica a priority.50 Peruvian insistence on retaining
both provinces ran headlong into patient indifference from Chile, whose forces already
occupied both. The result was a long-term diplomatic stalemate that Peruvians considered an
affront to their national honor. At the same time, Peruvians began to take stock of the
military and naval lessons of their defeat. Although military concerns were largely
overshadowed by considerable turbulence in Peruvian politics in the late 1880s and early
1890s, Peru’s leaders began to express grave concerns over Chile’s postwar efforts to
modernize and expand its Army and Navy. Particularly alarming to Peru was the fact that
Chile had begun employing German military and naval advisers in 1885. Painfully aware
that military and naval inferiority had been at the heart of their recent defeat, and convinced
that their nation could benefit from outside assistance, Peruvians also turned to foreign
advisers. Because a ground war seemed likely if diplomacy failed to break the stalemate on
Tacna and Arica, Peru turned first to augmenting its Army, welcoming a mission of advisers
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from the French Army in 1895. The move inaugurated a close institutional relationship that
would last with few interruptions until World War II. Not until Augusto Leguía came to
power in July of 1919, however, did a Peruvian president view the long-running Tacna-Arica
controversy and the nation’s military-strategic challenges as parts of an integrated whole.
Armed with a keen awareness of the War of the Pacific’s clearest strategic lesson, Leguía set
out to make Peru’s Navy equal to the task of serving as the ultimate guarantor of Peruvian
security.
STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY

This dissertation proceeds in a roughly chronological fashion. Chapter 1 assesses the
unique conditions that gave rise to the U.S. naval mission sent to Peru in 1920, and how a
convergence of interests between the United States and Peru shaped the mission and its work.
Specifically, it discusses growing U.S. economic and strategic interests in South America
after the First World War, and analyzes the ways in which the ardently pro-American Leguía
believed securing a U.S. naval mission would advance his particular interests for Peru’s
security and economic development. Chapter 2 describes the work that the U.S. naval
mission did to overhaul and reform the Peruvian Navy from the time of its arrival in 1920
until the Leguía’s overthrow in 1930 – a ten-year period in which, per Leguía’s insistence,
U.S. personnel exercised full command over the Peruvian naval establishment. This
treatment focuses specifically on the U.S. naval mission’s efforts to reform Peru’s system
naval education, establish a submarine force as the foundation of Peru’s naval defenses, and
create a national aviation system capable of furthering Peru’s security and economic
interests. Chapter 3 explores the specific ways in which the naval mission’s role in formal
command of Peru’s Navy often complicated relations between the two nations while Leguía
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was in power. It then addresses the challenges the mission’s status posed after Leguía was
overthrown in August of 1930, and traces how the violent unrest of Peruvian politics in the
wake of Leguía’s fall ultimately forced U.S. authorities to withdraw the mission entirely in
early 1933. Chapter 4 explores Washington’s search for new ways to exercise influence in
Peru and throughout Latin America consistent with its renunciation of armed
interventionism. Analyzing high-profile visits of U.S. Navy units to Peruvian waters, it
traces the origins of the policy of employing goodwill cruises by U.S. naval ships to help
promote good neighborism during the Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt
administrations. And finally, Chapter 5 assesses how the United States utilized both of the
types of naval diplomacy it had fashioned during the interwar period – naval missions and
goodwill cruising – to help ensure Peruvian cooperation in U.S. hemispheric defense plans,
as well as to forge a broad inter-American unity in the late 1930s and during World War II.
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CHAPTER 1: A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS, 1919-1921

The U.S. naval advisory mission that arrived in Lima, Peru in September of 1920 was
the product of a convergence of interests between the United States and the government of
new Peruvian President Augusto B. Leguía.51 For the administration of U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson, the mission was a clear and visible expression of a new postwar
commitment to expand U.S. strategic and commercial influence in South America, filling the
vacuum that had been left by European nations’ wartime retreat from economic and military
activities on that continent. Amid its efforts to cultivate a new order to ensure global peace,
the United States set about extending its Latin American sphere of influence beyond the
Caribbean to include the entirety of South America. Situated on the west coast of South
America, mid-way between the Caribbean basin, where U.S. influence was traditionally
strongest, and the southern reaches of South America, where European influence historically
eclipsed that of the United States, Peru was an essential focus of Washington’s influencebuilding effort.
For Leguía, who had come into office in mid-1919, developing a close economic and
security association with the United States was an overriding priority from day one. The
greater the U.S. involvement in Peru’s economic and security affairs, he believed, the better.
Thus, throughout his eleven-year rule he proved to be a willing partner in U.S. designs. It is
important to note, however, that while enthusiastically cooperative, Leguía was no mere
vassal of Washington. Over the course of his eleven-year rule (known to Peruvian history as
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El Oncenio) he pursued an unprecedented level of economic and security cooperation with
the nation he often referred to as “the great republic of the north,” and did so for his own
reasons. The U.S. capital and expertise he attracted to Peru was calculated to advance his
own distinct vision of a stable, secure, and prosperous future for Peru. To realize that goal,
Leguía believed, he had to deepen Peru’s trade and financial ties to the United States, resolve
his nation’s several border disputes with neighbors, and consolidate his hold on power. As
this chapter will discuss, he saw naval advisers from the United States as essential to
achieving each of these three objectives.
LOOKING SOUTH: U.S. INTERESTS AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR

The United States emerged from the First World War as the strongest of the
victorious Allies in economic and military terms, determined to establish a new, peaceful
global political order and an open capitalist economic world defined by equal access to raw
materials and export markets, and equal opportunities for trade and investment.52 Officials in
the Woodrow Wilson administration believed that, more than at any time in the nation’s
history, wartime dislocations in international commerce had demonstrated the importance of
a robust and growing foreign trade to the basic health of the U.S. economy. As historian
Michael Krenn notes, the disruption of U.S. trade at the outset of World War I had briefly
“paralyzed” business in the United States and “brought home the necessity of overseas
commerce with ‘compelling force’.”53 The solution, they increasingly believed, was to use
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the power of the U.S. government to promote trade expansion overseas.54 Accordingly, U.S.
officials began to embrace the idea that the nation’s military and naval power could be proper
tools for helping to advance American economic interests and expand U.S. strategic
influence. European nations had long sent military and naval advisory missions to South
America on the belief that helping to improve other countries’ military and naval
establishments made for smoother, more productive diplomatic relations and facilitated
expanded trade.55 Keen on dramatically expanding U.S. trade in the aftermath of World War
I, especially in Latin America, officials in Wilson’s State Department began to see naval and
military missions as useful accompaniments to U.S. economic policy.56
Latin America as a whole, and South America specifically, occupied a central place
within Wilson’s open world economic vision. To a greater degree than other areas of the
globe, U.S. foreign policymakers agreed, greater trade with South America could help the
nation address two pressing postwar needs: first, the continent could grow into a valuable
export market for American manufactured goods, and more importantly, it could supply U.S.
industry with a nearly endless supply of vital raw materials.57 Both would be essential if, as
the Wilson administration hoped, the United States was to moderate the dramatic swings that

54

Emily Rosenberg argues that, like their predecessors, Woodrow Wilson and his advisers “continued to view
strategic and economic concerns as inseparable.” In 1915 Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, wrote
that “commercial expansion and success are closely interwoven with political domination over the territory
which is being exploited” and suggested that the extension of U.S. economic influence over Latin America was
“the best way to strengthen America’s strategic posture.” See Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading the American
Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945, 1st ed., American Century Series (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1982), 63-64.
55

Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History, 1810-1987, 127-28.

56

Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America, 35.

57

Krenn, U.S. Policy Toward Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917-1929, 9-13. See also Tulchin, The
Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.
35

had characterized its cyclical boom-bust economic performance over the past half-century.58
As a coastal nation with a varied geography and a wide variety of accessible, exportable
natural resources, the Andean nation of Peru was integral to Washington’s plans. Peru
appeared especially attractive to U.S. foreign policymakers because its largest pre-war
trading partner, Great Britain, had proven unable to maintain its substantial trade presence
there amid the economic and demographic devastation of World War I. Britain’s overall
share of Latin America’s foreign trade, for example, had fallen from 29-percent to 20-percent
during the war. By 1920 British purchases of Peruvian exports were off 10-percent from
1900 highs, while Peruvian imports of British manufactured goods fell 32-percent during the
same period. The United States had had considerable success filling the void in Peru’s
wartime trade, as U.S. purchases of Peruvian exports increased by 13-percent between 1914
and 1919 while Peruvian purchases of U.S. manufactured goods during the war more than
doubled. By war’s end, the United States supplied more than 60-percent of Peru’s imports,
and even though these wartime heights would ultimately prove unsustainable, they signaled
an important trend: by the end of World War I, the United States had supplanted Britain as
the dominant force in Peru’s international trade relations.59
At the same time, Peru was becoming a strategic concern for U.S. military leaders,
who looked toward South America after World War I with a mix of optimism and concern.
They shared in the State Department’s hope that, with Europe in disarray and U.S. power
ascendant, the United States could expand its strategic influence in the hemisphere far
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beyond its traditional bounds in Central America and the Caribbean.60 They were also
concerned that European military and naval influence in South America, which had been
considerable before the war, might regenerate and become a menace to U.S. interests on the
continent in the postwar years. France, Germany, and Great Britain had all maintained
military or naval missions in South America in the decades before the war.61 The fact that
none of these three nations (which were in the midst of postwar reconstruction efforts)
possessed the capability to resume their military and naval advising missions in South
America immediately following the war, however, did not assuage U.S. military leaders’
fears that they might once again send missions in an attempt to reopen the hemisphere to
European commercial dominance. In this regard, Britain was the object of greatest concern.
U.S. military leaders viewed British activities in South America with “marked uneasiness,”
historian Joseph Tulchin has argued, and were especially concerned about potential sales of
British military and naval equipment to South American nations and the possible
construction of new British coaling stations on Latin American shores. It was these fears,
coupled with broader concerns that U.S. Navy leaders had about their institution’s place in
postwar American life, that ultimately caused them to embrace the idea of sending naval
missions overseas. Such missions, Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels acknowledged, would
help the United States “cultivate close diplomatic and commercial relations with South
60
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American countries” and would help improve the general “international situation”
throughout Latin America. Moreover, naval missions would give the Navy an important role
in the nation’s peacetime diplomacy.62
For economic, diplomatic, and security reasons, then, the Wilson administration was
primed to respond favorably when word reached Washington in October 1919 that Leguía
would formally request a U.S. naval mission for Peru. Such a mission promised to give the
United States a great deal of influence in a Latin American country outside of the Caribbean,
the area where U.S. influence in the hemisphere had traditionally been strongest.63 Leguía’s
ardently pro-U.S. orientation and Peru’s geographic location made it an attractive destination.
Sending a mission to Peru would help establish a different kind of military involvement in
Latin America than U.S. authorities had, by then, grown accustomed to exercising. Between
1900 and 1919, Washington had dispatched military forces to Latin American nations (none
south of the Caribbean) to protect U.S. interests and enforce order on twenty-six different
occasions.64 While many of those interventions had been brief, several, including those in
Nicaragua (1912), Haiti (1915), and the Dominican Republic (1916), had gone on for years
and required sustained, costly commitments of American military assets.65 In the wake of
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World War I, when Americans had interceded for the first time in a European ground war,
U.S. foreign policymakers accurately sensed that American public opinion was tiring of
interventionism and would not support it indefinitely as an instrument of the nation’s
diplomacy.66 Although the United States would not formally renounce interventionism in the
Americas until the early 1930s, declining public support for such operations in the Caribbean
made it impossible for U.S. foreign policymakers to consider using military intervention to
advance Washington’s post-World War I objectives further south in the hemisphere. By and
large, the State Department was not as deeply concerned about a resurgent European military
presence in Latin America as Navy leaders were, and believed that, going forward, it would
be unnecessary for the United States to seek formal imperial control over South American
nations in order to protect its strategic and commercial interests on that continent.67 To the
diplomats, a mission of U.S. naval officers serving in a friendly capacity at the invitation of
the Peruvian government represented a clear departure from traditional interventionism: it
would give the United States a beachhead for growing its strategic and commercial influence
in South America, but would not represent a coercive use of force. Thus, they believed,
Washington would not be opening itself up to the familiar charges of “Yankee imperialism”
that had long emanated from Central America and the Caribbean. In short, as a U.S. Navy
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history of American naval missions would later conclude, in the 1920s, for the first time it
became national policy to employ an arm of the United States military establishment to
supplement “the development and expansion of our trade and political relations” and to give
practical expression to previously “abstract expressions” of Pan-Americanism.68
PERUVIAN INTERESTS: FINANCIAL AND TRADE TIES

Washington’s designs to further expand its trade, investment, and military influence
in South America aligned well with the designs of Peruvian President Augusto Leguía, who
came into office in July 1919 with three overriding objectives: 1) spurring economic growth
through deepened financial and trade ties to the United States; 2) reaching favorable
resolutions to Peru’s unsettled border disputes, especially with Chile; and 3) entrenching
himself in power. The first of these did much to frame Peru’s foreign relations from very
early on. Having served one previous term (1908-1912) as Peru's president, Leguía returned
from exile to win the office again in 1919 on a Patria Nueva (“new fatherland”) platform that
staked Peru’s economic future on export-led growth in its extractive industries (principally
oil and minerals), the expansion of Peru’s transportation and communications infrastructure,
and a substantial expansion of the nation’s social safety net.69 Essential to Leguía’s vision of
a prosperous future for Peru was widespread foreign involvement in the inner workings of
both the Peruvian economy and government. In his assessment, infusions of foreign capital
were necessary to give industrial and infrastructure projects the boost they needed to
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overcome the nation’s difficult geography, which had long kept Peru’s coastal, mountainous,
and eastern rainforest regions divided into economically distinct regions. Similarly, he
viewed foreign technical expertise as Peru’s only hope both for advancing into the realm of
“modern” nations and for overcoming the longstanding socioeconomic divisions that flowed
from the racial and cultural makeup of Peruvian society. For both capital and technical
expertise Leguía looked first and foremost toward the United States.70 It was a familiar
pattern: during his first presidential tenure Leguía had devoted considerable energy to
securing U.S. commercial and government loans to finance his administration's programs,
and had invited educators from the United States to assume key positions of responsibility
within Peru's public education establishment.71
During his second tenure (1919-1930), these same patterns would reemerge on a
much larger scale. Between 1920 and 1929, for example, U.S. banks and private firms
loaned Leguía’s government more than $100 million to finance the ambitious public works,
rail and highway construction, and defense projects that were central to the Patria Nueva
idea.72 Often these loans were made through the sale of bonds in the United States, bonds
that, on the one hand, were highly profitable for the brokers who gathered substantial
commissions on their sale, but that, on the other, saddled Peru with an increasing debt load

70

In an early conversation with the U.S. Minister in Lima in the fall of 1919, Leguía “expressed the hope that
[the] great development which is inevitable in Peru will be participated in by capitalists of the United States.
He is credited with being friendly with all foreigners in Peru, and of being very friendly to foreign enterprises
and the introduction of foreign capital.” See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Vol. II (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 735. Hereafter, Foreign Relations of the United States volumes are
cited as FRUS.
71

James C. Carey, Peru and the United States, 1900-1962, International studies of the Committee on
International Relations, University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964),
24-26.
72

Ibid., 72. Carey includes a chart of all the major loans floated by U.S. banks to Leguía’s government between
1921 and 1928, totaling more than $100 million.
41

that would be difficult to pay back as the decade progressed.73 However, even as they left
Peru with a crippling debt burden, these massive infusions of U.S. capital (and the
infrastructure modernization they facilitated) did help foster impressive economic growth in
Peru during much of the 1920s.74 Moreover, they facilitated the importation of the U.S.
technical expertise that was so important to Leguía’s vision of a prosperous economic future.
The first substantial loan his government secured from the United States, for example, came
with the condition that an American be appointed to oversee the Peruvian government’s
fiscal management. This led to the appointment of a U.S. economist, William W.
Cumberland, as director of Peruvian customs, adviser on the government budget, and
member of the Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank of Peru.75 Leguía appears not only to
have gone along with this arrangement, but to have helped conceive of it. In the fall of 1919
he had made overtures to the U.S. Minister in Lima about establishing such a reserve bank,
and of having it led a U.S. manager.76 And on numerous other occasions during his early
years in office, Leguía made concerted efforts to attract North Americans with technical and
administrative expertise to Peru on the belief that doing so would pave the way for increasing
amounts of U.S. investment to flow into the country.77 To a significant extent these efforts
bore fruit, as U.S. citizens populated key civilian ministries and departments throughout the
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Peruvian government and, importantly, with Leguía’s blessing, took full charge of the
Peruvian Navy.78
PERUVIAN INTERESTS: SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES

To understand how a U.S. naval mission in particular fit into Leguía’s broader vision
for Peru’s future, though, it is also necessary to examine the foundations of the Oncenio’s
foreign policy. The centerpiece of that policy was a fervent desire to resolve Peru’s
persistent border disputes with its neighbors, and no border concern was more pressing to
Leguía and the nation as a whole than the longstanding one with Peru’s southern neighbor,
Chile, which had festered since Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).79 At the
heart of the dispute was the mineral-rich province of Tarapacá, which had comprised the
southernmost part of Peru before the war but which, along with a vast swath of Bolivia’s
coastal Atacama Desert, was captured and occupied by victorious Chilean forces during the
hostilities. By the Treaty of Ancón (1883) that formally ended the war, Chile was allowed to
keep the Bolivian Atacama and most of Tarapacá as spoils of war.80 The national fates of the
northern provinces of Tacna and Arica, however, were to be decided by a plebiscite held
within ten years of the Treaty’s ratification by both nations. In the interim, the Treaty
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stipulated that Chilean forces would be allowed to occupy both cities until the plebiscite
could be held, and this was the heart of the problem that made finding a permanent solution
so difficult. Unfortunately, the Treaty’s terms on the timing and conduct of the plebiscite
were not explicit, stating only that it should be held within ten years. The practical effect of
this ambiguity was that Chile could maintain de facto control of both Tacna and Arica
indefinitely until the vote was held.
The Treaty’s lack of clarity on the plebiscite question led Peru and Chile to arrive at
vastly different interpretations of the cities’ legal status when in 1893, predictably, the tenyear period passed and no vote was held. With the expiration, Peru quickly declared the pact
null and void since no vote was held within the specified timeframe. Chile, on the other
hand, claimed that not only had a plebiscite not been a hard requirement of the Treaty in the
first place, but that the ten-year window it specified was only a minimum timeframe within
which the determining vote could take place. The implication of the Chilean position was
that a vote could be held – or not held – at any time in the future and the Treaty of Ancón
would not be violated.81 While this uneasy status quo no doubt strengthened Chile’s de facto
hold on Tacna and Arica (both cities were occupied by Chilean forces at the time), the
unsettled condition of the dispute persisted and came to define the basic contours of
Peruvian-Chilean relations for decades to come. That the Tacna-Arica controversy, which
remained at an impasse when Leguía took office in 1919, would play a major part in Peru’s
foreign policy agenda in the 1920s therefore comes as no surprise.82
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Animated by a desire to gain the upper hand in that long-simmering dispute, once in
office Leguía channeled his enthusiasm for all things North American into a concerted effort
to secure U.S. naval assistance that would strengthen Peru’s strategic position vis-à-vis Chile
(among South America's major naval powers) both in the long-term and the short-term.
What he sought to do was leverage the power of the United States to enhance Peru’s national
security in much the same fashion that he was using cozy financial and trade relations to
strengthen Peru economically. In this way Leguía’s efforts to secure naval assistance from
the United States were entirely consistent with the central philosophical thrust of Patria
Nueva, a vital component being the importation of U.S. technical expertise and the promise
of close, sustained cooperation with Washington.
Leguía wasted no time putting his naval plans into motion. He began lobbying for a
U.S. naval mission well before the Woodrow Wilson administration had even extended his
government formal diplomatic recognition.83 In October of 1919, as he struggled to
consolidate his shaky rule after barely three months in office, Leguía approached the interim
U.S. Minister to Peru and signaled his intent to request a mission of U.S. naval officers to
“reorganize and direct” – not merely to advise – the Peruvian Navy, which he wanted to
improve and enlarge.84 In this regard the naval mission Leguía was contemplating differed
substantially from the purely advisory naval commission the United States had sent to Brazil
in 1918, a team of officers whose main purpose was to counsel the Brazilian Navy on the
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establishment of a naval war college.85 In December, as the U.S. State and Navy
Departments discussed the desirability of sending a naval mission to Peru, Leguía subtly
pressed Washington for action by making it clear to U.S. officials just how different a
mission to Peru would be: members of a U.S. naval mission to Peru were to have full
authority to reform that nation’s naval establishment, meaning they would act in an
“executive” capacity and exercise actual command over the Peruvian fleet. Moreover,
Leguía told the U.S. Minister in Lima, under his leadership Peru would “give preference at
all times to the United States regarding the strengthening of Peru in a financial, economical,
and political way.”86
Leguía’s proposal came as a welcome development to foreign policymakers in the
Woodrow Wilson administration, who had made expanding U.S. strategic and commercial
influence in South America the cornerstone of Washington’s hemispheric policy after World
War I.87 Indeed, by early 1920 Leguía’s Peru looked like the most fertile ground in all of
South America for postwar U.S. influence to take root. In mid-January Secretary of State
Robert Lansing pressed Navy Secretary Josephus Daniels to accede to Leguía’s wishes and
allow American naval officers to be sent to Peru. Given the broader thrust of U.S. policy
toward Latin America, he argued, the United States should not risk passing on the
opportunity and opening the door to the possibility that some other nation (presumably a
European nation with a history of military ties to South America) could step into the void and
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offer Peru a naval mission. It was a line of argument seemingly designed to provoke a
response. Coming out of the recent war in Europe, after all, it had been U.S. military leaders,
not diplomats, who had expressed the greatest concern about potential European military
encroachment in South America. Here, Lansing was reminding the Navy of that possibility.
Passing on Leguía’s request, he cautioned Daniels, would make it “more difficult to use our
influence toward the betterment of the international situation in South America.”88
The State Department’s position on dispatching a naval mission was decidedly more
aggressive than that of the U.S. Navy, which, ironically, was the agency expressing concern
about the diplomatic effects a U.S. naval mission to Peru might have on regional
developments such as the still-tenuous border situation between Peru and Chile.89 As
Secretary Daniels weighed the State Department’s argument, a debate about the diplomatic
wisdom of such a mission emerged among naval officers advising both the Secretary and the
Chief of Naval Operations. In line with State Department thinking, Lucius Bostwick
(Captain, U.S. Navy) advised Chief of Naval Operations Robert Coontz that Leguía’s request
for a U.S. naval mission should be “seriously considered” by the Navy Department even
though the United States could not hope to receive much immediate material return on its
investment. In Bostwick’s assessment, as in the State Department’s, the issue was not
immediate payoff but the expansion of U.S. influence, the fundamental questions being
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whether South American naval establishments like Peru’s should be “influenced by our ideas
or by the ideas and ethics of our possible enemies, whether we wish them favorably disposed
toward the United States or the reverse.”90 Another staff officer, Harry Yarnell (Captain,
U.S. Navy), acknowledged the validity of the State Department’s position, and recognized
that national policy dictated furthering the nation’s political and economic interests in Latin
America by “all legitimate methods,” including naval missions. But owing to the unsettled
border situation, he advised that the time was “unsuitable” for establishing a mission in Peru.
Another staff officer made the case more clearly: because relations between Peru and Chile
were “not cordial,” sending a mission to Peru “might easily be considered an affront to
Chile” and thus could prove profoundly destabilizing.91
Fearful that U.S. naval officers could become embroiled in a border war between the
two South American nations, Secretary Daniels at first came down against a mission. In
early November he wrote Lansing that, while he agreed in principle with the State
Department’s position, “the sending of such a mission could not be encouraged at any time
when the relations of Peru with any other South American country [Chile] were unduly
strained.”92 To the State Department, the Navy’s response was unacceptably cautious.
Secretary Lansing and other officials proceeded to apply consistent pressure to change the
Navy’s position. In late December, Daniels relented. He reiterated his belief that “the
present is not an opportune time” to send a mission, but in view of the direction broader U.S.
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policy toward Peru was heading, stated resignedly that the Navy would be “pleased to assist”
national policy by sending a naval mission “at such time as it is considered proper to do so by
the State Department.”93 Clearly, foreign policymakers in the State Department believed the
proper time had long since arrived.
As 1920 dawned, the Navy Department’s reluctant approval set the stage for a quick
consummation of the longer-term naval partnership Leguía had wanted with the United
States. Almost immediately, the Wilson administration began pressing Congress to pass
legislation permitting U.S. naval officers to accept employment from South American
governments.94 And just as quickly, Leguía began urging Washington to expand on the
commitment it was then only in the early stages of making. Specifically, Leguía wanted to
ensure that the U.S. naval mission chief (who would head the Peruvian Navy) was an officer
of sufficiently high rank to ensure that Peruvian officers, who may resent taking orders from
a norteamericano, would obey his orders. Leguía had bristled at Washington’s initial
proposal to make the mission chief a mid-level officer, an offer the U.S. Navy had made out
of necessity because it had few high-level officers it could spare for such duty. When, at the
State Department’s urging, Navy leaders subsequently elevated the position of mission chief
to a captain’s billet, the Peruvian president was still not satisfied.95 In a meeting that month
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with the U.S. Minister in Lima, he argued that the mission chief should be at least a rear
admiral, so as to avoid “jealousies” that might arise with high-ranking Peruvian officers.
Such problems had plagued the French military mission that had been advising the Peruvian
Army for years, Leguía maintained, and he was “insistent” that the mistake not be made
again within the Navy.96 Leguía soon backed off on this point, a move that appears to have
been related to the fact that, as of March 1920, the United States had still not extended
Leguía’s government the formal diplomatic recognition he so fervently desired.97 Perhaps in
an attempt to smooth the way for finally establishing those relations, Leguía soon indicated
that, after all, he would be willing to accept an officer at the lower rank of captain or even
commander – so long as the mission intended to train Peruvian naval forces “in actual work
at sea.”98 By May the United States had extended Leguía’s government its coveted de jure
recognition, and by September the U.S. naval mission was en route to Lima.99 The
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foundation for a more than decade-long naval partnership between Peru and the United States
was established.
As important as a close, cooperative naval relationship with Washington was to
Leguía’s longer-term security aims, his more immediate concern in late 1919 and early 1920
was procuring vessels and armaments from the United States that could help even the naval
balance with Chile immediately.100 In 1919 it appeared that Chile had recently acquired six
submarines from Great Britain and was in the process of acquiring additional surface vessels
to augment its fleet.101 If true, Leguía feared, these reports meant Chile was on the cusp of
achieving a position of significant strategic advantage over Peru, which possessed only two
aging, largely inoperable French-built submarines (acquired during his earlier presidential
term) and a thoroughly inferior surface fleet.102 The revelation of Chile’s emerging naval
superiority no doubt heightened Leguía’s fears for Peru’s security, as memories of its defeat
in the War of the Pacific and insecurities over the still-unresolved border dispute lingered in
the Peruvian national consciousness. As a new technology that had proven its worth as a
decisive instrument of modern naval warfare in the recent war in Europe, submarines
appeared to Leguía to be the fastest and most efficient means of increasing the lethality of
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Peru’s small naval fleet.103 Being deficient in submarines to Chile was therefore
unacceptable.104
The naval balance with Chile was such a concern, in fact, that Leguía had begun
inquiring about purchasing submarines in the United States more than four months before his
July 4, 1919 ascent to power. In March of that year, through an intermediary, Leguía had
sought basic data on submarines from the Electric Boat Company (Groton, Connecticut) on
the idea that, once in office, he might acquire several for the Peruvian Navy in order protect
Peru from a growing Chilean threat.105 He continued this push for submarines after assuming
the presidency. In the late months of 1919, even as he struggled to shore up his shaky hold
on power, Leguía unsuccessfully sought to contract with the Electric Boat for two
submarines.106 At the same time, hedging his bets, he reached out to Italian shipmaker
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Laurenti about the possibility of procuring several of its submarines, perhaps as a way of
strengthening his hand in negotiations with the United States (his preferred source) by
playing on Washington’s underlying concerns about resurgent European military influence in
South America.107 Several months later, just as negotiations with Washington for a U.S.
naval mission were coming to a fruitful conclusion, Leguía’s naval attaché in Washington,
Luis Aubry, approached the U.S. government directly about purchasing active submarines
from the U.S. Navy’s fleet.108 By mid-1920, however, the U.S. State Department had begun
to share in some of the regional concerns that had been expressed earlier by the Navy
Department: with a U.S. naval mission headed to Lima to take over administration of the
Peruvian Navy, it would be imprudent to approve more overt naval support (such as
armaments) for Leguía’s government. Taken so closely on the heels of the decision to send a
naval mission, such action could destabilize Peruvian-Chilean relations that had long been
tense over Tacna-Arica.109
This turn in U.S. policy set off a flurry of activity that clearly demonstrates both the
urgency Leguía attached to immediate naval expansion and the shrewdness with which he
moved to achieve it in his relations with Washington. Rather than taking no for an answer
and abandoning his plans to acquire submarines in the United States, in the face of Wilson
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administration opposition Leguía simply began working around the U.S. government by
cultivating closer direct ties with the Electric Boat Company and leveraging its connections
to New York banks that might have an interest in financing a sale of submarines to Peru. He
was encouraged in this regard by advice from Albert P. Niblack (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy),
director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, who was less reserved about supporting Leguía
with naval aid than his State Department and fellow Navy colleagues were. In light of the
Wilson administration’s opposition to selling Peru naval armaments, Niblack advised
Alfonso Pezet, Peru’s Ambassador in Washington, that, for Peru, “it was now a matter of
Peru going into the market” to buy submarines and destroyers to meet the nation’s urgent
security needs.110
This is precisely what Leguía set about doing. First, he agreed in principle directly
with Electric Boat to order four new boats of the 912-ton type, which at the time were the
largest and most modern submarines the company produced. To pay for the order, Leguía
authorized his naval attaché in Washington, Aubry, to negotiate directly with private banks in
the United States for a loan in the amount of $15 million to cover the purchase price.111
However, Aubry’s efforts to secure financing through banks in New York – aided by Electric
Boat Company representatives eager to complete the sale – quickly ran into trouble. In late
July one of the company’s vice presidents, Henry R. Sutphen, informed his superiors that
after meetings with representatives of banks that had interests in South America, the outlook
for a loan for the Peruvian government to acquire submarines was poor. He wrote that in a
meeting he had with representatives of the City Bank of New York, bank officials reported
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having turned down similar loan requests from Leguía’s government some months earlier
because of the Peruvian government’s “poor financial position.” In that earlier instance, City
Bank had viewed the loan request as simply too large in relation to the nation’s existing
external debt of $34 million. Adding nearly 50-percent to Peru’s national debt so its
government could purchase of vessels of war would be a mistake, the bankers had concluded,
especially in light of the fact that Peru had already “hocked almost everything she own[ed]”
and would in all probability be unable to repay the loan.112 Other banks shared this
sentiment, viewing the Peruvian government’s finances with a great deal of skepticism.
Nevertheless, Leguía remained “insistent” on obtaining submarines, going so far as to tell
representatives of Electric Boat that if he could not secure financing in the United States then
“the people of Peru will take the loan.”113
Sensing that the sale was in trouble, Electric Boat Company representatives went to
great lengths in search of a financial solution that would permit Leguía’s government to
receive the funds it needed to make the purchase. First, company president Henry R. Carse
floated the idea of seeking funds from a firm with an interest in oil exploration in Peru.
Under such a deal, he wrote to his representative in Washington, Leguía’s government would
grant an oil concession to a foreign (presumably U.S.) firm in exchange for the money
needed to purchase submarines.114 Although idea was consistent with Leguía’s Patria Nueva
vision of economic development, it appears to have never made it out of the concept stage
because Leguía had not given up on the idea of securing a large loan from a New York bank.
His preferred strategy was to improve the appearance of Peru’s financial standing in order to
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make it look more creditworthy to prospective lending institutions. This was the impetus
behind Leguía’s decision to have his ambassador to the United States deposit in a
Washington, D.C. bank the proceeds (approximately $2 million) from the transfer by Peru to
the U.S. Shipping Board of a German vessel that had been detained in the port of Callao
during the recent World War. Carse saw the maneuver for what it was – an attempt to make
Peru look like less of a lending risk.115
Neither this infusion of cash nor the oil concessions idea produced the financing both
Leguía and Electric Boat so fervently desired for Peru. Indeed, none of Leguía’s efforts to
acquire submarines in his first two years in office yielded the results he sought. But,
determined to build up Peru’s Navy, the Peruvian president continued to press Washington to
sell him naval hardware.116 As will be explained in Chapter 2, these early attempts laid the
groundwork for the successful submarine deals his government would conclude with the
Electric Boat Company – with the active support and assistance of the U.S. naval mission to
Peru – in later years. That those later purchases would take place at all given U.S. concerns
about destabilizing the fragile Tacna-Arica situation is yet another indication of Leguía’s
determination to exert some measure of control in his relations with Washington.
PERUVIAN INTERESTS: ESTABLISHING A DICTATORSHIP

While U.S. naval support became a visible symbol of Patria Nueva and clear
evidence of Leguía’s efforts to leverage the power of the United States in Peru’s ongoing
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difficulties with Chile, it also helped him strengthen his domestic political position and
establish a long-lasting dictatorship. Peru’s military establishment had become a powerful
force in the nation’s political life in the early 20th century. The Peruvian Army, for example,
had long been under the tutelage of a French military mission that, although it espoused the
French military ethic of obedience of military to civilian authority, was nevertheless imbued
with characteristics peculiar to the French Army’s overseas colonial service: a keen
awareness of its own institutional interests, a firm sense of social mission, and a penchant for
political activism.117 This mix of values took root and grew as the Peruvian Army
professionalized on the French model, a process most clearly visible in the golpe (coup) led
by then-Colonel Oscar R. Benavides against civilian president Guillermo Billinghurst
February 1914. Launched in response to Billinghurst’s cuts to military budgets and his
attempt to reign in growing Army opposition by arming working class militia, the Benavides
golpe demonstrated, in the words of historian Daniel Masterson, that Peru’s newly
professionalized Army “could not remain aloof from the nation’s partisan political struggles”
and “would enter the political arena once its corporate interests were threatened.”118 This
willingness to involve itself in the nation’s politics remained a hallmark of the Peruvian
Army amid both the political instability that followed Billinghurst’s overthrow and the
economic change that accompanied World War I. When Leguía looked to regain the
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presidency in early 1919, he naturally viewed Army support as a double-edged sword –
something he had to have in order to reach power, and something he had to carefully manage
in order to retain it.
In office, Leguía therefore sought to keep the Army happy while at the same time
neutralizing its ability to disturb his grip on power.119 In short order he initiated substantial
budget increases for the Army and, in a process that would continue throughout his rule,
began systematically purging its officer corps of potentially dangerous figures while
showering rewards on those officers he deemed politically loyal.120 Moreover, the energy
Leguía poured into reforming and expanding Peru’s Navy to strengthen it vis-à-vis Chile
played perfectly into his early efforts to weaken the Army as a potential source of political
opposition. In August 1919, after barely a month in power, he removed the Navy from the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of War and established a separate Ministry of Marine with a
political loyalist at its head.121 It was shortly after this that he began courting a naval mission
from the United States, promising its officers complete control over the entire naval
establishment. And only a matter of months after the U.S. naval mission arrived in Lima,
Leguía reorganized the fledgling Ministry of Marine to ensure that the North American
officers’ control would be complete. In a January 17, 1921 decree he established a Naval
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General Staff whose head position, that of chief of staff of the Peruvian Navy, would be
filled by the head of the U.S. naval mission. The chief of staff was to have “direction over
and administration of the entire Navy,” and his orders were to have “all the force and effect”
of directives that came from the Minister of Marine himself. In an indication of just how
close Leguía intended to keep the naval mission to the center of power, the decree stipulated
that the naval mission chief, as Navy chief of staff, was to attend all meetings the president
held with his civilian Minister of Marine.122 The Lima opposition newspaper, La Prensa,
called this particular aspect of the decree “a real resignation of the ministerial function” and a
“humiliating delegation of sovereignty,” but the result was just as Leguía had envisioned
it.123 The United States now had a direct, tangible stake in his regime.
With the U.S. naval mission in place and the Peruvian Navy firmly under the
command of U.S. officers, who even held Peruvian commissions and wore Peruvian
uniforms (see Appendix 1, Photo 2), the basic structure through which U.S.-Peruvian
relations would be conducted for the remainder of the decade was in place. Importantly,
Leguía had achieved his goal of linking Peruvian security, and the political security of his
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regime, to the United States. It was a favorable arrangement for the Peruvian president,
whose mutually reinforcing objectives at every turn were developing an ever-closer
relationship with the United States and consolidating his hold on power. Beginning in early
1921 Leguía set himself firmly about the task of achieving both. Through measures
substantive and symbolic, he continued to curry favor with the U.S. financial and political
establishments even as he moved to crack down on internal dissent. In 1921, for example, he
secured his first major loan from a U.S. bank, the Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
and, as noted earlier, received a North American as director of Peruvian customs and adviser
on government finances. A more sizeable loan from the Guaranty Trust Company followed
the next year – the result of productive lobbying both in New York and Washington, and a
success that paved the way for the much larger loans that would flow to Peru throughout the
rest of the decade.124 At the same time, Leguía sought to fertilize the growing U.S. economic
involvement in Peru with symbolic acts designed to ingratiate himself with the United States
and gain further validation of his rule. For example, on the occasion of three U.S. Navy
destroyer divisions’ visit to the port of Callao in January 1921, Leguía declared a national
holiday and arranged what the New York Times called “an enthusiastic reception, the docks
being crowded with people who commented on the fine impression made by the little war
vessels.”125 The next year, he presented as a gift to the city of Lima a copy of French artist
Jean Antoine Houdon’s famous 1788 sculpture of George Washington, as “a testimonial to
the American hero and to American ideals.”126 And later, in honor of the United States he
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declared the fourth of July a Peruvian national holiday and hung a large portrait of President
James Monroe (architect of the Monroe Doctrine) in the presidential palace.127
Leguía took these calculated measures as he continued to ratchet up pressure on his
domestic political opposition. Following an uprising in the eastern Amazon port city of
Iquitos early in 1921, he moved swiftly to crush dissent against his government, beginning
with attacks on the opposition press. In March Leguía accused the owners of La Prensa,
which had often been critical of his rule, of complicity in anti-government revolts, and
promptly dispatched government forces against its offices.128 Decreeing it “urgently
necessary to eliminate centers of conspiracy,” in a single day Leguía loyalists expropriated
the newspaper’s assets, assumed control of its facilities, and resumed publishing – albeit with
a strongly pro-government editorial bent.129 Such repression continued throughout the year.
U.S. engagement with Leguía’s government only grew as the dictatorial nature of his
rule came more clearly into focus. Indeed, the only debate that unfolded in Washington
regarding the naval mission as Leguía moved against his political enemies was what position
its members should assume in the event of revolutionary disturbances. At no point did the
State Department or the U.S. Navy consider recalling the mission, or even discuss whether
the United States should continue lending support to such an increasingly repressive regime.
The U.S. naval officers’ presence in Peru was seen too valuable to contemplate a recall.
Accordingly, U.S. foreign policymakers attempted to find a solution that would permit the
mission to remain, but that would ensure that American personnel did not become engulfed
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in a civil or foreign war that could prove embarrassing to Washington. The State
Department’s chief legal officer identified the heart of the challenge confronting U.S. policy,
which was inherent in the naval mission members’ dual status as officers in both the
Peruvian and U.S. navies: by the contracts the officers signed with the Peruvian government,
he wrote, they were for all intents and purposes Peruvian officers and “seem[ed] to be
obligated to fight for the present Peruvian Government if the necessity arises.”130 Such
involvement in a foreign nation’s armed conflict would be clearly unacceptable. Secretary of
State Charles Evans Hughes agreed, declaring that it would be “exceedingly unfortunate” if
officers of the U.S. Navy served in naval operations in support of a revolution against Peru’s
government, in suppression of such a revolution, or in a Peruvian war against another South
American nation. The obvious solution, he believed, was to develop more stringent contracts
when – not if – the mission was renewed after its initial two-year stint in Lima expired in
1922. Until that time, Hughes concluded, “the judgment and discretion” of the mission’s
officers should govern their conduct, and they “should never allow themselves to be placed
in a position, by the Peruvian Government, where they might be called upon to take part in
naval engagements in either domestic or foreign war.”131
That Washington did not consider withdrawing U.S. naval support from Leguía is not
surprising, given the amount of effort he had put into courting the United States, and
especially in light of the direction broader U.S. policy toward Peru was trending in the early
1920s. By the end of 1920 it was becoming clear that the United States was fully invested in
Leguía’s success. In December of that year, after more than twelve months of increasingly
130

See State Department Solicitor Letter to Secretary of State, February 15, 1922, RG 59, File 823.30/23,
National Archives.
131

Secretary of State to American Charge d’Affaires in Lima (Sterling), March 13, 1922, RG 59, File
823.30/24, National Archives.
62

close relations between Washington and Lima, the Latin American Affairs Division of the
State Department recommended that the Secretary of State issue some statement reaffirming
U.S. “intolerance” for armed uprisings against governments (such as Leguía’s) of
“established authority.” This was an ironic move, given that Leguía had come to power in an
Army-backed coup and received de jure recognition from Washington within a year despite
Wilson’s general policy not recognizing governments that had come to power by force.132
The deepening U.S. commitment to Leguía was based on more than compatible
economic and political visions of the future. There was a distinct racial component
underlying it that suggested to U.S. policymakers that Leguía’s dictatorial methods were not
so much a nuisance that U.S. policy had to live with, but, rather, were the right prescription
for the infirmities that had long ailed Peru. This racial underpinning is clearly visible in
correspondence between U.S. diplomats in Lima and Washington in the early 1920s. The
U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima in 1921, Frederick Sterling, gave U.S. views their clearest
expression in a remarkable dispatch to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes that
December – a moment when, amid Leguía’s assaults on his political foes, Sterling deemed it
appropriate to consider “what type of government is best suited to the development of Peru.”
Ninety-percent of Peruvian society consisted of either “pure Indians” or “mestizos,” he
wrote, and of the ten-percent who could be considered “white,” only one-tenth (or, onepercent of the society as a whole) could be “classed as intelligent, having a national
consciousness and a desire for the development of the country on modern lines.” This social
fabric, Sterling suggested, had long prevented “steadfast principles of government” from
taking root in Peru and had consigned the country to a history of chronic political instability
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and economic stagnation. Given this poor outlook, he urged, it was worth considering
whether or not “during its present state of civilization” Peru was “not better served by an
honest and progressive, if autocratic, administration” such as Leguía’s. After all, Leguía was
a son of the one-percent of Peruvians Sterling had classified as “intelligent.” And as the
ardently pro-American Peruvian president had clearly demonstrated, he had the national
consciousness and desire for “modern” development that Washington foreign policymakers
increasingly believed could only come from embracing the U.S. model of development.133
Moreover, Sterling continued, Leguía had the foresight to recognize that without firm
leadership, Peru would remain mired in the socioeconomic “weakness and inefficiency”
toward which its society’s racial make-up naturally inclined it. Thus, Leguía’s political
purges and deportations, attacks on the opposition press, and demonstrated “firm intention to
maintain his power at any cost” were, in Washington’s view, simply harsh but necessary
medicine. Sterling concluded that the dictator was “the ablest president that Peru has had for
many years,” and deserved the “entire support” of the United States.134 Thus did the United
States continue, through its naval mission and other measures, to involve itself intimately in
the inner workings of the Peruvian state even as it recognized the dictatorial nature of the
government its support was strengthening.
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CONCLUSION

The U.S. naval mission that took charge of the Peruvian Navy in 1920 was the
product of a convergence of interests between Washington and Lima. Intent on promoting
his Patria Nueva vision of national development, President Leguía believed that the
mission’s presence in Peru would strengthen U.S. investors’ confidence in the country and
would enhance its prospects for receiving the infusions of capital he deemed necessary to
facilitate long-term economic growth. At the same time, he saw the mission as a vehicle for
strengthening Peru’s position in its long-simmering border dispute with Chile, and by
extension, for enhancing the nation’s security. A student of Peru’s naval history, Leguía
knew that the mountains and desert comprising the Peruvian-Chilean frontier made a land
invasion of Peru from the south virtually impossible, and that, during the War of the Pacific,
Chilean ground forces had been able to land on Peruvian shores and march to victory only
after the Chilean Navy had destroyed Peru’s fleet in battle at sea. Thus Peru’s national
security depended on strong naval defenses. In Leguía’s view, having U.S. personnel in
positions of command authority over the entire naval establishment gave Peru the greatest
chance to successfully overhaul its fleet and achieve meaningful naval reform that would
render the Peruvian Navy capable of serving as the backbone of the nation’s defenses.
Strengthening the Navy as an institution, the president knew, would yield domestic political
benefits as well. Specifically, it would cultivate the Navy as a valuable political ally and
would aid his efforts to undercut the significant influence exercised by the Peruvian Army in
national politics. In this way, Leguía saw the presence of the U.S. naval mission an
important step toward consolidating his own political position and achieving the overriding
goal of entrenching himself in power.
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For its part, the administration of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson viewed the
sending of a naval mission to Peru as an opportunity to provide meaningful assistance to an
enthusiastic ally, and as a means of advancing its postwar goal of expanding U.S. strategic
and commercial influence throughout Latin America. The goal was to fill the void left by the
wartime retreat from South American military and commercial affairs of European nations
such as Britain that had historically maintained intimate ties on the continent. Leguía’s Peru,
with its seemingly insatiable appetite for North American capital and know-how, looked like
an ideal point of embarkation for putting this plan into motion. From the perspective of U.S.
foreign policymakers, a naval mission in Peru would help pave the way for increasing
amounts of American investment in Peru, and would aid in the expansion of U.S. trade in
South America. U.S. Navy leaders were initially less enthusiastic about the idea, but did
worry about a possible resurgence in European military and naval involvement in South
American nations. In the end, the diplomats and the sailors agreed that a naval mission
would be an appropriate tool for advancing U.S. objectives in Latin America beyond the
traditional sphere of U.S. influence in the Caribbean: it would give Washington an
unprecedented opportunity to influence an important South American nation from within,
and because it was invited by a friendly government, would not suffer from the problems that
had long plagued armed U.S. interventions further north.
To the officials in the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Navy who orchestrated the
naval mission to Peru, the potential rewards of this new type of arrangement were well worth
the risks Washington would assume. Early in the mission’s tenure in Lima, both agencies
acknowledged the complications that could flow from having U.S. personnel become officers
in Peru’s Navy – especially if, as seemed possible, Peru went to war with a neighbor or a
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revolution broke out against the Leguía government. Together, they took steps designed to
insulate the naval mission from these potentially dicey situations. They saw no problems,
however, with offering overt support (which the naval mission clearly was) to a dictator
(which, very early on, Leguía revealed himself to be). Unencumbered by any worries in this
regard, in short order members of the U.S. naval mission set themselves about the task of
completely reforming the Peruvian Navy. Their efforts would further strengthen ties
between the United States and Leguía, help fortify his autocratic rule, and lay the
groundwork for a fruitful long-term relationship between the U.S. and Peruvian navies.
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CHAPTER 2: THE WORK OF THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION TO PERU, 1920-1930

The U.S. naval advisory mission sent to Peru in 1920 was a primary vehicle through
which Washington exercised influence and promoted its interests in that nation during the
Oncenio of President Augusto Leguía. At the same time, it served as the principal
mechanism through which Leguía secured the naval assistance he wanted from the United
States, advanced his naval priorities, and ultimately, helped strengthen his hold on power.
That the United States and Leguía each succeeded in using the naval mission to secure their
objectives is clear from the things the mission accomplished during its more than twelve-year
stint in Lima. From the time of its arrival in 1920 until Leguía’s overthrow in 1930, U.S.
naval officers directed a wholesale transformation of the Peruvian Navy on the U.S. model,
establishing enduring organizations and traditions that have served, as Peruvian scholar Jorge
Ortiz Sotelo has noted, as the “backbone” of the Peruvian Navy ever since.1 Serving
simultaneously in the U.S. and Peruvian navies and enjoying complete authority to effect
change as best they saw fit, naval mission members threw themselves into the work of
instituting meaningful, long-term reform patterned on U.S. Navy values and traditions, and in
support of the broader U.S. policy goal of cultivating long-term influence for the United
States in Peru.
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The U.S. naval mission’s major accomplishments in Peru during this period fell into
three broad areas: the creation of a rigorous system of naval education, the establishment of a
submarine force as the foundation of Peru’s naval defenses, and the formation of a national
aviation system. Each afforded naval mission personnel opportunities to share knowledge
and practices in areas of recent innovation within the U.S. Navy, and more broadly, each
clearly supported the goals Leguía had for both naval reform and national development. As
it worked to bring about changes in these areas, though, the mission’s broad executive
powers did help open a fissure within the Peruvian Navy’s officer corps between younger,
more junior officers who favored the mission and saw its work as essential to Peru’s naval
future, and older, established officers who resented the intrusion of U.S. officers into their
ranks and viewed the mission’s broad authority over the Peruvian Navy as a subversion of
the nation’s sovereignty. Leguía’s repressive methods, including his liberal use of political
imprisonment and exile, helped contain much of the senior-level opposition within the Navy
for most of the Oncenio. Moreover, they opened paths of advancement to junior-level
officers who embraced the U.S. naval mission’s presence in Peru. These officers’
progression through the ranks did much to cement a positive long-term relationship between
the U.S. and Peruvian navies in subsequent decades.
BUILDING A SYSTEM OF NAVAL EDUCATION

Both the United States and Leguía viewed the creation of a rigorous system of naval
education for junior officers as the foundation for a meaningful, long-term modernization of
the Peruvian Navy. Early in the mission’s tenure this meant devoting considerable attention
to the reform of Peru’s Escuela Naval (naval academy) at La Punta, whose directorship was
deemed the mission’s most important detail. In order to successfully plant the seed of U.S.69

style naval reform, one member of the mission wrote, it “would be necessary to start with the
youth of the country” and build long-term support for change within the Peruvian Navy’s
officer corps.2 The reform program put into effect by the officer assigned to lead the Escuela
Naval, Charles Gordon Davy (Commander, U.S. Navy, who held the rank of Capitán de
Navío in the Peruvian Navy) reflected this goal of using the academy as a seedbed for longterm institutional change. Upon assuming the directorship on February 9, 1921, Davy
outlined a reform program focused on improving the academy’s academic quality, instilling a
focus on naval professionalism, ensuring that the school’s cadetes navales gained significant
experience at sea.
The challenges confronting Davy’s reform vision were significant. In a dispatch to
the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI, which oversaw the mission’s activities in Peru) near
the end of his first academic year at the Escuela Naval’s helm, Davy reported having found
the academy in deplorable condition. “Influence” outweighed merit in the cadet admissions
process; textbooks were scarce and outdated; examinations emphasized rote memorization
over comprehension; discipline was “lax” and poorly administered; at-sea training for cadets
was non-existent; and perhaps of greatest concern to the proud Annapolis graduate, there was
“little of the military or naval in the atmosphere” around the school.3 Davy immediately
sought and received from President Leguía both the authority to dissolve the numerous
boards and committees that had previously governed the academy’s rules and regulations,
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and the power to promulgate new standards “as he deemed advisable” for the academy’s
future administration.4 The subsequent re-writing of the academy’s rules and regulations
required an immediate two-month postponement of the start of the first academic year under
U.S. leadership, and resulted in a complete restructuring of the academy’s executive and
academic departments such that they “closely resemble[d]” those of the U.S. Naval Academy
at Annapolis, Maryland.5 Under the new structure, an executive officer responsible to the
academy’s director would supervise the company-sized student body’s day-to-day military
activities and administer discipline, while reorganized academic departments would govern a
new curriculum that ranged from naval engineering and navigation to mathematics, foreign
languages, the sciences, literature, and history. Such a structure was necessary, Davy
concluded, in order for the school to meet its mission of “giving the state young men whose
physical, mental, and moral aptitudes enable them to be officers in the first line of defense of
the fatherland: the Navy.”6
Davy’s highest reform priorities as Director were, as his initial restructuring of the
academy suggests, strengthening the school’s academic program and fostering a culture of
naval professionalism. Reforming the academy’s curriculum in accordance with U.S. norms
required, first, a substantial departure from the lecture-based learning model that had long
been dominant. It was a model, he wrote, in which course instruction proceeded from “rigid
outlines” while cadets’ workloads consisted principally of absorbing instructors’ in-class
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lectures.7 Davy instituted what he called “practically a reversal” of the lecture-based model,
one that required “more work” and “more application” from cadets and lightened the lecture
burden on instructors. To carry this reform to fruition, the academy would have to be
stocked with sufficient numbers of “modern” Spanish-language textbooks spanning the
entirety of the curriculum. It was a burden that Davy took up personally, translating a
number of U.S. Naval Academy and U.S. Naval Institute texts covering naval engineering,
mathematics, and the sciences.
Essential to improving the academy’s academic quality for the long-term was shoring
up both the cadet admissions process and cadet retention standards. Nominally governed by
merit, in practice the academy’s admissions process had long been “afflicted with certain
defects,” noted the professional journal of the Peruvian Navy, the Revista de Marina (which
Davy edited), in its November-December 1921 issue. Too often, new cadets were admitted
solely on the strength of the colegio (high school) diplomas they presented, the Revista
concluded, a method Davy believed did not take adequate stock of the entirety of prospective
cadets’ skills and aptitude. Not giving admissions authorities a view of the whole person, he
maintained, left room for influence peddling in the admissions process and permitted too
many “poorly prepared” candidates into the academy who had “no serious intention of ever
making the Navy their profession.”8 To address the problem, he refocused admissions on
clear physical standards and on the results of an annual competitive examination designed to
test academic aptitude. Candidates who met basic physical requirements would compete for
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a set number of spots in the entering class through an examination covering mathematics
(arithmetic, algebra, and geometry), as well as grammar, geography, and history. Following
that, candidates would be subjected to an assessment of their overall “presence” by an
admissions board that would score candidates’ education, general demeanor, and overall
potential to become good naval officers.9 To ensure that the academy drew the best qualified
candidates from the widest possible pool, and to overcome what Davy saw as the very real
problem of having a student body drawn excessively from the local area of Lima and its port,
Callao (which, in his view, undermined the Navy’s claim to be a truly national institution),
the new admissions policy also aimed to ensure geographical diversity. Under rules he
established, in situations where multiple candidates hailed from the same Department or
Constitutional Province of the country, admission would be granted to the candidate with the
highest merit as established through the revamped competitive examination process.10
As he moved to strengthen the admissions process, Davy also sought to address the
academy’s problem of retaining large numbers of academically deficient cadets from one
year to the next. For example, in his December 1, 1921 report to ONI, Davy noted that more
than 90% of the 1920 entering class (the last full class to matriculate before his arrival)
finished its first year academically deficient in one or more subjects. To ensure such laxity
did not continue, he approved three new measures aimed at raising academic standards: the
first raised the bar for “academic sufficiency” from 55% to 60% on graded work (the national
standard in Peru was 50%); the second required the expulsion or “turning back” of
9
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academically deficient cadets on an annual basis; and the third extended the academic year
from ten to eleven months.11 These policies took rapid effect. During the first year of
Davy’s directorship, 26 of the 71 cadets who had completed the 1920 academic year were
dropped from the academy altogether while another 30 were forced to repeat various classes
in order to retain their positions at the academy. Combined with the fact that only 17 new
cadets gained admission through the first competitive entrance exam administered on Davy’s
watch, for the academic year beginning on May 1, 1921, the result was a student body for the
school’s first year under U.S. direction of only 62 cadets – nine fewer than the previous year
and well below the optimum level of 80 that Davy thought necessary in order to keep the
Navy adequately supplied with junior officers in the future. Confident, however, that higher
quality was more important than quantity, he reported happily at the end of that year that the
academy’s new admissions and academic standards had had a “magical effect”: cadets
carried a larger workload and performed better, fewer were deemed academically deficient,
and faculty morale had improved.12
More rigorous academic standards supported Davy’s efforts to foster a culture of
professionalism at the academy. Instilling professionalism began, Davy insisted, with
strengthening the ties that bound the academy and its cadets to the Peruvian Navy. Upon
assuming the directorship he had complained that the academy had more the atmosphere of a
civilian university than a military institution. As a whole, he wrote, it “lacked a good many
of the fundamental principles of a military school.” Under the previous director, cadets were

11

See “Condition,” 1, 4.

12

See “Condition,” 5.
74

free to consider themselves “as boys at school and not as part of the Navy.”13 Davy therefore
took several early steps to bring the academy firmly within the Navy’s control. First, he
established a requirement that new cadets entering the academy take an oath similar to the
one taken by new midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, a measure intended to reinforce
the message that, by entering the academy, cadets were entering naval service. Moreover, it
would enforce that commitment by exacting a promise from new cadets to remain in the
Navy for five years after graduation.14 Second, he secured the dissolution of the academy’s
disciplinary board and reserved for himself, as director, the power to administer cadet
discipline – a power he called “one of the fundamental functions of command,” and one that
he had lacked upon assuming the directorship. Employing this power, Davy went after what
he considered one of the most damaging holes in the academy’s system of discipline by
doing away with weekend leaves that had previously been so liberally distributed that, more
often than not, a majority of cadets slept off academy grounds on Saturday nights. This was
a problem in practice, he reported to ONI, because so many cadets hailed from the local
Lima-Callao area, and because many routinely extended their weekend visits into Monday
morning (cutting into the academic and training week) without prior authorization and
without real fear of consequence from the academy’s disciplinary board. This ready access
to the comforts of family life for one day every week “effectively ‘undid’ any good work of
military development of the week,” Davy argued, and contributed mightily to the lax civilian
atmosphere which Davy saw permeating the institution. It nurtured a harmful perception that
cadets “still belonged to their fathers and mothers and not to the State,” he wrote, and more
13
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significantly, helped widen the chasm he saw separating the academy from the Navy it
existed to serve.15
Davy pursued other reforms in attempt to break those bonds of familial dependency
and replace them with a strong ethic of naval professionalism that bound cadets to the
academy, to the Peruvian Navy, and by extension, to the Peruvian state. Central to this, he
believed, was ensuring that the academy could provide for the physical and material needs of
cadets during their academy tenures, a particularly significant challenge in light of the status
quo prior to the U.S. naval mission’s arrival in Peru in 1920. Under its previous
administration, owing to scarce resources, the academy had maintained a policy that required
entering cadets to provide for their own uniforms, personal equipment, and to meet their own
food costs during the first year of studies – the idea being that the government would assume
responsibility for those costs in subsequent years. In practice, however, many second, third,
and fourth-year cadets were also left to provide for themselves because, as Davy wrote,
provisions purchased by scarce government appropriations were often distributed among
upperclassmen according to “whose families or friends could muster the required influence”
to secure them. This weakened the link between the academy and the Navy it served, Davy
argued, and created an economic inequality among cadets of an unhealthy and “most
pernicious condition” that endangered the school’s ability to meet its mission of producing
naval officers for the state.16 Given Davy’s desire to differentiate the academy from Peru’s
civilian universities as well as his insistence on drawing cadets fully into the nation’s naval
service, he deemed it essential that the national government shoulder the burden of supplying
all necessities cadets required throughout their academy educations. Near the end of his first
15
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year at the helm, Davy reported proudly that inequality among cadets was shrinking due not
to a massive infusion of funds, but to a “democratic” rationing of supplies by academy
officials. Moreover, he noted that although a shortage in funds had kept the policy from
going into effect, new academy regulations called for each cadet to receive an annual
allowance of 40 Peruvian Pounds for the purchase of academic and military supplies
“essentially naval in character.”17
Developing naval professionalism at the academy required more than meeting cadets’
material needs, however; it required strengthening the bonds of service among cadets,
between cadets and the academy, and between the academy and the Navy. An article in the
March-April 1924 issue of the Revista de Marina explained the importance of these linkages
to an effective naval service and a sound national defense. Written by a U.S. naval officer,
translated into Spanish, and republished from the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, the
article (entitled “El Servicio Naval,” or “The Naval Service”) argued that the overall quality
and efficiency of a nation’s Navy was derived principally from the “espíritu de cuerpo”
(esprit de corps) among its officers, which could not be developed through rules, regulations,
or decrees, but had to “come of its own accord through love of the service.” Love of service
took firm root, the author suggested, in officers’ aspirations to serve the whole nation in an
institution (the Navy) that “belongs to the people of the country” and is wholly dependent on
its people both for annual appropriations and for necessary “moral support.” In an incisive
passage which echoed the role Leguía envisaged the Peruvian Navy playing in the
socioeconomic life of Peru, the author further noted that, no matter how small or seemingly
unimportant, every action a naval officer took in the service of the nation contributed to
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country’s security and “protect[ed] its future development.” A healthy naval service infused
with sufficient esprit de corps was thus integral to the life, security, and prosperity of the
nation as a whole. As the Escuela Naval was in Davy’s view, in the author’s view the naval
academy was a place where the seeds of effective esprit de corps – abiding friendship,
brotherhood, and fealty to naval service – could take root and grow.18
In an effort to shape an environment conducive to the growth of an esprit de corps,
Davy instituted placed heavy emphasis on team sports and athletic competitions, and adapted
a number of traditions in effect at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. And to
strengthen cadets’ ties to each other and to the academy, Davy presided over the
incorporation of traditions similar to many in effect at the U.S. Naval Academy. Among the
most symbolically important of these was the adoption of the tradition of the class ring
featuring the academy seal on top, and years of matriculation and graduation on the sides.
Embraced for the first time by the Escuela Naval’s class of 1925, as the Revista noted, the
class ring would serve as a physical reminder of cadets’ experiences at the academy as well
as their bonds to one another and to the institution. Moreover, it would become “a symbol of
union and strong fellowship” among those who wore it.19 The adoption of a class ring
tradition followed closely on the heels of the establishment the year before of the “Class of
1924 Association,” formed by that year’s graduating class for the purpose of maintaining
“that spirit of comradeship that should be traditional among all who graduated from the
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Peruvian Naval Academy and, at the same time, to keep the highest ideals of honor, honesty,
truth, self-denial and enthusiasm for the institution.”20
While making efforts to forge a lasting spirit of comradeship among cadets, Davy
sought to focus the academy squarely on its mission of supporting the Navy, and on the
Navy’s mission of defending the nation. To this end, under his leadership the academy
adopted as its motto “Mihi Cura Futuri,” translated from Latin by a cadete navale in a 1922
essay as meaning “to me is entrusted the future.”21 In practice, this cadet wrote, the motto
drew a clear and unmistakable link between cadets’ academy experience and the subsequent
naval service all were required to render:
“I study to develop my intelligence; I awaken my spirit to strengthen my
character; I educate my muscles to increase my physical strength, so that
tomorrow, when I carry the noble title of naval officer, I can transfer this
knowledge – this moral, intellectual, and physical strength – to sailors whose
instruction or preparation is entrusted to me, thus forming in them the
knowledge and character without which it is impossible to dream of a
powerful navy.”22
Intended to reinforce to cadets that the academic, physical, and moral challenges they
confronted during their academy educations were preparation for future naval service, “Mihi
Cura Futuri” was also intended to instill in them an appreciation for the Peruvian Navy’s
reason for being: to prepare for and fight the nation’s wars. Cadets therefore had to prepare
on the assumption that war was an “inevitable” eventuality: modern war represented a
“struggle of minds,” and as such, the “national energies” required to fight it had to be
developed and matured over time and could not be the “fruits of an instant.” It was only at
the Escuela Naval, this cadet concluded, that minds and spirits of Peru’s young men could be
20
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molded into those of officers capable of defending the nation. For cadetes navales, then,
“Mihi Cura Futuri” was far from a meaningless generality. It was a concise expression of
Davy’s vision of the Escuela Naval as an integral part of Peru’s naval service. As the cadet
essayist concluded, its unmistakable meaning was that in preparing for the future, “Yo me
preparo para la guerra” (I prepare myself for war).23
To strengthen this institutional focus, and to ensure that Peru’s cadetes navales
received an “appropriate balance of theory and practice” in preparation for the rigors of naval
officership, Davy moved to require all cadets to participate in at-sea training early and often
during their academy educations. Upon his arrival he had identified the lack of sea training
as a significant flaw in the academy’s overall training program, noting that throughout their
entire four-year academy experience cadets “never enjoyed the advantages of service on
board ship” until they received their appointments as midshipmen following graduation.24
Together with his plans to reform the academy’s academic program, remedying this
deficiency required a complete restructuring of the whole institution’s yearly calendar
consistent with Davy’s promise that, on his watch, the academy would work “twelve months
a year and thirty days a month.”25 Months after taking charge of the academy, he approved a
new schedule that compressed the academic year from two five-month sessions into one
eight-month period (from early May through December), reduced cadet vacation from two
one-month periods to one (April), and established a full three-month period for sea training
during the summer months of January, February, and March.26 Indeed before Davy even
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welcomed the first entering class of his tenure, in March of 1921, he dispatched the
academy’s fifty-six upper class cadets (none of whom had any experience serving on board a
naval vessel) on a training cruise of the Peruvian coast north and south of Lima aboard the
Almirante Grau and Coronel Bolognesi in order to expose them to service at sea, acquaint
them first-hand with the nation’s coastline, and as a “reciprocal function” permit the people
of Peru’s port cities to become familiar with the Navy.27
Deemed a success by Peruvian and U.S. personnel in 1921, in subsequent years the
crucero de verano (summer cruise) became a mainstay of the academy program and a
cornerstone of the broader Navy’s annual training agenda. As an indication of both the
growing strength of the Peruvian Navy and the increasingly close naval, political, and
economic ties developing between the Leguía government and the United States, in 1925 the
annual cruise ventured for the first time far from Peruvian shores – to the American naval
base at Balboa, at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal. In Panama, Peruvian ships transited
the Canal and cadets visited U.S. submarine base at Coco Solo while the Almirante Grau
received repairs at U.S. naval facilities. A similarly ambitious itinerary characterized the
1926 cruise, which was the first to incorporate two new submarines Peru had recently
acquired from the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut. And, in a reflection of
just how close the ties were growing between the academy and the Peruvian Navy, between
1927 and 1930 the geographical scope and substantive complexity of the crucero de verano
grew even further: Peruvian cadets visited ports in Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
Honduras, El Salvador and Chile (in addition to Panama), and learned firsthand how Peru’s
surface vessels were beginning operate in tandem with Peru’s newest naval assets –
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submarines and naval aircraft.28 Indeed, thanks in large measure to Davy’s leadership, by the
late 1920s the Escuela Naval had become a bastion of naval professionalism and an integral
part of the Navy it existed to serve. Moreover, during the time of the U.S. naval mission, it
molded the generation of officers who, for decades to follow, would look favorably on the
United States and effect a long-term closeness between the Peruvian and United States
navies.
ESTABLISHING A MODERN SUBMARINE FORCE

The Navy became the linchpin of Peruvian national defense under Leguía, who saw
unresolved tensions with Chile as Peru’s most pressing foreign policy concern. Recalling the
War of the Pacific (1879-1883), he saw Peru’s coastline as its greatest security
vulnerability.29 In the decades following that costly war, Chile had maintained a significant
military superiority over Peru, the backbone of which was a pronounced naval advantage that
successive Peruvian governments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries proved unable to
overcome.30 Leguía saw in the relatively new and rapidly advancing technology of
submarines the potential for Peru to achieve significant advances in its coastal defense
capabilities without going to the expense of a major expansion of its surface fleet. In his
view, submarines’ ability to move stealthily while submerged meant cash-strapped Peru
could acquire more national security from a relatively smaller number of submarines than it
28
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could by purchasing a comparable number of new, more expensive surface ships. This meant
that even though Peru could not afford to build or buy its way to numerical parity with the
Chilean Navy, it could substantially narrow the overall capability gap with Chile without
breaking the bank. Thus did Leguía make the acquisition of submarines the centerpiece of
his plans for building Peru’s naval strength upon assuming the presidency for the second time
in early July of 1919.
This initiative to establish a modern submarine force in the 1920s represented a
continuation of efforts Leguía had made earlier, during his first presidential term (19081912), when the Peruvian Navy was for a time under the tutelage of a small French naval
mission, and when border disputes with each of Peru’s neighbors – including one with
Ecuador that nearly led to war in 1911 – made strengthening the nation’s defenses a central
concern.31 Seeking a budget-friendly way to quickly boost the capability of Peru’s coastal
defenses, during that period Leguía had accepted the French naval mission’s
recommendation to enact a modest, defensively-minded naval expansion program that
emphasized the acquisition of “small unit” assets such as torpedo boats and submarines. As
Jorge Ortiz Sotelo notes, such assets were capable of high speeds and possessed low surface
profiles that would significantly improve the Peruvian Navy’s ability to challenge enemy
capital ships along Peru’s coast.32 Moreover, as a commission of Peruvian naval officers
concluded in endorsing the purchase of two French submarines in 1910, Peru’s limited fiscal
resources made submarines the only immediately viable option for counteracting the superior
31
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naval power of potential enemies. In supporting the purchase, the commission noted
approvingly the words of former First Lord of the British Admiralty George Goschen, who in
1900 famously characterized the submarine as a “weapon of the weaker nation.” For a nation
dealing with unsettled border questions, experiencing economic upheaval, and facing a
persistent naval inferiority vis-a-vis its historical rival (Chile), the Peruvian Navy of the early
twentieth century found hope in Goeschen’s admonition that “the nation which possesses it
[the submarine] will cease to be weak, and will become really powerful.”33
The service lives of the two submarines Leguía’s government purchased from France
in 1910, the Ferré and the Palacios, were active but short. Both were decommissioned
shortly after the U.S. naval mission arrived to take charge of the Peruvian Navy in 1920, a
time when Leguía, eager to deepen Peru’s relations with the United States, had already begun
looking to replace the French-built boats with a larger number of modern submarines built in
the United States. Leguía’s strategic rationale for doing so was laid out by his naval attaché
to Washington, Luis Aubry, in a May 1920 public address in Lima. The submarine
represented an economical way to rapidly boost Peru’s coastal defenses, the career officer
and submarine advocate argued. He stressed that that the submarine’s value had been proven
by the fact that “the two most powerful fleets in the world were not able to do anything
against it” during the recently concluded “Great War” in Europe, and suggested that Peru
was uniquely positioned to benefit from the submarine’s acceptance as a weapon of modern
war. Echoing themes Leguía had struck while pushing for submarine acquisitions during his
first presidential tenure, Aubry argued that given Peru’s geographic position, unsettled
borders, and especially its unresolved difficulties with Chile, the nation could not stake its
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future security on diplomacy alone, but would have to back its foreign policy with credible
force. Submarines were the ideal fit for Peru’s precarious strategic situation, he continued,
because the nation found itself “in a state of incipient military and naval development”
relative to its likely enemies – again, Chile foremost among them. Moreover, Peru had
“scarce resources” it could devote to strengthening its defenses. A modest fleet expansion
whose centerpiece was six submarines, complemented by six destroyers, would solve “eighty
percent of the country’s vulnerability,” he concluded, adding that such a program would
constitute “the best insurance policy” for denying potential enemies all-important control of
Peruvian coastal waters.34 And, considering Peru’s greatest vulnerability to invasion lay in
its coastline, like Leguía, Aubry saw that submarines would help ensure Peruvian control
over the invasion route future aggressors would most likely take into the country.35
Leguía’s aim of making submarines a cornerstone of Peru’s national defense had a
substantial impact on both the composition of the U.S. naval mission and the work it
undertook upon its arrival. As early as the spring of 1920, when negotiations for a mission
were just getting underway, Leguía had informed Washington of his desire to receive officers
with expertise in submarine warfare who could serve as instructors for the Peruvian Navy.36
This desire was met in the person of Lewis D. Causey (Commander, U.S. Navy), a 1906
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graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who had commanded a submarine division in the waters
off Ireland and the Azores during World War I, and who had led the U.S. Navy’s fledgling
submarine school at New London, Connecticut, in the war’s waning days.37 With these
qualifications Causey was given command of the Naval Division (operating fleet) of the
Peruvian Navy and the rank of Capitán de Navío. And, as the naval mission’s resident
submarine expert, he was pressed into service almost immediately to provide Leguía with
advice on the shape of Peru’s future submarine force.
Clearly favoring the acquisition of American-built vessels, Leguía had delayed two
important decisions on submarines until after the American mission’s arrival in order to avail
himself of its officers’ counsel. First he looked to his new Naval Division commander to
weigh in on a proposal, which was already before the government, that provided for the
purchase of two Italian-built submarines. The proposal had originated with Lima’s
Asociación Naval Pro-Marina, an organization of naval enthusiasts that had long lobbied the
government for a stronger Navy and raised funds for naval acquisitions when government
appropriations fell short of desired levels.38 Convinced of the utility of submarines following
the European war, the Asociación had initiated a fundraising drive early in 1919 – before
Leguía’s July return to the presidency – to acquire new submarines for the Navy. By early
1920 it had raised enough money to enable the government to contract with the Italian firm
Ansaldo San Giorgo for the construction of two 430-ton submarines, and to provide a down
payment of two-million Italian lira so construction on those vessels could begin. On
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Leguía’s request, the naval mission examined the deal immediately upon its arrival, before its
members were even fully established in their positions in the Peruvian Navy. Not
surprisingly given Leguía’s inclinations and Commander Causey’s desire to remake the
Naval Division along U.S. lines, the mission found the Italian submarines’ specifications
inadequate to the nation’s needs, recommended that the contract be terminated, and called for
as much of the down payment as possible to be recovered for future use.39 Only weeks into
its tenure in Lima, the U.S. naval mission was not prepared to lay out a complete set of
recommendations on future naval acquisitions, but in voting to kill the Italian submarine deal
its members clearly agreed with Leguía that in the future Peru should look to the United
States rather than to Europe for such purchases.
The demise of the Italian contract foreshadowed the naval mission’s action on the
other pressing decision Leguía faced early on regarding the future of Peruvian submarines:
what to do with the aging Ferré and Palacios, which had fallen into disrepair. Employed
heavily in Peruvian naval exercises during their early years in the fleet (1913-1915), the
French-built submarines’ operational effectiveness quickly fell victim to the same economic
dislocations that affected much of South America following the outbreak of World War I.40
Specifically, during the war the Peruvian Navy could not acquire the replacement batteries
from France it needed to keep the boats supplied with electrical power while submerged.41
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Incapacitated by a lack of adequate power, the vessels were therefore in a highly vulnerable
position by the time a commission, chaired by Commander Causey, was appointed in April
of 1921 to assess their military value and determine their service fates. In short order
Causey’s commission found that the submarines’ condition was so far gone that the “the cost
of making them...of any military value was so great that it was inadvisable to undertake the
job.” The commission recommended that “due to their age and obsolete type,” the Ferré and
Palacios be decommissioned, dismantled, and that the materials in them be reused in the
construction of a future submarine base on San Lorenzo Island adjacent to the port of
Callao.”42 These recommendations, which helped clear the way for future purchases of U.S.
vessels, were entirely consistent with Causey’s broader assessment of the rest of the Peruvian
fleet. In general, he found, Peru’s surface fleet was similarly outdated and in poor condition:
all of the Navy’s surface vessels were considerably older than the two French-built
submarines and, with only one exception, he wrote, “had had no overhaul of any extent” for a
number of years.43
By the time he reported to Leguía on the Naval Division’s condition in mid-1921, it
was clear to Causey that the entire Peruvian fleet would require a substantial updating and
overhaul, and that Peru would have to acquire new surface vessels and submarines in order to
adequately defend its lengthy coastline. In the near-term, however, the country’s poor fiscal
outlook precluded even a modest acquisition program focused on the kinds of defensive arms
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(submarines, airplanes, and “a destroyer or two”) he believed were essential to ensuring
Peru’s future security.44 Importantly for Leguía’s naval ambitions, even as mission members
recognized Peru’s immediate fiscal troubles, they assumed that eventually the United States
would step in to help. Even though “the money for the purchase of any of these acquisitions
is not absolutely available,” Causey wrote, the plan “was to proceed with the idea in view of
making money available” in the United States for Peru’s naval purchases. Together with the
scuttling of the Italian submarine deal the previous year, then, the decommissioning of Peru’s
two French-built submarines before they could be plausibly replaced signaled that although
the time for substantial naval acquisitions had not yet arrived, the U.S. naval mission was
paving the way for that eventuality by doing away with vestiges of European naval influence.
The cause of the submarine in the Peruvian Navy received a considerable boost with
the arrival of Clark H. Woodward (Captain, U.S. Navy) as new head of the naval mission and
Chief of the Peruvian General Staff in July 1923.45 Within four months of his arrival,
Woodward, whose rank in the Peruvian Navy had been elevated by Leguía to
Contraalmirante (Rear Admiral), articulated an overarching strategy for Peru’s national
defense that formalized the Navy’s status as the unequivocal guarantor of the nation’s
security, and laid out a far-reaching naval program emphasizing the need to acquire modern
submarines from the United States. He arrived at this conclusion by identifying Peru’s
strategic predicament even more closely with its geographical reality and its longstanding
Chilean troubles than his predecessor had. Peruvian geography dictated that the country’s
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“correct” strategy for national defense was “essentially naval,” Woodward wrote, because its
nearly 1,500-mile coastline was both its greatest economic asset and its greatest strategic
vulnerability. Peru’s “impossible mountains” and coastal deserts “force her to look to the sea
for communications,” he argued, and the natural obstacles that divided its distinct coastal,
mountainous, and Amazonian regions meant that Peru’s flows of international and domestic
commerce were wholly dependent on the sea. This dependency on sea communications was
so great, Woodward continued, that the government could not even concentrate its army in
any part of the country “without recourse to the sea.” The greatest challenge to Peruvian
national security, then, was the fact that successive Peruvian governments had consistently
failed to maintain naval defenses capable of securing the nation’s territorial waters from the
threat of enemy attack. The disastrous results of the War of the Pacific, in which Chile
landed its Army on Peruvian soil from the sea, had clearly demonstrated the grave
consequences that attended naval ill-preparedness.46
In the new Chief of the General Staff’s view, Peru’s “first defense” therefore had to
be made at sea, and while securing “command of the sea” had to be the Navy’s ultimate goal,
at a minimum his proposal for naval acquisitions argued that Peru should strive to be able to
deny such command to Chile. Again he pointed for reference to the War of the Pacific,
recognizing that “although Chile possessed a superior Navy [during the war], it dared not try
to disembark an army on Peruvian soil until the last Peruvian ship was sunk.” Moreover,
Woodward argued, even though Peruvian ground forces fought valiantly against the
subsequent Chilean ground invasion, it was the Peruvian Navy’s defeat at sea that made an
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invasion possible.47 With the current state of the Navy in late 1923, Woodward’s assessment
of the situation concluded, Peru was “absolutely indefensible by sea.” Should Chile or
another potential enemy attempt another invasion of Peruvian territory, the ships of Peru’s
existing fleet would be “completely useless” in preventing or even hindering it “no matter
how weak the enemy force employed in the attack.”48
Woodward stressed that the time for Peru to build a modern submarine force was
therefore at hand. Recognizing that a significant buildup of the Navy might be politically
difficult to undertake absent some immediate national catastrophe, and taking stock of Peru’s
limited fiscal means, he dismissed as impractical any notion of building an offensivelyminded Navy and instead recommended an “adequate defense” that would – “like firefighters
and police forces in a city” – be capable of responding effectively to emergencies and, in his
words, nothing more. Woodward stressed that in Peruvian history “the clouds of war have
sometimes appeared quickly and the storm has erupted without warning,” a reality that made
it extremely difficult to prepare for war once it was underway. Failing to plan ahead entailed
“enormously high costs not only in money, material, and time, but what is more painful, in
human lives.”49 In its current state, he continued, the Peruvian Navy was powerless to resist
the pressure an enemy navy would no doubt apply in its littoral – the lifeline on which the
coastal nation’s security and economic well-being depended.50 The costs of inaction were
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therefore, in Woodward’s view, unacceptably high. But should Peru decide to undertake
even the modest preparations that “responsible” nationhood required, including construction
of “a sufficient number of submarines with which to successfully attack the enemy’s fleet,”
he argued, the effort would in all likelihood compel the enemy to abandon or significantly
change both its war plans and the assumption of Peruvian naval weakness on which those
plans would certainly be based.51
Woodward’s proposal was forceful not just because it made the acquisition of
submarines a priority, then, but because it spoke clearly about the advantages they offered to
nations able to devote few resources to national defense. Submarines would not only be
capable of harassing enemy vessels that approached the Peruvian coast with little fear of
being harmed in the process, he wrote, but could also mount attacks on enemy merchant
ships, surface combatants, and troop transports that an enemy might bring to bear in
attempting an invasion. Moreover, submarines’ range and relative freedom from observation
by enemy surface ships (sonar technology had not yet been fully developed) meant that they
could operate independently and effectively against enemy naval forces not only in Peru’s
territorial waters, but in moderately distant enemy waters as well. This, Woodward argued,
meant that in the event of war, submarines could observe and inform on enemy ship
movements before an enemy fleet reached Peruvian waters, and could do so without
significant fear of being discovered by enemy scouting vessels.52 But perhaps the greatest
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benefit submarine operations afforded Peru, he suggested, was that they gave the nation a
measure of naval power out of proportion to both the tonnage of its fleet and the funds in its
treasury: “the best defenses against submarines are constant vigilance and high speed,
conditions that cause excessive fatigue on [the enemy’s] personnel and significant strain on
materiel,” he noted. This meant that “the constant threat of [Peruvian] submarines in
proximity decays an enemy fleet to the point that...it will be so exhausted that his defeat may
become an easy matter.”53 Moreover, Peru’s possession of a credible submarine force would
compel an enemy fleet to divert resources and attention to the protection of its own ships,
hampering the effectiveness of enemy offensive operations and decreasing the threat to
Peru’s coastal security.
The acquisition program Woodward recommended on these grounds was ambitious
and costly. Its centerpiece was the purchase of six U.S.-built R-Type submarines, but it also
included a call for six U.S.-built destroyers, twenty-five naval aircraft, and large numbers of
torpedoes, mines, depth charges, and shells as well as the construction of a new submarine
base on San Lorenzo Island and a number of other naval building projects ashore. The hefty
bill for this naval overhaul, more than six million Peruvian Pounds, would be paid using
loans secured from U.S. banks. The loans would be repaid over time using the proceeds of a
new national defense tax proposed by Leguía, while the initial “down payment” needed to
get ship construction underway (approximately 170,000 Peruvian Pounds) would come from
the reliable coffers of the Asociación Naval Pro-Marina.54
Although expensive, Woodward’s late 1923 proposal was not as fiscally impractical
as it would have been had his predecessor proposed it even one or two years earlier. That is
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because American lenders’ confidence in Peru had begun to grow by late 1923 in response to
increased U.S. influence over Peru’s national finances. As noted in Chapter 1, the first
significant loan that Leguía’s government secured from a New York bank, in 1921, had come
with the condition that he appoint an American citizen, economist William W. Cumberland,
as administrator of Peruvian customs. Once in place, Cumberland’s charge quickly expanded
to include advising Leguía on the national budget and serving as a member of the board of
directors of the newly established, U.S.-designed Reserve Bank of Peru.55 With these closer
financial ties to the United States, what followed was a period of greater fiscal stability and
economic growth – if also greater indebtedness – within Peru.56 Between 1924 and 1928,
more than ten times the amount of foreign capital entered Peru than had come in during the
1919-1923 period, and as Barbara Stallings notes, the increasing enthusiasm of American
bankers for investments in Peru during these years meant that Leguía no longer had to
“cajole” them or threaten to seek loans in Europe, while the U.S. State Department no longer
had to “intervene to encourage the [American] banks to lend” to support its ally, Leguía, in
Peru.57 This increasingly favorable lending climate no doubt gave Woodward confidence
that his bold recommendations for a larger, better armed Navy would be well received both
within Peru, where improved defenses at sea promised to better secure the nation’s foreign
and domestic commerce, and in the United States, where the contracts for Peru’s new naval
vessels would undoubtedly be let.
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Yet only part of Woodward’s ambitious naval expansion proposal ended up becoming
reality. Developed in consultation with Leguía and without the U.S. State Department’s
knowledge, his recommendations came as a complete surprise in Washington, where
President Calvin Coolidge had recently taken up his predecessor’s efforts to mediate the
Tacna-Arica dispute between Peru and Chile.58 The State Department very quickly came to
view Woodward’s proposed naval buildup as profoundly destabilizing to the fledgling
negotiations over those disputed territories. Stung by the independence with which
Woodward had acted, Washington immediately applied the brakes to his proposed expansion
of the Peruvian fleet and sought to refashion it in more modest, clearly defensive terms that
would not enflame the delicate situation with Chile. Throughout the early months of 1924
Woodward worked to assess just how much of a fleet expansion Washington would deem
acceptable in the current context, and by September Leguía had concluded just such a deal:
turning to reliable old contacts at his favored shipbuilder, the Electric Boat Company of
Groton, Connecticut, Leguía contracted for two R-type submarines and 24 torpedoes, as well
as for the construction of the San Lorenzo submarine base that had been envisaged in the
original Woodward proposal.59 Although Leguía fully intended to continue the expansion
and modernization of the Peruvian fleet in the future and saw this scaled-down deal as
merely a first step, the naval purchases his government would make throughout the rest of the
Oncenio (consisting principally of two more R-type submarines from Electric Boat, for a
total of four) never lived up to the expectations set by Woodward in his proposal of late
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1923. These acquisitions did, however, have two important effects: they made the
submarine the operational backbone of Peru’s fleet, and confirmed the Navy as Peru’s first
and most important line of national defense.
The submarine’s rise to preeminence in the Peruvian Navy while that institution was
under U.S. tutelage made sense not only in the context of Leguía’s enduring belief in the
submarine’s suitability to Peru’s particular defense challenges, but in view of its evolving
place U.S. naval doctrine at the time as well. The U.S. Navy’s civilian leaders had briefly
entertained backing a British call to abolish submarines entirely following World War I, but
had reversed course by the time of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. Indeed in the
early 1920s, American naval planners increasingly viewed submarines as integral to the U.S.
Navy’s future brand of warfare at sea – both in support of battle fleet operations and in
coastal defense operations. This was evident in the Navy’s commitment to build six large,
long-range fleet submarines between 1921 and 1925.60 Yet in the mid-1920s submarines
were not yet, in naval historian George Baer’s words, the “self-contained masters of the
deep” they would ultimately become. Although the U.S. Navy was beginning to realize the
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potential of fast-moving, long-range submarines to contribute to fleet operations far from
shore, and although American Navy planners were beginning to envisage a future in which
long-range submarines would be integral to offensive fleet operations aimed at establishing
and maintaining command of the seas, in the early 1920s small coastal defense submarines
remained the heart of the U.S. submarine force.61 Fundamentally, U.S. naval doctrine of the
early 1920s confirmed, the submarine remained a defensive weapon. It is therefore not
surprising that officers of the U.S. naval mission in Lima, who came of age professionally
during the period of the submarine’s operational infancy, would see it as a tool ideally suited
for Peru – a nation whose central security concerns (refusing the approach of an enemy fleet
to its shores and ensuring the safety of its ocean-going commerce) were inherently defensive
and revolved around ensuring coastal security.
In the end, the Peruvian Navy’s embrace of submarines during Leguía’s Oncenio
demonstrates two things very clearly. First, it shows that, although their dual status at times
complicated U.S. diplomacy, members of the U.S. naval mission took their roles as Peruvian
naval officers seriously. They developed close, cooperative relations with their champion,
Leguía, and worked earnestly to acquire the U.S.-built submarines he believed were essential
to Peru’s defenses. Acting as Peru’s highest-ranking naval officer, Admiral Woodward made
Leguía’s case for a fleet expansion that had as its raison d’être an inherently Peruvian goal,
the strengthening of the nation’s defenses vis-a-vis Chile, even though it conflicted with U.S.
interests. Although Woodward’s efforts did not bear the amount of fruit Leguía had desired,
they were nevertheless instrumental in pushing the Peruvian president’s longstanding efforts
to acquire U.S.-built submarines over the proverbial finish line. And second, in Peru’s
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embrace of the submarine we can also see the shrewdly-played hand of the dictator Leguía,
who by the time he succeeded in acquiring submarines (the one naval arm he saw as
indispensible to meeting Peru’s unique security challenges) from the United States, had spent
portions of three decades pursuing them. Leguía had not only argued the merits of U.S.-built
submarines over those from other nations. He secured a naval mission whose institutional
views on this major issue comported perfectly with his own, and he successfully enlisted that
mission – and by extension the power and prestige of the United States – in the cause of
advancing his own naval priorities.
CREATING A NATIONAL AVIATION SYSTEM

As it had with submarines, the importance Leguía attached to coastal defense led the
Peruvian Navy to embrace another new, promising technology of warfare during the 1920s:
the airplane, whose promise the recent war in Europe had also begun to demonstrate.
Although the war had not answered all doubts about naval aviation within the United States,
and although debate about the utility of aircraft in naval warfare raged within the U.S. Navy
in the years that followed, consensus on aviation emerged early within Peruvian naval
establishment while under the direction of the U.S. naval mission.62 That is because Peru,
whose geography, principal security objectives, and limited fiscal resources precluded it from
building a large fleet and pursuing an offensive naval strategy aimed at achieving control of
the sea, could view aviation assets much as it did submarines – not as supplements to a great
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armada of powerful surface vessels, but as a cornerstone of an economical, defensivelyminded naval capability. Moreover, the development of naval aviation aligned perfectly with
Leguía’s Patria Nueva vision of national economic development because advances made in
the naval-military aviation realm held the promise of spillover benefits for the civilian
economy. Indeed, the U.S. naval mission’s efforts at developing Peruvian naval aviation in
the 1920s would give immeasurable aid to the creation of a national system of aviation aimed
at knitting together Peru’s distinct coastal, mountain, and Amazonian regions, as well as the
forging of closer commercial links between Peru and the United States.
The emphasis the U.S. naval mission placed on aviation from its earliest days is clear
from the pages of the Peruvian Navy’s professional journal, the Revista de Marina. Between
1922 and 1925 the Revista translated and republished a number of essays on the theory and
practice of naval aviation from the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings. Although written by
U.S. officers from a clearly North American perspective, each essay contained lessons
relevant to the Peruvian Navy’s development of a naval air service. The first such article,
penned by U.S. Navy Commander D.E. Cummings and published by the Revista in late 1922,
noted the possibilities and limitations of naval aviation, and posited that airplanes’ greatest
value in naval warfare lay in scouting and attacking enemy naval vessels, aerial combat
against other aircraft, and protecting friendly vessels in escort duty.63 Of special significance
to the Peruvian Navy, given its emphasis on defending the coast against Chilean naval attack,
was Cummings’s observation that aircraft were “particularly suited for scouting work, on
account of their speed and vision,” which enabled them to spot enemy surface vessels and
submarines at a distance and alert friendly forces to the likelihood of an impending attack.
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Aircraft were especially valuable in scouting operations against submarines, he noted,
because their position high above the water gave them the ability to spot submarines that
were submerged, but operating (as most at the time did) just below the surface – a point that
no doubt resonated with Peruvian officers who, like Leguía, were concerned about Chilean
superiority in submarines in the early 1920s. Because the Peruvian Navy was concerned first
and foremost with coastal defense and operations within the Peruvian littoral, the factors
Cummings listed as limiting the airplane’s usefulness in scouting operations (its limited
operating radius, limited radio range, and defensibility) were less of a concern than they were
to the globally-minded, “blue water” U.S. Navy.64 Because Peruvian naval aircraft would
conduct scouting operations relatively close to shore, and would be responsible for patrolling
a smaller area than their U.S. counterparts, they would not have to conform to the same
exacting standards that governed U.S. acquisitions of naval planes.
Subsequent articles selected by Davy for republication in the Revista de Marina
addressed the types of aircraft best suited to warfare at sea as well as the roles they should
fulfill in support of fleet operations. The November-December 1923 issue, for example,
contained an article by U.S. Navy Lieutenant DeWitt Ramsey entitled “The Development of
Naval Aviation,” which detailed the characteristics required of aircraft engaged in scouting
and observation, bombing, and aerial combat operations. Ramsey wrote that “large fuel
capacity” and “seaworthiness” were essential features of naval aircraft “adaptable to long
distance scouting flights over the sea,” and that bombing planes should be capable of “short
run” take-offs from the decks of aircraft carriers while carrying a “full military load.”65

64

Ibid, 683.

65

DeWitt C. Ramsey, “El Desarrollo de la Aviación Naval,” Revista de Marina VIII, no. 6 (NoviembreDiciembre 1923): 694-699.
100

Scouting and bombing of approaching enemy vessels would be essential missions for
Peruvian naval aviation, but these specific criteria were less important to the Peruvian Navy
because scouting over Peruvian coastal waters involved shorter distances. Moreover, no
Peruvian naval aircraft – whether for scouting or bombing of enemy vessels – would fly from
the decks of carriers. But the publication of Ramsey’s essay underscored that in the future,
airplanes would serve as the eyes of the Peruvian Navy in carrying out its vital coastal
defense mission. In practice, it also meant that Leguía and his U.S. naval mission would
have greater flexibility in choosing the kinds of aircraft with which to equip the Navy’s
aviation service.
The cause of Peruvian naval aviation received a significant boost with the arrival of
Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), an aviation expert whose Proceedings article on
the “Tactical Employment of Naval Aircraft” was published by the Revista shortly after he
joined the U.S. naval mission in Peru in January 1924. Charged personally by Leguía with
directing the development and training of Peruvian naval aviation service, Grow came with a
well-established reputation as an aviation expert, and clear views on the role aviation assets
should play in naval warfare.66 Accordingly, his 1924 essay focused less on the types of
aircraft best suited for naval aviation, or the exact specifications required, and more on the
tasks naval aviators should carry out in order to effectively support fleet operations. In a
finding ideally suited to Peru’s strategic situation, for example, he differentiated between
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“strategic” and “tactical” aerial scouting. Strategic scouting for enemy vessels, Grow wrote,
meant gaining “information as to the location, strength, disposition, course, etc. of the enemy
main body and screen.” It was a function for which naval aircraft were uniquely suited, he
continued, because under favorable weather conditions, a single aircraft aloft in close
proximity to a friendly fleet could give that fleet seaward visibility of up to forty miles.
Although it would be difficult to distinguish the specific types of enemy vessels at such a
distance, he noted, “the mere knowledge of their presence would be invaluable” even if the
plane were prevented from drawing near the enemy fleet’s defensive screen to collect more
detailed information.67 Simply alerting friendly vessels to the approach of an enemy fleet
would buy them vital situational awareness and, importantly, time to prepare for battle.
Not surprisingly, Grow believed that naval aircraft also had critical roles to play once
battle had arrived. Securing “absolute control of the air” was air power’s first function amid
hostilities, he argued, a task that involved seizing local control of the air and maintaining it
throughout the period of the main fleet engagement. This command of the skies would be
secured by fighter aircraft whose sole purpose was to attack any scouting, fighter, or bomber
aircraft the enemy fleet might launch in the course of its advance. But, Grow cautioned,
battle against an enemy fleet would not negate the need to keep scouting planes in the air.
Indeed the strategic (longer-range) scouting flights that preceded hostilities would give way,
in battle, to tactical scouting flights aimed at supplying commanders with “information
concerning the enemy main body,” including damage inflicted on enemy vessels and aircraft,
“in order to assist the commander-in-chief to dispose his force to best advantage.”
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In Grow’s view, still somewhat controversial in U.S. Navy circles, aviation was
clearly an indispensible element – perhaps the indispensible element – of naval power. In
laying out his ideas he was careful to acknowledge, however, that as a new discipline within
the profession of arms, aviation had not been shaped by a highly-developed body of theory
and had not had the benefit of years of test and evaluation. Indeed, he concluded, when it
came to the young business of naval aviation “for once we can not study history and the
actions of great leaders for our own edification. True, certain principles exist in aerial
combat...but to no source can we turn for any experience in working out our plans for the
coordination of tactics of air units operating with the fleet.”68 Clearly Grow had a faith in the
utility of air power to naval warfare, and expressed no reservations about building Peru’s
naval air capability from this very limited base of experience.
By the time of Grow’s appointment as the naval mission’s point-man on aviation in
early 1924, Leguía’s push for an aviation service within the Peruvian Navy had already
gained significant momentum. Indeed a month before Grow’s arrival in Lima, Admiral
Woodward, in his case before the Peruvian congress for a naval buildup centered on
submarines, pointed to aviation as an essential component of an effective national defense.
Like submarines, he argued, naval aircraft delivered the nation more capability per dollar
than significantly more expensive surface vessels could. Given Peru’s limited resources,
aircraft could therefore help close the capability gap with the Chilean Navy without forcing
Peru down the financially ruinous course of building its surface fleet to numerical parity with
that quantitatively and qualitatively superior force. As Woodward wrote in a strategy
document that accompanied his proposal to the congress, that was because the Navy’s
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defensive orientation and emphasis on coastal defense meant it could content itself with
“minor attacks” aimed at “reducing the enemy’s relative superiority by putting some of his
ships out of action.” Such attacks would do much to exhaust and frustrate the advance of a
Chilean fleet to Peruvian shores, and would no doubt help prevent the landing of a foreign
army on Peruvian soil. In an assessment remarkably consistent with the views Grow
expressed in his Revista essay, along with submarines, Woodward argued that naval aircraft
would serve as the eyes of the Peruvian Navy (and indeed, of the nation as a whole): they
would give the Peruvian fleet greater visibility on lurking threats, and would “impose much
caution in the employment by the enemy of surface craft, be they battleship, cruiser or
destroyer.” And importantly, Woodward noted, like submarines, aircraft would deliver those
capabilities at a lower cost than a comparable number of surface ships.69
Not surprisingly given the Peruvian Navy’s emphasis on coastal defense, the aviation
portion of Woodward’s proposal was built around the scouting mission. But given Peru’s
paucity of fiscal resources, it also envisioned a naval air service in which all naval aircraft
would do double duty as both scouts and attack planes. Although tests in the United States in
the early 1920s were validating the airplane as a useful weapon against surface vessels, it was
clear, Woodward stressed, that for Peru they would be most useful “in locating the enemy
during his approach to the coast,” whether they be “behind a line of enemy scouting ships or
behind a smokescreen made by enemy destroyers.” Control of the air (and therefore,
success) in naval warfare, he cautioned, would be impossible to establish without the longrange early warning that aircraft could provide. With sufficient warning of approaching
enemy vessels, Peru’s naval air service could transition from strategic scouting to tactical
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attack with relative ease – dropping depth charges in the vicinity of submerged enemy
submarines, combating enemy planes in the air, or even, in Woodward’s words, “spreading
gas over a considerable extent of the ocean, paralyzing enemy surface ships” – all while
remaining safely out of range of enemy anti-aircraft guns.70
Amid the diplomatic fallout following Woodward’s December 1923 naval expansion
proposal to the Peruvian congress, though, the planned purchase of twenty-five naval aircraft
was cut to zero. In fact, the scaled-back naval purchases Leguía made in 1924, which
included two of the six submarines Woodward had envisaged, included nothing for Peru’s
fledgling naval aviation service. These cuts did not, however, represent a death knell for
Grow’s early naval aviation efforts. That is because the lion’s share of his early energies
went into the decidedly non-controversial areas of education and training. This emphasis
meant that during much of his first year in Peru, Grow would have to devote considerable
time not to acquiring aircraft, but to establishing the basic structure of Peruvian naval
aviation and developing a training program. To accomplish this, he focused on undoing the
work of a short-lived French aviation mission that Leguía had invited to Peru during the
earliest days of is Oncenio. One of the few successes that that French mission achieved
during its disastrous three-year tenure in Lima – which Lawrence Clayton notes was marked
by “little success, undermined in part by spectacular accidents” – was the creation in 1922 of
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an aviation school staffed by French, British, and American instructors.71 Upon his arrival
Grow tore down this existing structure of aviation education, which had housed civil,
military, and naval aviation in one organization, and, in accordance with Leguía’s wishes,
initiated a program aimed at Americanizing Peruvian naval and military aviation and
consolidating it under the watchful eye of the U.S. naval mission.
The process unfolded quickly, beginning with the construction of a naval air base and
a new aviation school at Ancón, just north of Lima. By September of 1924 the mission was
able to report to Washington that due to Grow’s efforts, construction of the commanding
officer’s quarters, general store house, power plant, cuartel (barracks), and water
management systems of the school had been initiated. Actual flying time during those early
months was limited, though, by a lack of suitable training aircraft.72 It was a shortage for
which Grow sought immediate redress. Two months earlier, in July, Woodward had
informed ONI that although his ambitious call for twenty-five naval aircraft had been
scuttled, the naval ministry had placed an order with the Boeing Corporation of Seattle,
Washington, for three training planes “exactly like the lot being built for the U.S. Navy,”
which President Leguía had authorized for the naval aviation school at Ancón. A hands-on
manager, Grow took the lead in negotiating the deal with Boeing, securing funds for the
purchase from the Peruvian treasury, bargaining with Boeing for a price of $16,300 per
plane, and securing a promise that the new aircraft would be delivered to Peru in time for the
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inauguration of the aviation school on January 1, 1925.73 An early product of the close,
personal relationship Grow and Leguía developed between 1924 and 1930, this acquisition
helped ensure that the fledgling naval aviation service’s survival. Moreover, by bringing
U.S.-built aircraft into the Navy’s inventory, it helped solidify U.S. influence over Peru’s
nascent military-naval aviation establishment.
As Grow labored to establish a U.S.-style naval aviation service, Leguía’s broader
efforts to draw U.S. commercial aviation interests to Peru also began to bear fruit. Forging
an integrated, “modern” national economy was a central objective of the Patria Nueva
program of economic development, and, he believed, knitting together Peru’s distinct coastal,
mountainous, and Amazonian regions was essential to the task. Very early on, therefore,
Leguía had made establishing air linkages between these regions a priority. In 1921, for
example, he had offered a prize for the first trans-Andean flight from Lima to the Peruvian
Amazon port of Iquitos – a competition won by American aviator Elmer “Slim” Faucett, who
later established one of Peru’s first commercial airlines. Because of Leguía’s desire to
establish a national aviation system and his favorable attitude toward foreign business
interests, in the mid-1920s Peru became a magnet for pilots and aviation interests looking to
either set new flight records or gain an upper hand in the struggle to corner the emerging
South American commercial air market.74 By 1928, the maturation of aviation technologies
had reduced overall risk to levels acceptable to major investors, and an intense competition
quickly developed between two new companies for the Peruvian market, one established by
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Faucett with a group of Peruvian investors, and the other backed by the North American
giant Pan American Airways and its aggressive founder, Juan Trippe.
To manage this competition Leguía made a decision in early 1928 that united
Peruvian naval, military, and commercial aviation in a single bureaucracy and cemented
American control over it: he appointed Commander Grow, by then one of his most trusted
aides, to the newly created position of Director General of Aviation.75 As naval mission
chief A.G. Howe later noted in a report to Washington, the appointment had the effect of
bringing all aviation activities in the country “directly under his [Grow’s] orders.”
Moreover, it ensured that Howe, as the head of the naval mission and Chief of the Peruvian
General Staff, would “at all times be posted in connection with the aviation activities of
Peru.” As the competition heated up between Faucett’s company and Pan American for the
right to establish an international passenger, mail, and cargo route between Peru and the
United States, Howe noted, Grow’s position was “daily growing in importance to the country
[Peru] and also to the United States.”76 U.S. foreign policy makers in Washington agreed
with Howe that Grow’s position was vital to the furthering of American commercial aviation
interests in Peru. On January 19th, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg had advised the U.S.
Ambassador to Peru, Miles Poindexter, that it was “highly desirable” that Leguía not grant
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any aviation concession until Pan American’s representative in Peru had had the time to
develop his company’s “projects” in the country. Moreover, he wrote, in the future Pan
American “would associate the Naval Air Service of Peru” (Grow’s creation) in its work.
Two days later, Poindexter informed the Secretary, approvingly, that Leguía had placed the
matter of the concession entirely “in the hands of Grow,” who had recently established the
naval air service’s first link across the Andes, and who was now poised to recommend that
the concession be awarded to Pan American.77
In addition to giving U.S. commercial aviation interests the upper hand in the
competition for the Peruvian market, Grow’s appointment underscored the importance of the
U.S. naval mission to broader American interests in Peru. With this single decision by
Leguía, Howe and U.S. diplomats noted approvingly, an enormous amount of diplomatic
power had been invested in a mid-level U.S. naval officer – one who was a member of the
dictator Leguía’s inner circle, and who, by virtue of that access, was in a strong position to
advance the cause of U.S. commercial aviation interests in Peru. And although by 1928 U.S.
naval mission members had long held sway over the Peruvian Navy, Grow’s appointment
represented a new, more intimate level of U.S. involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs. His
support of the Pan American bid, and Leguía’s subsequent approval of it, stands as the
clearest example of the U.S. naval mission lending direct support to American commercial
interests throughout its tenure in Peru. Grow’s place within the Peruvian bureaucracy gave
the United States a measure of influence with Leguía that no civilian diplomat could hope to
achieve. In so doing, it directly benefited U.S. commercial interests and afforded U.S. policy
significant amount of influence over Peru’s economic future.
77

See Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Peru (Poindexter), January 19, 1928, and The Ambassador in
Peru (Poindexter) to the Secretary of State, January 21, 1928. Both contained in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1928, Vol. I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 800-801.
109

As Director General of Aviation, Grow continued to facilitate advances in both naval
and commercial aviation until Leguía’s overthrow in August of 1930 ended his tenure and
forced the U.S. naval mission to relinquish its executive authority over the Peruvian Navy.78
In May of 1929, for example, he directed Leguía’s establishment of a joint Navy-Army Air
Corps, which required that all Navy and army pilots be trained to fly missions in support of
ground and sea operations. That same month, new naval mission head William S. Pye
(Captain, U.S. Navy, who held the rank of Contraalmirante in the Peruvian Navy) reported
the successful commencement of air mail service between Peru and the United States.79 In
August of that year, Grow oversaw an increase in the size of the student body of the Escuela
Naval, by twenty cadets navales, in order to “provide for more aviators which will be needed
for an expanding aviation service.”80 And from late 1929 through early 1930, he accelerated
his longstanding efforts to procure U.S.-built aircraft for Peru’s naval air service – an effort
that ultimately fell apart amid the freezing of international capital markets following the
stock market crash of October 1929 and the advent of a worldwide economic depression.
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CONCLUSION

When it relinquished command over the Peruvian Navy in August of 1930, the U.S.
naval mission could claim an impressive record of success over its decade-long tenure.
Improved academic and physical standards at the Escuela Naval, together with Captain
Davy’s emphasis on professionalism and his dedication to improving the academy’s
facilities, transformed it into a leader in South American naval and military education and
shaped a generation of young officers favorably disposed toward the United States and the
U.S. Navy. At the same time, the naval mission delivered on Leguía’s desire to acquire
modern, U.S.-built submarines and establish a base of expertise within the Peruvian Navy’s
officer corps in their use. In so doing, as Robert Scheina notes, the U.S. naval mission to
Peru firmly established submarines as a cornerstone of Peruvian national defense and laid the
groundwork for what would become, in subsequent decades, Latin America’s premier
submarine force.81 And finally, the mission established a naval air service that, together with
the submarine, became an integral part of Peru’s naval defenses at the same time that it
served as the seedbed for commercial aviation developments that both propelled Leguía’s
Patria Nueva vision forward and materially aided U.S.-based aviation interests.
These successes did come at a cost, however. Throughout the 1920s, the naval
mission’s place within the Peruvian state apparatus, its broad authorities, and its members’
dual status as Peruvian officers who enjoyed close relations with Leguía himself, helped
firmly align U.S. policy with an autocratic leader. Indeed, the dictator’s fall from power in
the depths of the Great Depression would inaugurate a period of violent political turmoil
within Peru, a defining feature of which was a rising tide of anti-U.S. sentiment within the
81
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Peruvian population. A detailed examination of the challenges that the naval mission’s
unique structure and work posed for U.S. foreign policy is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES, 1920-1933

For all the successes it achieved in the areas of naval education, submarines, and
aviation, the U.S. naval mission’s work in Peru from its arrival in 1920 until Leguía’s
overthrow in August 1930 came at a cost. Its members’ dual status as officers in the U.S.
and Peruvian navies meant that their activities often fell into gray areas between U.S. and
Peruvian sovereignties, and posed significant challenges for U.S.-Peruvian relations. The
complications flowed from the fact that, on the one hand, naval mission members were sent
to Peru as instruments of U.S. policy calculated to achieve certain national objectives, while
on the other, they were to serve as integral parts of the Peruvian government and labor on its
behalf to build a more efficient, effective Navy for that nation. Over time, mission members’
dual status proved more difficult to manage than U.S. decision makers had thought possible
at the outset, in large part because Leguía, far from being a mere vassal of Washington,
proved adept at using the mission to advance his own foreign and domestic priorities. The
challenge was no less pronounced after Leguía’s overthrow in August of 1930, when naval
mission members relinquished command of the Peruvian Navy and assumed an advisory
status that still proved diplomatically difficult. In the end, from its arrival in 1920 to its
withdrawal in early 1933, the actions taken by the U.S. naval mission to Peru often
contributed directly to more difficult relations between the United States and Peru.
“VERY CORDIAL” RELATIONS

Initially the dual status of American officers aroused little concern in Washington.
The Woodrow Wilson administration had agreed to send the mission to Peru on the
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understanding that U.S. personnel would act mainly as trainers, consistent with Leguía’s
request for American officers to “reorganize and direct” the Peruvian Navy and enact
structural reforms.1 Indeed, once the mission was in place the rules governing its activities
stated that members’ roles were to be limited to “merely those essential to the proper
organization by them of the Peruvian Navy, and the instruction and training of its officers
and other personnel.”2 The United States had had no previous experience sending such
missions before approving Leguía’s request, but in the Wilson administration’s view the
arrangement was consistent with its expansive hemispheric policy aimed at aiding Latin
American nations “as far as possible in all cases where there is no good reason not to do so.”3
The desire to extend such assistance was especially strong the case of Peru, given Leguía’s
strongly pro-American pronouncements and obvious desire to invite U.S. capital and
expertise into the country. As a result, acceding to Leguía’s request that U.S. officers assume
actual command of the Peruvian Navy was seen by American foreign policymakers in
Washington as a means – if a unique one – of facilitating the naval mission’s work and
keeping an enthusiastic ally happy. Indeed, there is no evidence in the records of either the
State Department or Navy Department to indicate that, in the mission’s earliest days,
American officials were worried that American personnel might be called upon to direct
Peruvian forces in a domestic or international conflict.
1

Interim U.S. Minister to Peru to Secretary of State, October 22, 1919, U.S. Legation Lima, Vol. 175, RG 84,
National Archives.
2
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The State Department expressed little concern about the naval mission’s unique status
even as it strengthened ties with Leguía’s increasingly dictatorial administration. In
November of 1921, for example, the ardently pro-Leguía American Chargé d’Affaires in
Lima, Frederick Sterling4, urged U.S. support for the “honest and progressive” Leguía
despite the fact that earlier that year he had launched an all-out assault on Lima’s
independent press (including the seizure of one of Lima’s largest daily newspapers, La
Prensa), closed the nation’s oldest and most storied university for spreading anti-government
“propaganda,” and began systematically arresting and detaining “political suspects” he
deemed threats to his government.5 Four months later Sterling reported, approvingly, that
through such repressive measures Leguía had largely succeeded in neutralizing political
resistance to his administration, and that the successful enactment of such Americanizing
reforms as the establishment of a Peruvian reserve bank “patterned on the lines of the United
States Federal Reserve Act” had done much to enhance both Leguía’s personal “prestige”
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and that of the United States within Peru.6 Washington’s satisfaction with the stabilizing
political situation in Peru and the promise it held for U.S. interests ensured that when Leguía
moved to amend the Peruvian Constitution in May 1922 to permit his reelection at the end of
his five-year term of office, the State Department offered no objections.7 As the United
States moved closer to Leguía throughout these critical months of late 1921 and early 1922 –
months when Leguía consolidated his dictatorship under Washington’s watchful, approving
eye – American diplomats and naval leaders consistently referred to the naval mission as a
critical contributor to the all-important growth of U.S. “prestige” in Peru.
U.S. ties with Leguía grew so close during the naval mission’s first year that when
concerns did arise about what status U.S. officers should adopt in the event of a revolutionary
disturbance against the dictator – or worse, an international war against one of Peru’s
neighbors – they were given little credence. As noted earlier, when in the midst of Leguía’s
efforts to consolidate his rule in early 1922 the State Department’s solicitor concluded that
mission members’ contracts appeared to obligate them to fight on behalf of the Peruvian
government should they (as members of the Peruvian Navy) be ordered by Leguía to do so,
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes argued that the United States should rely on the
“judgment and discretion” of the individual officers to avoid being pulled into such a murky
situation.8 The benefits of maintaining a naval mission in Peru that met Leguía’s needs, State
Department and Navy leaders agreed, outweighed the risks that could flow from the unique
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arrangement permitting its members to serve simultaneously in the U.S. and Peruvian navies.
Besides, Hughes and U.S. Navy leaders further agreed, by mid-1922 information from the
U.S. legation in Lima confirmed that Leguía had achieved a virtually unassailable position
within Peru, while U.S. mediation of the Tacna-Arica dispute made war between Peru and
Chile unlikely for the foreseeable future.9 In short, they concluded, neither concern raised by
the solicitor in February seemed likely to develop. Neither the naval mission’s wide-ranging
powers nor its closeness to the dictator was seen as a significant impediment to the execution
of U.S. foreign policy.
Having cast the American lot firmly with the now-entrenched Leguía, and
recognizing the naval mission’s importance to productive U.S. relations with him, the State
Department next sought to extend the naval mission’s tenure in Lima beyond its initial twoyear term. In this endeavor it found willing partners in the U.S. Navy’s General Board, a
panel of senior naval officers formed in 1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on naval
policy, and in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), which had overseen the activities of the
U.S. naval missions in Peru and Brazil since their creation.10 ONI Director Luke McNamee
(Captain, U.S. Navy) was particularly impressed with the work the naval mission had done
throughout its first two years in Peru, and believed the expansion of such missions was
important to the success of U.S. policy in Latin America. “The United States should do
everything to encourage Latin American Republics to ask for Naval missions,” McNamee
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urged the Chief of Naval Operations in March of 1922, “and should send them wherever
[they are] requested.”11 In stating this case, he made an eloquent argument that the Navy
should do more than fulfill its historical role of protecting American interests overseas – it
should promote those interests as well. Latin America was where the Navy could most
productively do this, he noted, not only because U.S. interests there were significant and
governed by a clear, longstanding policy (the Monroe Doctrine), but because in recent years
Washington had based its policy there on the forging of a spirit of “Pan-American union”
throughout the hemisphere.12 This meant, McNamee wrote, that U.S. policy depended to a
far greater degree than before on securing the “friendship and confidence of our southern
neighbors” – a job for which the Navy was particularly well suited given “the importance of
the military in these [Latin American] Republics, where the General or Admiral of today is
very apt to be the President of tomorrow.” After all, he suggested, it was “only natural” to
expect that military and naval men trained by U.S. missions should, when they rose to
positions of national leadership in the future, “look with favor on the country under whose
tutelage they gained their education.” In the long run, he stressed, this “favor” toward the
United States would be “reflected in their political, financial and economic relations” and not
merely in their military and naval relations.13
11
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At the same time they helped foster goodwill toward the United States, McNamee
further argued, naval missions throughout Latin America would help advance Washington’s
post-World War aim of rolling back and replacing European influence in the Americas and
paving the way for U.S. supremacy. Indeed, when the Woodrow Wilson administration
decided to accede to Leguía’s request for a U.S. naval mission in 1920, it did so in large part
because it harbored concerns that European powers that had long maintained dominant
economic and strategic influence in South America (principally Great Britain) would seek to
re-establish themselves there after recovering from the devastation of the recent World
War.14 The successes the U.S. naval mission had achieved in Peru throughout its first two
years had helped to hold this feared development at bay, and importantly, he stressed, had
done so on the relative cheap. Indeed, McNamee argued, the great benefit of missions such
as the one in Peru was that they furthered American interests and “cost us nothing.” Naval
missions were therefore “the most potent influence I can think of in fostering close relations
with South America,” he wrote. They enabled the United States to “neutralize the influence
of foreign powers” in Latin America, expand U.S. strategic (and by extension, economic)
reach there, and perhaps most importantly, they demonstrated the kind of positive
engagement that would keep Latin American nations from seeing in Washington’s policy
“anything that might be construed…as apathy or as ignorant disregard of our mutual
interests.” Failure to send U.S. missions, McNamee concluded, would render Pan-American
solidarity “nothing but a pious aspiration,” and would leave the U.S. interests in a
disadvantaged position in the future.15
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McNamee’s two lines of argument resonated with the Navy’s General Board, which
demonstrated a keen understanding of the diplomatic nature of naval missions’ work and, in
turn, fully endorsed the expansion of such missions to other Latin American countries. In a
letter to Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, the Board noted that South America
represented one of two “special spheres” in the world (the other being Asia) that the United
States was “particularly interested in seeing developed along lines in accord with her general
ideas of international policy.” In its view, nothing less than “the prestige of the United
States” – so important to cultivating international goodwill – was on the line when it came to
the question of sending more naval missions to Latin America. The United States should,
therefore, not only approve future requests for such missions, the Board advised, but should
“in a diplomatic way make it understood that similar requests from South American countries
would not be unwelcome.”16 This was especially true of what the Board called South
America’s “peculiar triangle” of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (today known as the Southern
Cone) – nations which, as historian Mark Gilderhus notes, have leaned politically,
economically and culturally more toward Europe than the United States, have long been the
“most powerful and influential” in South America, and have acted as counterweights to U.S.
influence in Latin America.17 “It would be exceedingly undesirable,” the General Board
concluded, if in these countries “dissimilar [European] sentiments, ideals and methods should
be allowed to crop out” and spread throughout the continent. Therefore, the Board
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recommended, all efforts should be made to send additional naval missions to South America
“to forestall any influences which might tend to work against the methods and ideals which
we hope to see instituted” there, and to ensure that U.S. “naval sentiment” was positioned to
permeate the entire continent.18 Given its concern about European influence in the “peculiar
triangle” countries, the General Board saw continuing the naval mission to Peru as especially
important, as Peru was a nation whose geographic position and extraordinarily pro-U.S.
political orientation under Leguía aided in the task. Accordingly, in its final set of
recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, the General Board urged that in addition to
encouraging further missions, the Navy should support the renewal of contracts for naval
mission members in Peru.19 Secretary Denby’s approval of the Board’s recommendations on
May 23, 1922 helped solidify the American naval mission’s presence in Peru, and
demonstrated that the U.S. Navy foresaw no problems associated with the dual status of the
mission’s personnel.20
On the issue of retaining the naval mission in Peru, the General Board’s position was
in perfect harmony with that of the State Department. In February 1922 the U.S. Chargé
d’Affaires in Lima, Sterling, who was already on record as a strong advocate for supporting
Leguía, wrote to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes recommending that the contracts
of mission members be renewed. “From a political point of view,” he wrote, “there is no
question but that the presence of the Mission is valuable to the United States.” It was
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valuable in large part because Leguía was a willing partner who was “most anxious” to have
its stay in Peru extended. Moreover, he argued, the mission strengthened the already “very
cordial” relations between the United States and Peru and enhanced “American prestige.” In
an assessment that echoed the analyses of ONI and the Navy’s General Board, Sterling
pointed not just to the benefits of maintaining the mission, but to the costs: should the
mission not be renewed, he noted, “the Peruvian Government would doubtless invite some
other foreign Power – probably Great Britain – to replace it.”21 Just as they did in
establishing the mission in 1920, on the issue of extending its tenure the Navy and State
Departments exhibited a degree of cooperation that suggests an underlying compatibility of
views. To both, the U.S. naval mission to Peru was an important arm of American
diplomacy and a critical ingredient to productive relations with Leguía. In July 1922 the
contracts of naval mission chief Frank Freyer and Escuela Naval director Charles G. Davy
were extended by one and two-and-a-half years, respectively, while arrangements were made
to dispatch replacements for personnel being rotated home for assignment elsewhere in the
U.S. Navy.22
CHALLENGES: THE WOODWARD INCIDENT

Diplomatic difficulties with the naval mission began to appear only after its initial
two-year contracts had been renewed and it experienced this first turnover in personnel.
Their emergence is traceable to the fact that, in committing to extend the mission,
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Washington confirmed the wisdom of the curious arrangement whereby its naval personnel
served as officers in the Peruvian Navy. Continuing the mission gave this arrangement an air
of permanence, and made it a durable symbol of Washington’s support for Leguía. These
developments emboldened the dictator to pursue his long-desired expansion of the Peruvian
fleet, just as American banks’ growing confidence in Peru made a naval buildup seem more
possible than before. As the odds of some sort of Peruvian naval expansion grew in 1923,
the State Department began to perceive the challenges that this type of involvement in Peru’s
sovereign naval affairs could pose for U.S. policy in the region.
Up to that time the State Department had expressed only approval of Leguía’s
methods and praise of the naval mission’s activities on his behalf. But the prospect of a
Peruvian naval buildup directed and supervised by American officers acting as agents of
Leguía’s government gave U.S. foreign policymakers pause. The U.S. legation in Lima
expressed fears that Leguía’s naval ambitions could destabilize fragile relations between Peru
and Chile and disrupt President Warren Harding’s nascent efforts to mediate the Tacna-Arica
dispute between the two neighbors that had festered since the War of the Pacific (18791884). In February 1923 the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima, who earlier had made the case
for strong American support for Leguía despite his dictatorial ways, warned that in the
context of U.S. mediation, even small U.S. naval contracts made with Leguía could be
interpreted as hostile by Chile and stoke opposition to U.S. policy in the region. 23 With this
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in mind the State Department pursued a cautious policy aimed at supporting Harding’s
efforts and finding a workable solution that would lower bilateral tensions between Peru and
Chile and bring permanent stability to that troubled border region.24 Central to that cautious
policy was maintaining a favorable environment in which bilateral discussions could make
unimpeded progress. From the State Department’s perspective, that seemed to rule out a
significant expansion of the Peruvian fleet.
It was in this tense environment that Clark H. Woodward, who took over as the new
chief of the U.S. naval mission in July 1923, took his highly public stand in favor of a major
enlargement of the Peruvian fleet and, for the first time, clearly demonstrated that U.S.
mission members’ dual status could significantly complicate U.S. foreign relations. The
difficulties began with a public address Woodward gave at a memorial honoring Peru’s
foremost naval hero, Contraalmirante Miguel Grau Seminario, in Lima’s port of Callao on
October 27, 1923 – the day celebrated as “Navy Day” in the United States.25 Woodward had
been instructed by the Navy Department in Washington to render honors to Admiral Grau,
whose death aboard the Peruvian ship Huáscar in battle with the Chilean Navy during the
War of the Pacific made him a martyr, by laying a wreath at the monument built in the
Peruvian officer’s honor. Charged with an essentially diplomatic task and acting a
representative of the United States, Woodward briefly paid homage to Grau at the beginning
of his remarks, calling him an able, energetic, and “brave” naval commander. The majority
of his speech, though, was far from routine. In short order, he shifted from praising Grau to
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exhorting the gathered crowd to avoid repeating what he saw as the mistakes that made
Grau’s death such a crushing blow to the nation’s fortunes. Wading deeply into the realm of
Peruvian naval policy, Woodward shed his ceremonial role representing the United States
and seamlessly assumed another role: that of Peru’s most senior naval officer. Stepping
firmly beyond the bounds of his assignment from Washington, Woodward proceeded to
articulate a number of naval preparedness lessons he believed Peru should draw from the
War of the Pacific, and made a forceful argument to the gathered crowd that, to avoid a
similarly tragic fate in the future, Peru needed to significantly strengthen its naval defenses.26
The heart of Woodward’s argument at the Grau memorial was that, as the linchpin of
Peru’s security, the Navy must never again be put in a position where its continued existence
as a credible fighting force could be threatened in a single battle. It must be made larger and
more capable. Despite the “heroism” Grau exhibited in the War of the Pacific’s decisive
Battle of Angamos (October 8, 1879), and despite the fact that he had done “all that a mortal
could do with the inadequate means” he was provided, Woodward argued, the admiral had
been “sacrificed on the altar of his country” by his government’s “lack of foresight” and
failure to maintain a navy equal to the nation’s security challenges.27 The outcome of
Angamos had given the Chilean Navy command of the sea and had made it possible for Chile
to land an invading army on Peruvian soil. That, he continued, made the outcome of the war
(Chilean victory) a foregone conclusion.28 Moreover it had demonstrated with tragic force
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the truth, for Peru, of the maxim “he who is victorious at sea, is victorious also on land.” The
present gathering at Grau’s memorial, Woodward noted, afforded him the opportunity to
“take from the pages of history some of the bitter lessons that should be learned from the sad
facts of 1879, when Peru – owing to its failure to truly prepare – was obligated by her enemy
to accept peace because the statesmen of the country had provided only a small navy unable
to compete with the enemy.”29 Sadly, he continued, even the bitter peace that followed the
War of the Pacific could not convince successive Peruvian governments to prepare and
maintain adequate naval defenses. In words echoing similar criticisms American officers had
of U.S. preparedness, Woodward noted that “as the work of the navy in times of peace is not
prominent,” public interest in naval affairs has a tendency to decline, permitting “desires of
economy take precedent in the mind of the statesman.” “Unfortunately,” Woodward argued,
the economy mindset “manifests itself in a dangerous way: in a policy of poor preparation,
and in a reduction of the fleet to a point much lower than that needed to ensure security.”
The real danger of the peacetime economy mindset, he concluded, was its staying power:
absent some national crisis, “little or no interest is taken in naval affairs” until “the clouds of
war begin to loom on the horizon.”30
As he would later argue while making his specific recommendations for building up
the Peruvian fleet, in his remarks at the Grau monument Woodward made the case that over
the long term, ill-preparedness invited greater foreign aggression and proved more costly
than a policy of modest, proactive preparation. Fundamentally, he argued, by failing to
maintain adequate naval defenses Peru was neglecting the very important fact that, for
coastal nations, national power and naval power “march in parallel.” Given the nation’s vast
29
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coastline and wholesale dependence on the sea for commerce and communications, he
stressed, maintaining “a weak navy is only preparation for defeat – a defeat that would mean
humiliation and disaster” for Peru. Should it continue maintaining a poor naval
establishment, Woodward suggested, Peru would soon learn the very difficult lesson that
“national weakness causes more wars than national power.” Thus, he urged, the efficiency of
the Navy (and, for that matter, the Army) was “not something to be thought of only when
war is imminent.” And the ability of the naval officer, whose job was to safeguard the
nation’s security regardless of the Navy’s material condition, was extraordinarily limited in
this regard. The reality, Woodward concluded, was that in the absence of a change of course,
the nation’s future battles would be lost long before hostilities commenced: they would be
lost by statesmen in the halls of parliament, in the Council of Ministers, or in the various
ministries of government where important resource decisions went against the interests of
stronger naval defenses. Building a Navy equal to the task of ensuring Peru’s security thus
placed a special burden on the statesman.31
Fully embracing his role as a Peruvian officer, Woodward then proceeded to define
what an adequate naval defense for Peru should look like. Its centerpiece, he argued, must be
the acquisition of enough capable vessels to deny potential enemies the ability to threaten
Peruvian shores, as Chilean naval and ground forces done in the War of the Pacific.32 As
justification Woodward cited French naval strategist René Daveluy’s assessment of Peru’s
predicament in that war. “If Peru would have been superior at sea,” Woodward quoted
31
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Daveluy, “it would have protected its territory without the need of a single soldier.” While
the nation’s “first concern” in the wake of the war “should have been the reorganization of its
navy,” he further cited Daveluy, in the decades that followed, Peru ignored the causes of its
defeat, minimized the Navy, and foolishly dedicated the lion’s share of its scarce defense
resources to the Peruvian Army.33 The implication was that for nearly four decades Peru’s
national policy had ceded control of the sea to an enemy it still very much feared, and with
whom it still had an unresolved border dispute. The solution, which Woodward would spell
out in considerable detail later, was the acquisition of vessels capable of securing and
maintaining command of the seas – not necessarily “battleships or cruisers of grand power,”
which Peru could not afford, but “destroyers, submarines, and airplanes which, although
small, play a very important role in naval warfare.” “If sufficient in number and properly
managed,” he concluded, “they will be capable of stopping an enemy squadron of much
larger, more powerful ships.”34
Woodward’s address, and reaction to it in other South American countries, caused
alarm in Washington. After the admiral’s remark’s began hitting newspapers in Chile and
Argentina, Frederick Simpich, a former State Department official working as a writer for the
Saturday Evening Post and Colliers, reported to Orme Wilson of the Department’s Division
of Latin American Affairs that Chilean and Argentine officials had expressed to him “a
strong dislike” for naval missions such as the ones the United States maintained in Peru and
Brazil. Simpich noted that officials in both countries’ Washington, DC embassies recognized
that the United States was “within its rights” to send such missions, but that the sight of
American officers drawing pay from these Governments created “suspicion and hostility”
33
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because the American officers’ efforts were “helping to increase the [size and capability of
the] navies of the countries,” and because those improved navies “might be employed against
Chile and Argentina in the future.” Moreover, Simpich noted, the officials had singled out
Admiral Woodward’s Navy Day activities for criticism: his action of laying a wreath on the
statue of Admiral Grau had “created a painful impression” in Chile in light of Washington’s
stance as independent arbitrator of the Tacna-Arica dispute as well as its position as an
advocate of “plans and conferences for the limitation of armament[s]” throughout Latin
America.35 At the same time, another official in the Department’s Division of Latin
American Affairs cautioned State Department leaders that assistance provided to Peru by the
United States through its naval mission would almost invariably “cause much comment in
other South American countries,” and that “this Government…will be severely criticised
therefor [sic.]” because of the mission’s activities.36
The State Department was taken by surprise because Woodward had crafted his
remarks at the Grau monument and his subsequent recommendations for a naval buildup
(detailed in Chapter 2) in close consultation with President Leguía and without notifying
Washington of his intentions. The fleet expansion he proposed called the purchase of six
destroyers, six submarines, and twenty-five military aircraft, as well as for the refurbishment
of the remainder of the Peruvian fleet and the construction of new stations ashore. In total, it
was a massive buildup given the diminutive stature of the Peruvian fleet at the time. The
price tag for all of this, reported to be approximately 6 million Peruvian Pounds, far exceeded
the size of the modest proposals Woodward’s predecessor had contemplated. The size and
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cost of the Woodward program, in the State Department’s view, was unacceptably large and
threatened to undermine the impartiality that underlay President Calvin Coolidge’s fledgling
efforts to mediate the Tacna-Arica dispute.37 If Woodward’s proposal were enacted, U.S.
foreign policymakers feared, other nations of the South America would see the United States
– and not just its naval officers in Peru – as proposing a destabilizing expansion of Peru’s sea
power at a time when Peruvian-Chilean relations begged for caution.
Upon receiving word of Woodward’s proposed expansion program, Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes pinpointed the heart of the diplomatic problem it posed for the United
States: such a quantitative and qualitative increase in Peru’s Navy, Hughes wrote to Navy
Secretary Edwin Denby, could easily be interpreted by the Chilean government as a hostile
act by the United States because, even though Woodward made the recommendation in his
capacity as a “Peruvian” naval officer, the fact was that he remained a commissioned officer
in the United States Navy and continued to draw pay from the American treasury. Foreign
governments, he suggested, would not necessarily understand the unique circumstances
under which U.S. officers in Peru served the Leguía government. The danger, he concluded,
was that if the impetus for a buildup of Peru’s Navy appeared to come from the United
States, it would undercut nascent U.S. efforts to find an “impartial” solution to the TacnaArica dispute. Not surprisingly, the State Department quickly sought to distance itself and
the Coolidge administration from any implication that American policy advocated a
destabilizing expansion of the Peruvian Navy. In fact, in attempting to control the damage
Secretary Hughes asked the Navy Department to have Woodward abandon any plans for
enlarging the Peruvian fleet or, if that proved impossible given his contractual status as an
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arm of the Peruvian state, that he “at least not to push the matter of increased armaments for
Peru.”38 Woodward’s deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign naval affairs had made him an
advocate of a policy, Peruvian naval expansion, that threatened to derail his own nation’s
interests in solving a persistent, seemingly intractable problem in inter-American affairs. The
controversy surrounding the Woodward proposal ended up subsiding when Washington gave
its blessing to more modest, “entirely defensive” naval building plans that were designed to
meet Leguía’s desires while not upsetting the delicate Tacna-Arica situation. However, the
episode did cause significant “embarrassment” in Washington, and underscored the unique
diplomatic problems that could arise from permitting U.S. naval personnel to serve
simultaneously in the U.S. and a foreign naval establishment.39
The difficulties that the naval mission’s deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign naval
affairs could cause for U.S. foreign policy came even more sharply into focus in the months
that followed. In March of 1925, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, William Collier, reported
that the press in the Chilean capital of Santiago had begun expressing grave concerns about
Peru’s unfolding naval building plans. A February 24, 1925 article in El Mercurio had noted
that Peru’s impending purchase of two R-Type submarines from the Electric Boat Company
was being received “with a great deal of interest by the public,” and suggested that even
though Peru professed to be building its fleet “to guard coastwise and international
commerce,” it seemed likely that the acquisition of submarines with the blessing of the U.S.
naval mission was “merely the first step in the unfolding of Peru’s plans.” The article
expressed concern that “the submarines that have been ordered are twice as large as those of
38
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Chile,” and that under U.S. tutelage Peru appeared also to be arming a large air force
equipped with naval airplanes. In sum, the article noted fearfully, it appeared that Peru had
plans to create a fleet “that will make her one of South America’s foremost naval powers.” A
February 27 editorial in the same paper suggested that the only objective of such an
aggressive program – one intended to “create an Army and Navy capable of competing with
ours” – was “revenge” for Chile’s triumph in the War of the Pacific. It went so far as to
suggest that Leguía was plotting “a war of revenge” in order to “make Peruvians forget the
persecutions that attend the regime of Mr. Leguía.”40
CHALLENGES: A MILITARY MISSION

Despite such concerns the United States remained committed to keeping its naval
mission in Peru even as it became clear, following the Woodward episode, that overt U.S.
military support for Leguía could compromise Washington’s broader interests in the region.
Triggered in part by Leguía’s desire to expand the Peruvian fleet, these concerns were
heightened by the dictator’s persistent pursuit between 1920 and 1925 of a U.S. military
mission to provide his Army with the same kind of direction and assistance that the American
naval mission was providing to the Peruvian Navy. He first considered seeking a U.S.
military mission while courting the naval mission in 1919 and 1920, but, perhaps recognizing
that Washington saw a naval mission as better suited to promoting its interests in the region,
opted to take what he could get at the time and revisit the issue of a military mission in the
future.41
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Leguía’s tenacity in pursuing a U.S. military mission in subsequent years
demonstrates very clearly that he was far from a passive recipient of U.S. actions and that,
indeed, he intended to play the United States for maximum benefit. In April of 1923, months
after the renewal of the naval mission’s contracts had cemented U.S. ties to his government,
Leguía dispatched his son, Juan, to raise the idea of a U.S. military mission directly with
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes in Washington. The tack the younger Leguía took
in broaching the idea reflects his father’s attentive focus on Washington’s interests in South
America, and specifically, its desire to supplant Europe as the dominant strategic and
commercial player on that continent. In his meeting with Hughes, Juan Leguía presented the
idea of a military mission for Peru as an opportunity for the United States to continue rolling
back European influence in South America. He indicated that his father was contemplating
terminating Peru’s longstanding French military mission, on the grounds (which Hughes
recognized as suspect) that the mission’s chief, a figure widely respected in Peru, was
engaged in graft against the government. The younger Leguía proceeded to state that his
father would “probably remove” the mission chief from command of the Peruvian Army, and
then said that in “his own view” Peru’s Army, like its Navy, would be better off in the future
under the charge of American officers. For his part, in relaying the substance of his
conversation with the younger Leguía to U.S. Ambassador Miles Poindexter in Lima,
Secretary Hughes advised that from a policy point of view he considered the moment
“inopportune” for sending Leguía a military mission because the Tacna-Arica dispute
remained unresolved, and because the United States did not want to disturb ongoing Pan-
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American discussions on limiting military and naval armaments.42
Still Leguía persisted. He gauged U.S. willingness again in 1924 in the hope that the
glacial progress being made in the U.S.-brokered talks on Tacna-Arica might soften
Washington’s resistance.43 His August 1924 query came to Washington via naval mission
member Charles Gordon Davy, the Director of the Escuela Naval (Peruvian Naval
Academy), who relayed a message to Ambassador Poindexter with a familiar ring to it:
“great dissatisfaction exists [within the Leguía administration] with the French Military
Mission,” and Leguía would likely seek a new mission “from some other country” when the
French contract expired. Sending the request through the U.S. naval mission, whose
members were firmly on the inside of the dictator’s inner circle, made it clear that, to Leguía,
“some other country” was the United States. As it had the year before, though, Washington
held firm. Despite some very limited progress in negotiations, a solution on Tacna-Arica
remained elusive, and relations between Peru and Chile continued to be strained. Together,
this meant that the moment was still inopportune for the United States to comply with
Leguía’s wishes. As Ambassador Poindexter noted, should the United States comply with
Leguía’s request, “the junction of both a Naval and a Military Mission from the United States
in one country would give a handle that the anti-United States press [in Latin America]
would be quick to grasp.”44
Undaunted, Leguía tried again in late 1925 when the untimely death of the French
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mission chief presented him with an opportunity to again force the issue with Washington.
Approaching Poindexter directly in late December, Leguía again stressed that he wanted an
American officers to direct and administer Peru’s Army.45 State Department fears of
destabilizing the Tacna-Arica negotiations persisted, however, and continued to weigh
against complying with Leguia’s request. But the dictator’s persistence finally forced the
American diplomats to be more forceful in responding. On the one hand, the Washington
needed to maintain a happy and compliant Leguía who favored American commercial
interests in Peru and who continued to look to the United States for capital and technical
expertise. On the other hand, though, it was clear that the United States had to be sensitive to
broader regional concerns and could not grant Leguía all that he asked. As Secretary
Hughes’s response to this Leguía overture demonstrates, from that point forward, the
objective became containing him – ensuring he had enough U.S. support to maintain his
ardently pro-American leanings, but not so much that he could threaten regional stability. So
long as the Tacna-Arica situation remained unresolved, Hughes instructed, it would remain
“impossible” to send a military mission to Peru. But rather than risk alienating a firm ally
even further with such an outright denial, the Secretary noted, the ambassador should only
explain to Leguía that the 1920 law that had authorized naval missions for Latin America in
the first place had covered only naval personnel and did not specifically authorize sending
personnel from other military services.46 By taking this approach, Hughes believed, the
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United States could stall the issue further, keeping Leguía in the pro-American fold while
protecting its impartiality before the world as arbitrator of the Peruvian-Chilean border
dispute.
Containing Leguía’s ambitions became more of a challenge after the U.S. Congress
passed, and President Calvin Coolidge signed, legislation in May 1926 authorizing the
sending of U.S. Army and Marine Corps personnel to military missions abroad. This action
removed what had become the State Department’s key public justification for not sending
Leguía a military mission. Because the real, underlying reason (Tacna-Arica) for not sending
a mission remained, when newspapers in Lima began reporting the U.S. Congressional
action, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg instructed Ambassador Poindexter to simply dodge
the issue should Leguía continue to push. “Please endeavor if possible to avoid the subject at
the present time,” he advised, adding that “should President Leguia again bring up the
question you may express appreciation and readiness to inquire again regarding the
Department’s attitude.”47 Washington continued to defer, neither sending Leguia a military
mission nor clearly denying him one, until, in May 1927, the Peruvian president called the
American bluff and appointed a German officer, William Faupel, as Chief of Staff of the
Peruvian Army.48 The move demonstrated yet again that, while he had strong pro-American
leanings, Leguía was willing to act independently of Washington when it suited his needs.
And while the move reawakened some U.S. worries about European influence in Peru49, they
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did not outweigh concerns about possibly enflaming tensions between Peru and Chile over
their still-disputed border. Moreover, U.S. officials were not overly concerned in the 1920s
with German military influence in Peru.50 Managing Leguía’s ambitions while the delicate
negotiations over Tacna-Arica progressed was a higher priority into 1927 than trying to
counteract German influence over Peru’s Army. In the end, only when the Tacna-Arica
question was settled, in 1929, did Washington seriously entertain sending Leguia the U.S.
Army advisers he had desperately wanted for most of the decade.
As Leguía’s push for a military mission in the early 1920s demonstrates, even as he
sought closer ties with the United States, the dictator grew quite adept at challenging
Washington when he believed it would help him achieve his goals. The U.S. naval mission’s
presence was a source of strength that helped make this growing assertiveness possible.
First, by 1925 it was clear that the mission had developed into a source of secure, predictable
support for Leguía and that the United States had no interest in removing it. Despite the
diplomatic headaches caused by Admiral Woodward’s recommendations, and despite the fact
that they had to constantly parry Leguía’s numerous attempts to secure a military mission,
offered them [to send a military mission]. The appointment of a German head of the Army and the additional
German officers which it implies, is expected to lead to the purchase of a large proportion of the Peruvian
military supplies of all kinds from German dealers. This is an important element in the foreign business of the
country and it may be expected that the enterprising German merchants will take full advantage of it...In one
stroke it has done more than anything that has occurred since the war to advance and enhance the standing of
Germans and of Germany in this Latin-American country. It is looked upon as correspondingly a lost
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American foreign policymakers continued to perceive enough value in the naval mission to
render its withdrawal highly unlikely. Throughout 1924, 1925, and 1926, even as they
recognized the nature of Leguía’s strengthening dictatorship, U.S. diplomats continued to
advocate closer relations in light of growing American interests in Peru and throughout the
region. At the same time, they wrote to Washington with nothing but consistent praise for the
mission’s work, calling it a source of prestige for the United States and a vehicle for
developing closer, more cooperative relations with Peru.51 Second, even though Washington
developed concerns about its officers’ dual status, and came to insist on amending their
contracts to protect them from involvement in potential Peruvian wars, by the contracts they
signed with Leguía’s government the mission’s officers did become integral parts of the
Peruvian Navy and incurred certain obligations to Leguía as commander-in-chief. As Chief
of the General Staff, for example, the U.S. mission chief attended weekly meetings
(recuerdos) with the president on naval affairs to which the civilian Minister of Marine was
not privy.52 And from very early on, seldom did Leguía attend high-profile public events
without a member of the naval mission close by.53 As historian Lawrence Clayton notes, by
virtue of Leguía’s interest in naval affairs and their placement at the top of the Peruvian
Navy, U.S. naval mission members enjoyed “extraordinary access to power.”54
By ensuring close, continuing contact between Leguía and the officers of the
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American mission, these meetings gave weight to the Peruvian half of mission members’
dual status and, over time, helped the dictator draw the mission into his inner circle and give
it an importance out of proportion to its mandated functions of ensuring the “proper
organization of the Peruvian Navy” and the instructing and training its personnel.55 Evidence
of this closeness appeared as early as 1923, when, at Leguía’s personal request, the first chief
of the mission, Frank B. Freyer (Captain, U.S. Navy), embarked on a tour of southern Peru
with the purely propagandistic mission of drumming up public support for the government’s
naval plans. As reported by La Prensa, the Lima daily taken over by the Leguía government
in 1921, Freyer traveled to the mountain cities of Cuzco, Puno, and Arequipa – inland from
Peru’s lengthy coastline and high in the Andes mountains – to “awaken the interest of the
youths of the mountainous regions in affairs of the sea and of the Navy.” The idea driving
the trip, Freyer argued to the assembled crowds, was that “the Navy should not be considered
as a luxury belonging only to rich countries,” but rather should be recognized as an
indispensible contributor to the whole nation’s security. The subtext of Freyer’s public
remarks was that all Peruvians, whether they lived near the coast, high in the Andes, or in
Peru’s eastern rainforest region, had a stake in the development of strengthened naval
defenses. In each city he spoke to crowds on Leguía’s rationale for a strong Navy, and
supplemented his presentations with (as La Prensa reported) “the portentous invention of
moving pictures” depicting U.S. Navy vessels at sea – a stroke that was no doubt intended to
wow the locals while presenting “vividly to the men of the great Andean altitudes the
problem of national defense” as Leguía saw it.56 For his mission Freyer garnered the praise
55

See description of naval mission duties included in Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Lima
(Sterling), September 23, 1924, RG 59, File 823.30/24, National Archives.
56

U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Peru to Secretary of State, February 21, 1923, RG 59, File 823.30/29, National
Archives.
139

of his own government (U.S. Chargé Sterling noted he showed “both ability and tact” and
“added to the prestige of our country”) and the thanks of his Peruvian commander-in-chief.
Upon completing his stint as naval mission chief later that year, Leguía bestowed upon
Freyer the rank of Rear Admiral in the Peruvian Navy and lauded him as a credit to the
institution.57
CHALLENGES: HAROLD GROW

The officer who did the most to strengthen Leguía’s ties to the naval mission – and
whose relationship with the dictator did the most to complicate U.S. foreign policy – was
Harold B. Grow (Commander, U.S. Navy), who arrived in Lima in January of 1924 in
response to Leguía’s request for an officer to lead Peru’s nascent naval aviation service. As
he embarked on his duties, beginning with the establishment of the naval aviation school at
Ancón, Grow very quickly developed a strong rapport with Leguía and became one of the
dictator’s most trusted advisers. A contributing factor to their personal and professional
closeness was the fact that the two men had similar visions of aviation’s place both in Peru’s
national defense and its economic development. Within the realm of national defense,
Grow’s vision for aviation aligned with Leguía’s plans to rebuild Peru’s Navy around
submarines and aircraft, the latter of which the president deemed “necessary for the national
defense” in an address to the Peruvian Congress in October of 1924.58 Shortly after arriving
in Lima, Grow, who had helped establish the U.S. Navy’s new Bureau of Aeronautics
immediately prior to his assignment to the naval mission in Peru, went on record arguing that
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aircraft had an “integral” role to play in the nation’s future naval defenses.59 In 1925 he
amplified his argument in the pages of the Revista de Marina, calling airpower “uniquely and
exceptionally applicable” to Peru’s peculiar national defense challenges because aircraft
could “most rapidly help to overcome the existing deficiency in the [nation’s] naval defense
forces, with a minimum expenditure of money.” Moreover, he argued in terms wholly
consistent with Leguía’s view of Peruvian national defense, superiority in aircraft “might
mean the saving of the country” in war while the lack of a naval aviation capability “would
most surely spell defeat to a country inferior in other branches” of armed power.60
Grow’s views comported with Leguía’s in the realm of civil aviation as well. Leguía
had made overcoming Peru’s difficult geography and uniting its distinct regions (the costa,
sierra, and selva) into a coherent, traversable whole a priority of his Patria Nueva program of
economic development. Throughout his Oncenio, for example, he directed a near-doubling
of the national road system (from 10,643 kilometers in 1926 to 19,465 in 1930), which
historian Peter Klarén notes improved communications, helped the government “expand its
reach into remote areas and extend its authority as never before,” and significantly increased
the flow of trade and commerce to the nation’s remote interior.61 Grow saw the naval
aviation service as a complement to Leguía’s effort to knit the country together. Eventually,
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he imagined, it would be a seedbed from which a broader national aviation program could
grow – one that would forge permanent links across Peru’s geographical barriers and permit
free flows of trade, commerce, and communication throughout the nation. From his earliest
days in Peru, Grow hung a map of the country in his office at the naval aviation school in
Ancón which labeled much of its interior as “unknown” or “unexplored,” something he later
said hung “like a burden” over his head.62 Early on he resolved to address the problem by
proposing the establishment of a network of air routes that would carry mail, trade, and
passengers from Lima over the high peaks of the Andes into the nation’s interior. The city he
identified as the air route’s eastern terminus, the city of Iquitos, was an important Amazon
River port that, once fully integrated into the nation’s economy, could significantly enhance
Peru’s international trade prospects. It was an idea that met with Leguía’s immediate
approval. Concerned about Peru’s unsettled borders and anxious to break the bonds of
commercial and cultural interaction that bound many of eastern Peru’s peoples to populations
in neighboring countries, the dictator shared Grow’s optimism about the potential of air
routes to enhance Peru’s security and economic prospects, and authorized funds so
preliminary work could begin.
With the president’s backing, in September 1926 Grow set out with a small party on
an overland roundtrip to survey the terrain and climatic conditions with which future air
linkages would have to contend, as well as to identify possible locations for air stations and
landing fields between Lima and Iquitos. The journey followed the same treacherous path
that intra-Peruvian trade and mail delivery routinely had to confront. The group started out
from Lima on the Central Railroad of Peru for the interior city of Oroya, then proceeded the
next day via automobile to La Merced before hiring a mule train and spending eight long
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days traversing trails only wide enough for single-file passage while contending with
torrential rains, abundant mosquitoes and “insects of all shapes and sizes.” Upon arriving at
the head of the Pichis River, Grow’s group then hired canoes piloted by indigenous guides
for a three-day journey to Puerto Bermudas, where they boarded the naval gunboat Napo,
which carried them the rest of the way to Iquitos. The return trip to Lima took longer – thirty
days – due to difficulty crossing rivers that ran high with the Peruvian spring. In total, the
difficult journey to Iquitos and back took fifty-four days to complete. Along the way, Grow
selected sites for the three air stations (San Ramon in the Chanchamayo Valley, Masisea on
the Ucayali River, and Iquitos) that would anchor the air link. He also selected the aircraft he
believed best suited to takeoffs and landings on the kinds of short runways that would be
built both in the mountains and in the thickly-vegetated Amazon basin, and settled on a
preliminary four-stage transportation plan on which the project could proceed. Grow’s
design envisioned that when the route between Lima and Iquitos was fully operational,
passengers, mail, and commerce would travel from Lima to Oroyo by rail, from Oroya to San
Ramon via automobile, and would fly from San Ramon to Masisea before continuing by air
to Iquitos. The total journey, which had ranged on average between twenty and thirty days
over land in each direction, would be cut to three days.63 By 1928 the groundwork had been
laid and flights between San Ramon and Iquitos were beginning to occur with increasing
regularity. In January of that year, with Leguía’s backing, Grow established a governmentsupported airline, La Linea Aérea Nacional al Oriente, and by 1929 the air link between the
costa and the selva ran routinely enough that the government considered expanding similar
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routes to other cities in Peru’s eastern interior.
Grow’s achievements in building the Lima-Iquitos air link impressed Leguía and
distinguished the officer as someone with strong organizational and administrative skills who
could quickly deliver positive results. Those results, on top of the success he had had in
building the naval aviation school at Ancón (discussed in Chapter 2), strengthened Grow’s
influence over Peruvian aviation matters and helped deepen his personal and professional
relationship with the president.64 In December of 1926 this growing closeness took on an
official flavor when Grow signed a five-year contract with the Peruvian government and
accepted de facto supervision of all aviation in Peru – civil as well as military and naval.65
By design it was a longer contract than the typical two- to three-year agreements signed by
other members of the naval mission. As Sharon Pope notes, Leguía did not want his aviation
priorities to fall victim to turnovers in personnel.66 Consequently, along with the position
came direct access to power and an extraordinarily high profile.
Expecting that supervision of Peru’s fledgling aviation establishment would require
his undivided attention, and cognizant of the fact that U.S. Navy authorities were unlikely to
permit him to extend his tour in Peru beyond early 1927, Grow chose to accepted Leguía’s
offer to remain. He resigned his commission in the active duty U.S. Navy and opted for a
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commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve. While regular naval mission members drew salaries
from the U.S. Navy as well as the Peruvian treasury, Grow’s new reserve status came with no
American pay. The practical effect was that in both institutional and financial terms, he
would have the freedom to remain in Peru and serve Leguía indefinitely.67 In making this
choice, Grow stepped beyond the difficult balance that other members of the naval mission
had struck between carrying out their obligations as Peruvian officers while taking care not to
entangle themselves too deeply in Peru’s sovereign affairs. His contract ensured that he
would be working directly for Leguía and, although he would remain a member of the naval
mission in name, it also virtually guaranteed that his work would proceed outside established
channels.68 Comfortable with Leguía and accustomed to unfettered access, it was a modus
operandi that Grow immediately embraced. In 1927 he urged Leguía to create a single
bureaucracy that would consolidate his control over all aviation within Peru. Such an
agency, he argued, would make management of money, equipment and personnel more
efficient. Moreover, it would permit the purchase of standardized equipment, and would
enable better coordination of training efforts. Quickly persuaded, Leguía presented a bill
drafted by Grow to the Peruvian congress, which approved it in February of 1928. Grow’s
appointment as the new agency’s head – to the post of Director General of Aviation – was a
foregone conclusion.69
As Director General of Aviation, Grow’s proximity to power enabled him to directly
advance American interests while laboring for Leguía’s priorities. He was sensitive, for
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example, to the interests of American airplane manufacturers and keen to prevent non-U.S.
firms from making significant inroads into the Peruvian market, stipulating that the
government-backed airline he had established would fly only American-made planes.70 He
continued to push for acquisitions of U.S. planes even after Peru began suffering severe
effects of the Great Depression, signing a contract with the United Aircraft Corporation for
twenty-six naval aircraft in January 1930.71 More significant than his commitment to
acquiring American-built aircraft, however, were his efforts to preserve an advantage for U.S.
airlines seeking entry into the Peruvian market. As discussed in Chapter 2, in early 1928
Grow paved the way for Pan American Airways to win the Leguía administration’s
concession to establish an air mail, cargo, and passenger service between the United States
and Peru. When that line began operating in May of 1929, it reduced transit time for
communications between the two countries from weeks to a matter of days.72 The speed with
which Pan-American’s work on the U.S. air mail route progressed convinced Grow that the
airline would soon be poised to expand its operations from Peru to other South American
nations. Accordingly, in late 1928 he prevailed upon Leguía (who had been poised to
approve it) to deny a concession to the French firm Aeropostale for the creation of an air link
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between Iquitos and the northern Brazilian state of Pará.73 And in early 1929 Grow’s
continued lobbying against allowing non-American airlines into Peru caused Leguía to
disapprove a proposal by the Colombian-German airline SCADTA (Sociedad ColomboAlemana de Transportes Aéreos) to service select cities in northern Peru.74
SUPPORTING DICTATORSHIP

While it cleared the way for American supremacy in Peruvian aviation, Grow’s work
also complemented ever-increasing levels of U.S. investment in Peru, advanced Leguía’s
Patria Nueva agenda, and contributed to growth in the Peruvian economy.75 At the same
time, it undeniably facilitated more intimate U.S. ties with Leguía, and, by extension, helped
strengthen the dictator’s hold on power. Their close relationship portended a broader pattern
developing in U.S.-Latin American relations. As Grow intensified his relationship with
Leguía, U.S. hemispheric policy began undergoing something of a sea change. In the face of
increasingly vocal opposition throughout the hemisphere, Washington began in the late
1920s to back away from its longstanding dependence on armed interventionism as a tool of
its relations Latin American nations.76 Little more than a month after assuming the American
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presidency, Herbert Hoover, who had held the chairmanship of the Inter-American High
Commission while serving as President Calvin Coolidge’s Secretary of Commerce, made his
opposition to U.S. interventionism in Latin America clear. In an April 1929 address to the
Gridiron Club of Washington, the new U.S. president declared that it “ought not be the policy
of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our citizens
and foreign states or their citizens.”77 Later that year he stressed in an address to the U.S.
Congress that, although U.S. Marines remained on long-term occupation duty in Nicaragua
and Haiti, in the future the United States did “not wish to be represented abroad in such
manner.”78 To end those interventions, and to render similar actions unnecessary in the
future, Washington would need to find other means of maintaining stability in the region.
The formula that eventually came to characterize the non-interventionist “good neighbor”
approach consisted principally of lending political, material, and monetary support to Latin
American leaders that Washington saw as capable of maintaining that much-desired
stability.79 It was precisely the kind of relationship the United States had been developing
with Leguía since 1919, a relationship to which the naval mission had been indispensable.
By the time Hoover’s Latin America policy began to take shape, the U.S. State Department
had spent nearly a decade recognizing the dictatorial nature of Leguía’s regime. However,
because the dictator favored U.S. interests and demonstrated an ability to shield them from
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harm with an iron-handed political stability, it offered him increasing levels of U.S. support.
In this way, the American relationship with Leguía represents a trial run for good
neighborism.
When Hoover made his landmark seven-week “goodwill tour” of Latin America as
president-elect between November of 1928 and January of 1929, the State Department
adviser assigned to brief him on Peru prior to his arrival there, G. Butler Sherwell, gave this
emerging reality clear expression. In a background memorandum for Hoover he noted that
Leguía exercised “practically autocratic power” within Peru, and acknowledged that
elections there were “free only in theory.” He further wrote that the Peruvian Supreme Court
was “nothing more than an instrument for his [Leguía’s] wishes” while Peru’s prisons were
“known to be filled with political prisoners” who had opposed Leguía. Only token
opposition to Leguía could be said to exist within the Peruvian political establishment.
Peru’s national Congress was packed with pro-Leguía deputies who made it their business to
“pass any measure upon which he insists,” Sherwell continued, while locally, the prefects of
Peru’s provinces were “personally appointed by the President and are responsible to him.”
These transgressions were acceptable, he wrote, because it was clear to the State Department
– as it had been to American diplomats very early on80 – that Leguía was “a man of great
energy, ability and vision” whose close economic and political ties to the United States were
“one of his main points of support.” In pointing out Leguía’s simultaneous dependency on
repressive rule and American friendship, the State Department acknowledged that embedded
within his rule were the seeds of its own possible demise. Moreover, the State Department
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perceived that the United States had a stake in keeping those seeds from germinating and
growing: Leguía could not afford to have “the existence or efficiency of that friendship [with
the United States] called into question,” Sherwell concluded. As long as his relationship with
Washington and New York bankers remained strong, Sherwell cautioned Hoover, Peru could
continue to finance its massive program of public works improvements and achieve the
economic gains the dictator needed to continue diverting Peruvians’ attention away from the
state of their nation’s internal politics and “the lamentable state” of their government’s
services. Absent Washington’s support, the State Department signaled, Leguía’s days could
be numbered.81
As Leguía’s Director General of Aviation, Grow’s proximity to the center of power
made him an important asset in lending Leguía the strong measure of U.S. support he needed.
At the same time, however, this access, and the wide-ranging powers he wielded over the
aviation establishment, blurred the established lines of authority that had governed the naval
mission’s activities since its earliest days. Upon Grow’s appointment as head of all aviation
in Peru, naval mission chief A.G. Howe stressed to Washington that “it was distinctly
understood that it [Grow’s appointment] should not in any way interfere with the fact” that
Grow remained a member of the Naval Mission and, as such, subject to the orders and
jurisdiction of the Head of the Mission.82 As Grow accumulated more power and influence
with Leguía, Howe sensed that his own position of influence with the president was
beginning to wane. He subsequently sought clarification from ONI that, even though Grow
occupied a new position with broad national responsibilities within Peru, the Inspector
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General of Aviation was still “a member of the Naval Mission and, as such, one of my
subordinates.”83 But there was little that Washington could say or do to alter the reality on
the ground. Having resigned his active duty commission in the U.S. Navy and signed a
contract directly with Leguía, Grow was an independent operator, come what may.
THE END OF THE ONCENIO

Developments throughout 1929 and 1930 exposed just how serious a challenge
Grow’s close relationship with Leguía – and his deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs
– posed for U.S. foreign policy. The crash of the U.S. stock market in October 1929, and the
precipitous decline of the world economy in the months that followed, wreaked havoc in
Peru and strained Leguía’s close relationship with the United States. It directly threatened
the foundation of his political strength.84 For more than ten years Leguía had courted favor
with politicians in Washington and bankers in New York, efforts which paid off handsomely
as American firms injected tens of millions of dollars in American capital into Peruvian
industry and infrastructure projects. That massive, sustained infusion of U.S. capital had
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fueled impressive rates of economic growth in Peru for most of the 1920s.85 Although it was
founded on high levels of indebtedness, Leguía’s stewardship of the Peruvian economy and
emphasis on public works improvements had, in turn, caused many Peruvians to overlook or
at least stomach his dictatorial methods. By 1929, however, what had previously been
disparate threads of opposition to his rule began to coalesce following his rigged reelection to
a third five-year term, a move which historian Daniel Masterson notes “led his opponents to
believe his regime would go on indefinitely.”86 When the global economic crisis froze the
long-reliable flow of loans into Peru from the United States, the foreign capital-dependent
Peruvian economy ground to a halt. There was little left to divert the public’s attention from
Leguía’s repressive rule and his intimate association with the United States.87 Twin
backlashes against Leguía and his benefactor ensued. American embassy personnel reported
growing public unrest and political instability throughout late 1929 and 1930. Worse for
Leguía, there was growing unrest within the Peruvian Army, whose political influence he had
long feared.88 In July 1930 the extent of the problem became clear to U.S. naval mission
chief William S. Pye during a public presentation by the French ambassador to Peru of a
motion picture celebrating the French Revolution on Bastille Day. With Leguía in
attendance, Pye reported, the Peruvian crowd “stamped and cheered at each scene depicting
the success of the revolutionists.” The crowd’s demonstrated approval “of the ideas of the
French revolutionists,” Pye noted, was remarkable both for its intensity and for the fact that it
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took place in the president’s presence. Its effect was clear and jarring, he concluded: “the
Head of Mission was conscious from that date of a decrease in the feeling of security usually
manifested by the President.”89
By August of 1930, as policymakers in Washington were just beginning to realize it,
members of the U.S. naval mission saw that the writing for Leguía’s dictatorship was on the
wall. In the new political environment, the naval mission, long seen by Washington as a
stabilizing force in Peru, had become a diplomatic liability. It had become too closely
associated with a single man. In mid-August Pye reported that the political situation “had
become so bad that the Head of Mission decided that a change from the executive to the
advisory status was essential,” meaning that American personnel should relinquish command
of the Peruvian Navy at the earliest possible moment. He made the decision believing that
the naval mission’s executive control of the Peruvian Navy “was recognized as a Leguía
Policy” and could become a lightning rod for public opposition. A substantial weakening of
the president’s power could subject the mission to political attack “even under the best
possible circumstances.”90 On August 20th Pye sent urgent follow-up to both the State
Department and Navy Department imploring them to approve a change in the naval
mission’s status, while U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Ferdinand Mayer cabled Secretary of State
Henry Stimson to the same effect. In his note to Stimson, Mayer noted that opposition to the
naval mission’s continued executive control of Peru’s Navy was becoming widespread, and
that, in addition to the potential difficulties that could flow from having U.S. officers in
control of the Navy in the event of a coup against Leguía (which would no doubt invite
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attacks on the United States in the Peruvian congress), there was among Peruvian naval
officers “a growing feeling that after ten years of administrative control and training
received, they should now have administrative control.”91 In a later assessment Pye
concurred with the Chargé and expressed “sympathy” with the Peruvian officers’ position,
noting that a belief existed “among the higher ranking officers” that “after ten years training
by the Mission, they are capable of self administration.” Moreover, Pye added, senior
members of Peru’s naval officer corps recognized, as did the Americans, that “a revolution
was not far distant” and that Peruvians should be in charge of their own Navy when it
came.92
The revolution came four days later, led by a politically-minded Army officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, who led an uprising from his command in the
southern city of Arequipa. Within twenty-four hours three of Peru’s five military districts
had abandoned Leguía and joined the revolution. Public discontent, so widespread since the
Peruvian economy had begun its Depression-induced tailspin, gave the revolution critical
nourishment. Harold Grow’s closeness to Leguía placed him at the center of the emerging
turmoil, and complicated Washington’s efforts to manage and protect American interests
amid the growing chaos. It worked at cross-purposes with the naval mission’s efforts to
assume an advisory status because, from the time the revolution broke out, Grow dedicated
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himself to preserving the dictator’s hold on power. It was Grow, for example, who first
notified the officers of the naval mission on the afternoon of August 22nd that a revolution
seemed afoot in the south of Peru. And it was Grow who huddled with Leguía through the
night of August 22nd plotting strategy to quell the uprising. At Leguía’s insistence and over
Admiral Pye’s strenuous objections, Grow then accepted the lead role in a flight operation
intended to report to Leguía on conditions in the south and to “drop proclamations over
Arequipa denying false charges against the Government which had been used to incite the
revolution.” Pye voiced his opposition to Grow’s participation, stressing that it was
dangerously “inconsistent with his status as an officer of the Naval Mission.” While
dropping leaflets could hardly be considered an act of war, Pye admitted, carrying out the
mission would require planes to land and refuel in areas of southern Peru where government
control was not assured, meaning they could be subject to capture by elements of Sánchez
Cerro’s revolutionary movement. But there was little the naval mission chief could do to
stop it, and Grow’s proximity to power again carried the day. Following direct orders from
President Leguía, airplanes flew south on August 23rd. At the dictator’s personal insistence,
Grow had gone as their leader.93 His involvement in the operation, although not technically a
violation of the letter of his contract (which merely stated that Grow was “not obliged to take
part in any foreign or civil war in which Peru is engaged”), certainly violated the spirit in
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which it was written.94 A U.S. naval officer had become a partisan in an armed revolt within
Peru.
Grow was captured by Sánchez Cerro’s forces the morning of August 24th in
Camaná, approximately 430 miles south of Lima on the Peruvian coast, following an
overnight refueling stop. As the revolution gained momentum and neared Lima that
afternoon, Leguía sensed that the end of his rule was near. Within twenty-four hours of
Grow’s capture, Leguía submitted his resignation to the Peruvian congress and sought refuge
on the naval ship Almirante Grau, whose crew he hoped to persuade to take him to Panama.
However, Sánchez Cerro, who had quickly consolidated his hold on Peru’s military
establishment, ordered the ship attacked if it attempted to leave Callao with Leguía aboard.
In short order the former president was handed over to the governing Junta for trial and
judgment.95 Intent on trying Leguía and making examples out of those who had helped
prolong his dictatorship, Sánchez Cerro quickly zeroed in on the highly visible Grow, going
before the international press corps to call him “a mercenary who has been violating the rules
of public right.”96 The former aviation chief remained in custody for more than four months
in the wake of the revolution, facing charges that he had flown toward Arequipa in an armed
aircraft with the intent to bomb revolutionists’ positions.
Securing Grow’s release from captivity became a significant ongoing concern for the
Herbert Hoover administration throughout the latter months of 1930. In defending himself,
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the former Director General of Aviation – who for several years had held the naval mission at
arm’s length while directly serving Leguía – employed a surprising line or argument. Grow
wrote to new U.S. Ambassador Fred M. Dearing that “the idea that may have occurred to you
that I was independent of the Mission or had separated myself from it is probably due to the
more or less independant [sic.] nature of my work in the country. My present contract clearly
states that I am a member of the above mentioned Mission.”97 He further stated that he had
never taken an oath of allegiance to the Peruvian government and that, because he remained
attached to the U.S. naval mission, the only person authorized in his contract to interpret his
actions and administer discipline was that mission’s lead officer.98 At the same time, Grow
felt the need to explain why he had gone much further than any other naval mission member
in supporting Leguía during the revolution. “The second clause of my contract,” he argued in
a separate letter to Dearing, “is very specific in obliging me to submit myself to ‘obey’ all
orders of the President of the Republic and the Minister of Marine.”99
Caught in the middle of an international diplomatic spat, Grow clearly tried to walk
back from the modus operandi that had governed his activities as Leguía’s Director General
of Aviation. His release on January 1, 1931 came only after several months of diplomatic
negotiation helped convince a Peruvian court of inquiry that Grow had not flown to Arequipa
with hostile intent.100 In the end, though, the energy with which he served Leguía made him
a polarizing figure in the highly-charged political environment that developed in Peru in 1929
and 1930. His deep involvement in Peru’s sovereign affairs had caused considerable
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difficulty for U.S. foreign policy. And perhaps more clearly than any previous episode, the
Grow affair exposed with devastating clarity the problems that could flow from allowing
American military personnel to serve as integral parts of another nation’s defense
establishment.
POST-LEGUÍA TURMOIL IN PERU

What followed Leguía’s overthrow was one of the most turbulent periods in Peru’s
political history, one that required the United States to retreat from the intimate ties it forged
with Peru throughout the Oncenio. The challenge for U.S. policy in the month and years
following the dictator’s downfall was finding a more cautious approach to relations that
acknowledged the disfavor with which a majority of Peruvians, suffering through a
devastating economic depression and alienated by years of U.S.-backed dictatorship, had
come to view the United States.101 Peru’s political turmoil during these years was driven in
large measure by the economic chaos that continued to wreak havoc in the Peruvian economy
throughout 1931 and 1932. The prices of Peru’s three most valuable agricultural exports –
sugar, cotton, and wool – plummeted by 22-percent, 42-percent, and 52-percent, respectively,
during the period. The nation’s extractive industries (principally copper and oil production),
which had eclipsed agriculture to produce the largest share of Peru’s exports under Leguía,
experienced similarly precipitous price declines in the face of a collapse in international
demand. Imports of finished goods, on which the raw material export-oriented Peruvian
economy depended, dropped by half as Peruvians’ purchasing power fell victim to a
depreciating currency, tightening credit markets, and a demand-killing combination of wage
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cuts and growing unemployment.102 Anti-U.S. sentiment, which had built up considerably
while Leguía was still in power, continued to grow even after he was gone. It reached a
breaking point in late 1931 when laborers of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining
company, protesting layoffs and wage cuts occasioned by falling export prices, clashed
violently with police at the company’s Mal Paso hydroelectric station. Thirteen miners died
in the confrontation, as did three American employees of the company when the
demonstrators, outraged at the conduct of the police, proceeded to ransack the station.103
U.S. efforts to reframe policy toward Peru were further complicated by the antiLeguía and anti-American political leanings of Peru’s new political leadership. While met
initially with broad public approbation, the anti-Leguía coup’s success could not by itself
begin to solve the nation’s underlying economic problems or the fiscal crisis they had
produced. Serving as the head of the provisional junta that took control following Leguía’s
ouster, Sánchez Cerro enjoyed several months of relative popularity. His political standing
had begun to erode, however, by late 1930 amid seemingly intractable economic difficulties
and growing opposition from political foes, chiefly the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (APRA, a leftist political party founded in opposition to the kind foreign political
and economic penetration on which Leguía had built his Oncenio) as well as from individuals
within Peru’s military establishment who resented Sánchez Cerro’s dogged pursuit of the
presidency.104 Sánchez Cerro’s political maneuvering angered a number of his fellow
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military officers, who believed the architect of the anti-Leguía coup should resign his
position with the junta before making a play to carve out a long-term political future. He
refused, however, and scheduled elections for late March of 1931. As Daniel Masterson
notes, within weeks of Sánchez Cerro’s February announcement of elections, Peru descended
into “open rebellion” and was “on the verge of civil war.” Sánchez Cerro sought to defuse
the potentially explosive situation in the only way he could, by agreeing to leave the scene
through temporary exile in France. It was a short-term political calculation. Although his
political enemies tried to prevent it, Sánchez Cerro returned to Peru in early July to contest
the election that, in his absence, had been scheduled for October.
Sánchez Cerro’s subsequent electoral triumph helped escalate what up to that point
had been mainly a political competition into a violent confrontation between APRA, which
saw his victory as illegitimate, and conservative political forces aligned with the new
president. Fearful that Sánchez Cerro would mobilize the power of the state in a campaign to
destroy their movement after his inauguration, APRA members turned to violence to effect
change they believed (unjustifiably, according to the Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre) they
had been cheated out of at the ballot box.105 Violent clashes between APRA activists and the
gained its most credible foothold within Haya’s homeland, where it appealed to Peruvians disgusted with
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armed forces ensued. Vowing to meet violence with force, Sánchez Cerro moved almost
immediately to crush APRA once and for all, thus validating the Apristas’ fears of the state’s
hostility.106 Within weeks, in late December 1931, the president ordered a police raid on
APRA headquarters in the city of Trujillo, in northwestern Peru, that wounded several party
leaders. Less than two months later, armed with near-dictatorial powers after the Peruvian
Congress had declared martial law, Sánchez Cerro ordered the arrest and exile of all twentythree Aprista lawmakers that had been elected to Congress during the same October elections
that had delivered him the presidency. The president intensified his efforts yet again
following a failed attempt on his life in early March by a young Aprista gunman inside a
church in the Miraflores section of Lima. The assassination attempt not only hardened
Sánchez Cerro’s resolve to destroy APRA, but heightened his determination to capture its
leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who he believed was directly responsible.
Haya’s capture by government forces on May 6, 1932 should have marked the
crowning success of Sánchez Cerro’s anti-Aprista efforts. However, it was followed quickly
by events that proved that the conflict with APRA was only growing more intense. The very
next day, around 9:00pm on May 7th, enlisted sailors onboard the Peruvian naval cruiser
Coronel Bolegnesi in Callao harbor (ten miles from central Lima) overpowered the guards on
board their ship, captured and locked up its officers, and ignited a rebellion they hoped would
spread throughout the Navy. The mutinous sailors could perhaps have been forgiven if their
grievances centered entirely on pay, which had been irregular because of the crisis
confronting the national treasury, or living conditions. But the demands they announced
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once the rebellion was underway ranged beyond narrowly naval concerns. The sailors, who
Robert Scheina notes came from the “lowest grades”107 of the naval service, presented a
proclamation calling for a number of the things that Peruvians suffering through economic
depression might have expected (and perhaps even sympathized with) from disgruntled
sailors: better treatment of enlisted personnel, greater regulation of the promotion process,
better quality food, and limits on the length of naval cruises. Their fifth demand, however,
that power be transferred from the military government of Sánchez Cerro to a new civilian
administration, had a distinctly political tone and raised red flags within the president’s inner
circle.
Sánchez Cerro, who was suspicious of the Navy because of its close relations with
Leguía, believed the hand of APRA was behind the Callao naval rebellion. His suspicion
was later proven to have some foundation in fact. As Peruvian scholar Jorge Ortiz Sotelo
notes, during the Bolognesi’s 1932 summer cruise stopover at a U.S. naval base in Panama, a
number of the ship’s junior enlisted personnel had met with exiled APRA representatives,
who shared with them the hope that, with the Navy’s help, “there would be an uprising
[against Sánchez Cerro] across several departments of the government.”108 Amid the tense
political environment of 1932, though, mere suspicion of APRA involvement was basis
enough in Sánchez Cerro’s view to take action. He ordered the mutinous crews be attacked
if they did not surrender by 5:00am the next morning. An hour before that deadline, the
president issued a communiqué calling the rebellion as “part of a revolutionary social plan”
that had as its goal not just the overthrow of the Peruvian government, but the sparking of a
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broader revolution of “Communist character” throughout South America.109 When the
leaders of the rebellion failed to heed the government’s demands to surrender, the Navy’s
loyal elements, which were able to coalesce only because of the efforts of a few key
personnel who escaped from the Bolognesi as the mutiny first got underway, opened fire in
the early morning hours using three naval aircraft and the deck gun of the submarine R-4
(one of four submarines purchased from the Electric Boat Company during Leguía’s reign).
Within minutes the mutineers hoisted a white flag above the Bolognesi, whose hull had been
pierced by a government volley that set its oil tank ablaze.
Although APRA leaders subsequently disclaimed any operational involvement in the
Callao naval mutiny of 1932, the party did see the rebellious sailors as making common
cause. In turn, they took the uprising’s failure as an opportunity to launch an even broader
offensive against the Sánchez Cerro government. APRA’s commitment to violent,
revolutionary action hardened. Its leaders began preparing to stage a major civil-military
revolt they hoped would capture the city of Trujillo (APRA’s power base) and expand
throughout the country. The plan’s success depended on the quick defeat of the
undermanned Peruvian Army garrison stationed there, which had more arms and ammunition
than its skeletal crew could effectively protect. Moving well before their planned steppingoff date, Aprista rebels, many of whom were irate sugar workers, attacked the undermanned
garrison on July 7th and captured it in four hours with relative ease. The city of Trujillo fell
under APRA control shortly thereafter. However, this rapid success, coming early as it did,
could not be duplicated in other regions of the country where APRA activists were not nearly
as prepared to move as were their counterparts in Trujillo. As a result, the revolt failed to
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expand much beyond Trujillo. The Sánchez Cerro government, facing an isolated local
revolt rather than the broad-based uprising APRA leaders had anticipated, responded by
unleashing a furious military response against the Aprista rebels there. On July 10th and
11th, government forces would pour into Trujillo and crush the revolt.
APRA’s de facto leader, Agustín Haya de la Torre (brother of the party’s jailed
founder), and his inner circle managed to flee the city ahead of government forces’ arrival.
Those who remained, though, would face the full wrath of Sánchez Cerro’s anti-APRA fury.
Not content to stand idly by and wait for an onslaught from government forces, the Apristas
lashed out, executing the thirty-five Army and Guardia Civil personnel they had been
holding since taking the garrison on the 7th. Five of the bodies were disfigured beyond
recognition. These executions enraged Sánchez Cerro, whose government forces unleashed a
terrible response after wresting the city from APRA control. Moving house to house through
the city, Peruvian troops rounded up all male residents, young and old, whose shoulders and
index fingers showed bruises or skin irritations that could be attributed to recent use of a
firearm.110 Whether one was a bona fide Aprista or not was irrelevant to Sánchez Cerro, who
intended to destroy the party once and for all. The suspected rebels were brought to the
nearby pre-Colombian ruins of Chan Chan, where more than one thousand were summarily
executed.111
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The violent struggle roiling Peru’s political establishment reached its apex just as a
border crisis with Colombia threatened to engulf Peru in an international war. On August
31, 1932, a band of Peruvian filibusters, angry about Peru’s cession of territory to Colombia
during the Leguía years, stormed the Amazon River port of Leticia in an attempt to recover
it.112 The move gave Peru’s domestic political crisis a complicated international dimension.
Sánchez Cerro, whose anti-Aprista campaign had helped buoy his popularity despite the
nation’s declining economic fortunes, initially condemned the filibusters’ action as the
isolated work of a few rogue communists, and pledged to work toward a settlement that
would preserve Colombia’s claim to the city. He did not count, however, on APRA
exploiting the crisis to try and undermine his government. Almost immediately the party
began producing propaganda hailing the filibusters as patriotic heroes, and criticizing
Sánchez Cerro for failing to back their brave action. The efforts paid off, as public opinion
quickly trended in the filibusters’ favor and against the president’s position. In an attempt to
forestall an erosion in his popularity, which he saw as vital to waging an effective fight
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against APRA, Sánchez Cerro reversed course and publicly threw his support behind the
filibusters. In doing so he accepted the risk that his action might lead, as in fact it did, to an
outbreak of hostilities with Colombia. Historian Frederick Pike calls Sánchez Cerro’s
decision reluctant, and argues that it was made not only to preserve the popularity he felt he
needed to maintain in order to successfully pursue his overriding objective of destroying
APRA, but because to the lowly Lieutenant Colonel, who had experienced a meteoric rise
from a mid-level Army command to the Peruvian presidency in little more than a year, public
approbation was a “supreme good in itself.”113 As Peter Klarén notes, it was certainly a
decision Sánchez Cerro made with the politics of Peru’s deteriorating economy in mind. By
mid-1932 the former soldier had had little success combating the effects of the depression,
and had resorted to heightened deficit spending in an effort to mollify government and
military personnel who, he feared, could pose a threat if irregularities in their pay were not
resolved.114 But the end result was that, whether he did so reluctantly or not, Sánchez Cerro
had moved Peru toward war with Colombia in order to enhance his domestic political
standing and advance his campaign against APRA. Shortly after coming out publicly in
favor of the Leticia filibusters, Sánchez Cerro appointed General Oscar Benavides, Peru’s
most widely-respected military figure and a former provisional president of the nation, to
command of operations in the Leticia region. In short order, Benavides ordered the
conscription of all males between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five.115 With Peru and
Colombia were on the verge of war, the position of the U.S. naval mission in Lima grew
quite tenuous.
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THE END OF THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION

The more cautious orientation of U.S. policy after Leguía left the naval mission, a
product of Washington’s closeness with the dictator and a tangible investment in his rule,
somewhat in limbo. In the immediate weeks and months following the revolution, the key
question confronting the mission was what its continuing functions should be amid the new,
highly uncertain political conditions. Very quickly its chief, Pye, decided on the least
controversial option. The mission’s principal focus, he decided, would be to build on what
Peruvians and Americans alike had long recognized as the biggest success of the mission’s
tenure to date: enhancing Peru’s system of naval education. In the new, post-Leguía political
environment, in which Peruvian officers exercised executive control of their own Navy
(including the Escuela Naval), this meant the creation and development of a Naval War
College to prepare mid-level officers for senior leadership positions. Establishment of such
an institution had been on the U.S. mission’s agenda at least since mid-1929, when Admiral
Pye first endorsed the idea as a way of enhancing the professionalism of the Navy’s officer
corps. It was such a popular idea that even a noted opponent of the naval mission, a retired
Rear Admiral and Senator from Peru’s northwestern Lambayeque province, called in early
1930 for mission members to devote their efforts to “the creation of a School for Advanced
Naval Study.” Such an institution, he explained, could educate officers on “the experiences
of the last war” and to “explain the evolution which has occurred in strategic and technical
principles” as a result.116
But efforts to translate those plans into reality gained momentum only after the
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mission relinquished executive control and assumed an advisory status. In mid-September,
little more than two weeks after Leguía’s ouster, Pye wrote to the Director of Naval
Intelligence noting that the prevailing attitude in the Peruvian Navy had become “completely
demoralized” since the change in government, and that, given the difficult political
environment and the “impossibility of extensive operations due to the financial depression,”
the mission would endeavor “to emphasize naval education, in order to keep the minds of the
personnel occupied.”117 Naval mission members threw themselves into the task. In October,
on Peru’s “Navy Day,” the mission marked the inauguration of the Escuela Superior de
Guerra Naval (Naval War College) with an initial class of six officers, including two naval
aviators, and the opening of an abbreviated initial academic year of five months.118 In late
November, Pye reported that mission members’ lectures at the College were progressing
“satisfactorily,” and that students reported their course of study to be “the most complete
discussion of the subject of naval warfare in the Spanish language.” As the War College was
in its infancy, Pye noted, instructors could do little more than expose students to “the great
field of knowledge of naval operations” and “begin the compilation of material for future
instruction.”119 Still, by early 1931 the U.S. officers’ efforts on the War College made
enough of a positive impression on the Sánchez-Cerro government that, instead of seeking its
recall to Washington, the president sought renewal of the naval mission’s contracts. It was an
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unlikely turn of events, considering how Sánchez Cerro’s had viewed the mission (calling
Harold Grow a “mercenary”) immediately after toppling Leguía. Although Peru’s financial
difficulties would require a reduction in the number of officers assigned to the mission, the
Peruvian government expressed a desire to renew two members’ contracts for the sole
purpose of “conducting” the Naval War College.120
Yet even in an advisory capacity the mission’s work at the Naval War College posed
challenges for U.S. foreign policy, as mission members soon found themselves in the midst
of the turmoil over Leticia. As a routine part of his advisory duties at the Naval War College,
William O. Spears (Captain, U.S. Navy), who took over as chief of the naval mission in late
1931, regularly delivered lectures (in Spanish) on a variety of topics on everything from
international relations to naval strategy and tactics, as his predecessor, Pye, and fellow naval
mission members had done. In July 1932, the month before the Peruvian filibusters’ move
on Leticia, he delivered a series of lectures that featured a scenario closely resembling the
developing imbroglio with Colombia.121 The purpose of this scenario, as others he and his
colleagues developed in their lectures, was to provide students with a set of strategic and
operational problems for which they would have to develop and recommend solutions. In
this case, Spears presented a situation in which a state of war existed between Peru and
Colombia, and in which the Peruvian Navy planned to dispatch a number of gunboats on an
expedition from the Peruvian port of Iquitos (on the Amazon River) to Colombian territory
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on the north bank of the Putumayo River.122 Because of the geographic orientation of both
rivers, which flowed west-to-east within Peru and converged at a point inside Brazilian
territory, the expedition would require the Peruvian vessels to travel “several hundred miles”
through Brazilian waters before reaching the portion of the Putumayo comprising the
Peruvian-Colombian border. Although the Peruvian students’ findings and recommendations
in response to the scenario are not known, available evidence indicates that, in closing out
discussion of the issue, Spears lectured that under the circumstances such an expedition could
proceed because existing treaty arrangements between Peru and Brazil permitted it.
Specifically, he noted, a 1909 commercial treaty between the two nations conferred on
Peruvian vessels – including, Spears concluded, vessels of war – the right to pass through
“such Brazilian rivers as head wholly or partly in Peru.” Moreover, he concluded, that right
was confirmed by the protocols of the Barcelona Convention and Statute on Freedom of
Transit (1921), which guaranteed that Peru could “legally transport land forces and armed
vessels across the territory and waters of the Amazon to the Putumayo zone.”123
Informed of Spears’s July remarks in early September, only after Peruvians’ seizure
of Leticia, State Department reaction was swift and forceful. Upon receiving the dispatch
summarizing the lecture’s content, Selden Chapin, a staffer within the State Department’s
Division of Latin American Affairs, argued to that division’s chief, Edwin C. Wilson, that
even though the naval mission was laboring in an advisory capacity in Peru, “Spears is still
skating over extremely thin ice in lecturing on such subjects as this.” “His discussion,”
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Chapin concluded, “might easily be construed as ‘advice’ by the ignorant Peruvian
military.”124 The concerns Chapin raised in this situation were not unlike those the
Department had expressed in late 1923 when naval mission chief Clark Woodward had made
his recommendation to dramatically expand the size of the Peruvian Navy’s operating fleet: if
strategic decisions affecting the stability of Peru’s fragile relations with a neighboring
country appeared to emanate from the United States, American interests and policy in the
region could be jeopardized. The State Department was especially sensitive to implications
of U.S. meddling in this case because, since coming into office in 1929, the Herbert Hoover
administration had pursued a broad new policy that renounced interventionism in Latin
American nations’ internal affairs.125 Moreover, following Leguía’s August 1930 overthrow,
the U.S. naval mission was supposed to be working in a strictly advisory capacity vis-á-vis
the Peruvian Navy. Peruvians were supposed to be making the decisions and devising the
plans that affected their own national defense. Secretary of State Henry Stimson made that
point abundantly clear in a September 30, 1932 directive to the American Embassy in Lima,
ordering that “it is essential that members of the [naval] Mission refrain from participating in
any way whatsoever in formulation of war plans directed against Colombia.”126
Meddling was certainly not how Spears or the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Fred
Dearing, interpreted the officer’s activities at the Peruvian Naval War College. In their view,
Spears was merely fulfilling his contractual obligations to the Peruvian government. At issue
was whether American instruction at the War College should be regarded as a purely
124
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academic exercise, in which scenarios presented to Peruvian students for their use were
merely theoretical, or whether it constituted a form of strategic advice and, as such, a direct
U.S. contribution to Peru’s war planning efforts.127 It was a very fine line, and as subsequent
correspondence between Dearing and the State Department demonstrates, it was entirely too
difficult a line for the United States to walk given the political conditions then prevalent
within Peru. In a “strictly confidential” telegram to Secretary Stimson on September 28th
(two days before receiving Stimson’s directive to refrain from such activity), Dearing made it
clear that, in practical terms, he believed that Spears’s work did represent a direct
contribution to Peru’s preparations for war with Colombia. However, he argued, it did not
constitute U.S. interference because, by the contracts Spears and his fellow officers had
signed, they had to “perforce take part in preparing war plans since their contracts only
relieve them from duty in case of a declaration of war.”128 It was an argument that had merit,
and it pointed to a very real problem with maintaining a naval mission with even advisory
status in Peru after Leguía’s fall. The State Department had gone to great lengths since the
first renewal of the naval mission’s contracts with Leguía in 1922 to protect U.S. personnel
from becoming involved in Peru’s armed conflicts, both domestic and international, by
insisting that clauses be inserted into each contract expressly forbidding mission members’
participation. But in this case, sporadic fighting between Colombian forces and the Peruvian
filibusters at Leticia (who enjoyed some support from the Peruvian Army) had not risen to
the level of all-out war. Neither Colombia nor Peru had actually made a declaration. And no
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member of the U.S. naval mission occupied an official position that had anything at all to do
with devising or implementing war plans. The mission’s activities were confined to
instruction of mid-level officers at the Naval War College, while the General Staffs of Peru’s
Navy and Army managed the nation’s operating forces and plans for their employment in
war. In Dearing’s view, such instruction as Spears provided was well within the limits set in
his contract with the Peruvian government.
Yet somehow the naval mission was at the center of another diplomatic high-wire act.
In the State Department’s view, the crux of the problem was that, in the course of his work,
Spears had offered his students an interpretation of international law that could easily have
had more than theoretical applicability: he may have intended the scenario portraying
Peruvian-Colombian hostilities to be purely academic, but there was no way of keeping the
Peruvian Navy from interpreting it otherwise. Because of this, despite the advisory and
academic nature of Spears’s work, it became clear to the State Department that his lecture
could have directly influenced matters of war and peace between Peru and Colombia. In the
State Department’s view it marked the reemergence of the problem that had plagued the U.S.
naval mission since the Woodward incident years before – namely, did U.S. officers make
recommendations and offer their interpretations in their capacities as Peruvian naval officers,
or on behalf of the United States? Were they purely Peruvian assets, or did they act as
emissaries of U.S. policy? Under Leguía, when the naval mission exercised executive
control over the Peruvian Navy, the lines of authority were clear even if these questions could
not always be answered in a manner satisfactory to U.S. foreign policy makers in
Washington. But in the unsettled post-Leguía political environment, it became even more
difficult to understand, let alone categorize, the impact of the naval mission’s activities.

173

The message embedded in Secretary Stimson’s solution to the problem, conveyed to
Ambassador Dearing both on September 30th and again on October 12th (when he instructed
that the mission “refrain absolutely from participation in any Peruvian operations preparatory
to war” or face recall to the United States129), was clear. Diplomacy in such delicate
situations must be left to the diplomats. Dearing responded appropriately, cabling that “the
Naval Mission’s duties are now strictly routine and have nothing to do with any South
American country.”130 It was a terse follow-up to a more lengthy dispatch in which Dearing,
who was close to Spears personally and who saw great value in the work the officer had done
at the Peruvian Naval War College, had retreated from his earlier assertion that Spears had
made direct contributions to Peruvian war planning. Directly addressing his earlier
statement, the Ambassador wrote that, as an advisory body, the naval mission’s “primary
endeavor is to counsel and train the officers of the Peruvian Navy,” work that entailed
instructing them “in the methods of preparation of war plans,” but which never required U.S.
personnel to “take part in making these plans either as a Mission or as individuals.” War
plans were devised and implemented by the General Staffs of the Peruvian Navy and Army,
Dearing further noted, and those staffs “may or may not use material collected by the student
officers of the Naval War College in their regular studies of theoretical situations and war
games.” This was the heart of the problem to Secretary Stimson and the State Department as
a whole: given the volatility that had characterized Peru’s internal politics since Leguía’s
overthrow, and given the murky situation between Peru and Colombia over Leticia, the naval
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mission’s work at the War College left far too much of U.S. policy to chance.131
Dearing disagreed but carried out the Secretary’s instructions. In accordance with
Stimson’s directives, the Ambassador reported that the U.S. naval mission was “abstaining
from taking part in the studies relating to the Colombian situation,” while Spears had taken
care to remove himself from “even passive participation” in the study of possible Peruvian
naval action against Colombia.132 However, as the Ambassador noted in a separate dispatch
a few days later, this did not change the fact that, in his view, “a naval mission must, as all
military missions must, concern itself with theoretical war problems.” It was quite natural,
he wrote, that in countries such as Peru where “there is no experience or developed ability in
making of plans,” American missions should be willing to provide such instruction “within
the proper limits,” as, in his view, Spears had done in Peru. “In peace there would be no
criticism of such activity,” he concluded. Dearing’s fear was that the difficult circumstances
surrounding the naval mission’s work at Peru’s Naval War College might scare the United
States away from providing such valuable services to Latin American nations in the future.133
A retreat from this sort of engagement, his October 6th dispatch to Stimson concluded, would
be unfortunate, despite the periodic diplomatic complications the U.S. naval mission’s
activities in Peru had caused. Throughout the mission’s tenure but especially since assuming
its advisory role in August of 1930, its officers had done much to facilitate closer embassy
contacts with Peruvian government officials. Moreover, Dearing stressed, the mission had
directly supported U.S. commercial interests in the country. But perhaps most importantly, it
had helped sustain the “pro-American” orientation of Peru’s Navy and aviation services “at a
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time when the country is full of attacks on the United States.”134
CONCLUSION

With little left to do, the U.S. naval mission’s days in Peru were numbered. In his
October 1932 monthly summary of the mission’s activities, Spears pinpointed the problem
the mission then confronted. To comply with Washington’s new orders “to do nothing
unneutral” while also meeting its contractual obligation to the Peruvian government “to do
everything possible to increase their [the Peruvian Navy’s] efficiency,” he wrote, was an
impossibility. Ever since making the transition from executive control to advisory status, the
naval mission had been devoted entirely to Peru’s Naval War College, and absent carrying
out meaningful instruction there, he reported, there was little of substance that U.S. personnel
could provide to the Peruvian Navy. Under the circumstances, he concluded, it appeared that
the “first aim of the Mission now is to keep the Mission going as long as possible hoping that
the present situation [with Colombia] will be amicably adjusted” – the implication being that,
with peace between Peru and Colombia restored, new officers might be sent and the naval
mission could resume normal advisory duties.135 As it turned out, however, time was not on
the naval mission’s side. By late 1932 and early 1933, several developments – the worsening
fiscal crisis confronting the Peruvian government, seemingly chronic political instability, the
intensification of Peruvian-Colombian hostilities over Leticia, and a rising tide of antiAmericanism fed by Peruvians’ lingering anger over U.S. support for Leguía and the
deepening economic depression – ensured that the naval mission members’ current contracts
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would be their last. In January of 1933 Sánchez-Cerro declined to extend the mission’s
contracts further, and in early March its members departed Callao on a Grace Line vessel
bound for New York.136 The naval mission’s nearly thirteen-year tenure in Peru was over.
Even so, the U.S. Navy would remain a key player in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy toward
Peru.
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CHAPTER 4: A NEW NAVAL DIPLOMACY, 1928-37

As the Great Depression deepened and Peruvians expressed growing anger with the
United States, American policy toward that nation entered a period of adjustment. For eleven
years, from 1919 to 1930, Washington had maintained intimate ties with Peru, offering close,
continuing support to a Leguía dictatorship that, although it fostered remarkable economic
growth, repressed the will of its people and alienated a substantial share of the Peruvian
population. From the time of President Augusto Leguía’s ouster in August of 1930 through
1932, U.S. foreign policy makers witnessed the after effects of that support as political
turmoil, violence, and anti-American sentiment within Peru accelerated while economic
conditions steadily deteriorated. Similar dynamics played out simultaneously across much of
Latin America, as governments in a majority of Latin American countries experienced coups
or revolutions between 1930 and 1933.1 Increasingly sensitive to criticisms of American
imperialism that were emanating from the nations to its south, Washington began working to
fashion a more cautious, hands-off policy appropriate to the increasingly delicate situation.2
President Herbert Hoover turned U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America away from armed
interventionism and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, embraced the policy and gave it its
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enduring moniker, the Good Neighbor Policy.3 Both realized that for the policy to ultimately
be successful, the United States would have to make attempts to alter negative popular
attitudes of Latin Americans toward the United States. As this chapter will discuss, both also
saw the U.S. Navy playing a central role in that effort. Accordingly, throughout Latin
America, under the banner of good neighborism U.S. naval vessels and personnel engaged in
public diplomacy aimed, among other things, at demonstrating neighborly respect for the
sovereignty of Latin American nations. This meant that, just as it had during Leguía’s
Oncenio, the U.S. Navy would play an integral part in shaping U.S. policy toward Peru.
WASHINGTON’S SEARCH FOR A POLICY

The escalation of political violence within Peru and the unfolding crisis over Leticia
made settling on a new policy an urgent matter for U.S. foreign policymakers in Washington.
The United States had already perceived a need to craft a new framework for relations with
Peru at the time of Leguía’s fall, but throughout the nearly two years between his overthrow
and mid-1932, American policy was characterized by drift. The fundamental problem, U.S.
Ambassador Fred Dearing wrote in September of 1931, was that throughout Leguía’s eleven
years in power Washington had cast its diplomacy toward Peru in far too personal terms,
carrying out relations more with Leguía personally than with the nation as a whole. The
dictator’s friendship and affection for the United States had been “so intense and profuse,” he
wrote, “that it amounted to favoritism” and constituted an “addiction” that the majority of
Peruvians came to resent. Washington had erred in catering to the dictator’s “unlimited
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appetite for flattery,” he continued, and had unwisely heaped “fulsome praise” on him “with
no sense apparently of how ridiculous...and how inevitably the unwarranted praise and
fulsomeness would bedevil our future relations.” As a result, he wrote, in the post-Leguía era
Peruvian public opinion was characterized by “suspicion and dislike” of the United States – a
situation made worse by the fact that “it had to be suppressed during Leguía’s time” and
because Peruvians believed that the United States had aided the dictator in doing so.
Speaking to the enormity of the challenge confronting Washington, Dearing noted that
although it was animated by an “intense nationalism,” by anti-Americanism, and by a
revulsion to all things Leguísta, the Sánchez Cerro government came “nearer to expressing
the real feelings of the Peruvian people” than any government in recent Peruvian history. 4
The problem facing the United States, then, was how to undo the damage wrought by
more than a decade of invited meddling in Peru’s internal affairs while still protecting the
economic and strategic interests that had caused cozy relations with Leguía to make sense in
the first place. The delicate situation in Peru was part and parcel of the broader challenge the
United States faced in recasting its foreign policy approach to Latin America in the late
1920s and early 1930s. By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the U.S. presidency in
early 1933, the costs (both financial and political) of U.S. intervention in Latin America had
become unacceptably high. Even though American foreign policymakers like Henry L.
Stimson, Hoover’s Secretary of State, believed interventions had been well-intentioned and
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in the “best interests” of the countries where they took place, the repeated use of force to
protect U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean had “instead of promoting
feelings of friendship...initiated feelings of hate and hostility” throughout Latin America
towards the United States.5 As Stimson noted, the challenge facing the United States in Latin
America was developing policies so that “less and less pressure would be necessary on the
part of the United States to keep matters straight.”6
Amid the intense unrest of early 1933 in Peru, when Sánchez Cerro was trying to
mobilize the nation for war with Colombia even as its economy slumped to new depths,
Ambassador Dearing proposed a policy he believed would do just that. A veteran diplomat,
Dearing saw problems with the longstanding U.S. policy of dispatching warships to Latin
American countries in times of crisis. He wrote to Secretary Stimson that, fundamentally,
because United States had long adhered to a broad policy of armed interventionism in Latin
America, when U.S. naval vessels arrived in Latin ports for any purpose, they were more
often than not “interpreted as having ulterior purposes and being in a sense admonitory.”
Moreover, he continued, U.S. interventionism had stoked broad resentment in South America
despite the fact that, in practice, all interventions carried out under the “Roosevelt Corollary”
had been confined to the Caribbean and Central America. The solution, Dearing argued, was
not to reduce the U.S. Navy’s visibility in Latin America, but to increase it. The United
States should begin sending its naval vessels into ports throughout Latin America on a
regular basis, he urged, in order to help the peoples of those countries “become accustomed
to the sight of our war vessels engaged in friendly missions.” The idea behind Dearing’s
proposal was that if American naval visits were regular occurrences, individual visits would
5
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not “stir up resentment and excitement” as had become the norm. Higher visibility would
have a calming effect in countries such as Peru that were suffering through serious bouts of
depression-induced economic and political instability, would give confidence to U.S. citizens
conducting business there, and would, in general, render American interests throughout Latin
America more secure. It was “only common sense to take preventive measures and to take
them in time,” he concluded. Doing so would ensure the creation of an atmosphere
throughout the hemisphere that more effectively promoted U.S. interests and enhanced
American “prestige.”7
Coming as it did at a peak moment in Peru’s political and international crises, and
during a month when the U.S. economy sunk to alarming new lows, Dearing’s
recommendation landed in the State Department with a thud.8 The Assistant Chief of the
Department’s Division of Latin American Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, strongly disagreed
with the Ambassador’s prescription, writing in response that visits by U.S. warships to Latin
American ports were “usually misunderstood and cause[d] friction” – a conclusion with
which the Department’s most senior Latin America hand, Edwin C. Wilson, and Assistant
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Secretary of State Francis White both concurred.9 But their shared opposition to naval
cruises for goodwill purposes would prove to be short-lived. Relative calm would fall over
Peru’s domestic and international crises by mid-1933, following the ascent of General Oscar
Benavides to the presidency after Sánchez Cerro’s assassination by a lone Aprista gunman.
Benavides quickly negotiated a settlement of the Leticia problem with Colombia and, at
home, retreated from Sánchez Cerro’s hard line position on APRA by lifting martial law and
allowing the party to resume limited political operations.10
While calmer conditions began to prevail in Peru, the State Department started
warming up to the idea of using U.S. naval vessels for goodwill diplomacy throughout Latin
America. That is because in his first months in office the new President of the United States,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, had proclaimed a “Good Neighbor Policy” renouncing armed
intervention in Latin America and committing the United States to the shaping of “an
atmosphere of close understanding and cooperation” in the Americas.11 It was not a policy
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born, as some scholars have suggested, entirely of U.S. altruism.12 Although backing away
from the tactic of armed intervention, U.S. foreign policymakers were intent on maintaining
the decisive sway the United States had spent more than a century painstakingly developing
throughout Latin America.13 Washington’s embrace of non-intervention under the banner of
good neighborism was calculated to maintain that hard-won influence, but to do so in a less
obtrusive way.14 It was a clear departure from decades of heavy-handed intervention, and the
United States would have to back it with substantial action. As Washington began searching
for tangible ways to demonstrate its good neighbor bonafides to Latin America, public
exhibitions of goodwill assumed great importance. To Roosevelt, who had served as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson and who had maintained a
lifelong love affair with the sea, the Navy was the perfect instrument to assume such an
important role.15
GOODWILL NAVAL DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE GOOD NEIGHBOR
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In order to understand the systematic implementation of goodwill naval cruising in
Latin America under the Good Neighbor Policy, it is necessary to briefly examine the
bureaucratic tug-of-war between the Navy and State Departments going back to the First
World War. Beginning with American involvement in that war, Navy and State Department
officials alike began to recognize that naval power was becoming more integral to the
conduct of U.S. policy toward Latin America. Underlying that conviction was a shared sense
that naval activity outside of combat operations was inherently diplomatic activity. A useful
tool for understanding the emergence of this consensus is the work of naval theorist Ken
Booth, who defines “naval diplomacy” as the use of naval power to “affect the thinking and
behaviour of other governments with little or no intention or expectation of using brute
force.”16 Booth’s definition proceeds from the understanding that the versatility, mobility,
range, and symbolic power of naval vessels make them more useful instruments of a nation’s
diplomacy than other varieties of military power (such as ground armies or air forces). That
is because, as he argues, wherever a nation’s navy ventures in the world, its vessels are
“small mobile pieces of national sovereignty” and carry with them the full weight of a
nation’s intentions and commitments.17 This applies, he suggests, whether naval assets are
engaged in a more coercive style of naval diplomacy, of the sort that often occupied the U.S.
Navy in the Caribbean during the early 20th century, or whether they are carrying out actions
aimed at fostering goodwill and enhancing the sponsor nation’s international “prestige” –
actions of the type that became important as the United States abandoned interventionism in
Latin America and began pursuing the good neighbor approach.
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The U.S. Navy had embraced a central role in carrying out the nation’s Latin America
policy during the First World War, when it detached four armored cruisers from its Pacific
Fleet for diplomatic duty in South America. Under the command of William Banks Caperton
(Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), the ships’ objective was to cultivate friendly, pro-Allied
sentiments among South America’s leading powers. It was a mission that Caperton, who had
spent several years leading “gunboat diplomacy” interventions in the Caribbean before the
war, pursued with great enthusiasm. From mid-1917 through the end of the war in late 1918,
his squadron staged highly publicized goodwill visits to South American ports including Rio
de Janeiro, Montevideo, Buenos Aires, and Valparaiso. Sensing the need to connect with
populations as well as leaders in those countries, in each port he orchestrated and financed
activities designed to maximize locals’ contact with U.S. vessels and personnel, including
concerts, parades, balls, and a variety of social gatherings. It was a “wonderful chance,” to
serve the American war effort, Caperton told his men – “a little different perhaps than we
would do in battle, but nevertheless a means to an end.”18 His effectiveness as a wartime
sailor-diplomat impressed the State Department. In every country he visited, American
diplomatic representatives sent glowing reports of his efforts back to Washington, the
consensus being, as David Healy notes, that “no man...could have done better as a
propagandist and advocate” of American interests.19
Encouraged by his successes and by the favor with which U.S. diplomats had greeted
his efforts, the following year, just before retiring from naval service, Caperton urged the
Navy Department to maintain an active role in the forefront of the nation’s diplomacy.
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While the Navy’s primary mission was always to prepare for war, he wrote to Chief of Naval
Operations William S. Benson, its important secondary mission was to maintain a presence
in “all the important seacoast countries of the world” as a “visible and active manifestation of
the friendships, and when necessary, the power of the United States.” Such a presence was,
“in the best sense of the word, national advertising,” he argued, that served to heighten U.S.
prestige and yield great benefits “out of proportion with the cost” such operations entailed.
Such an investment was, in his view, especially necessary in Latin America, where a
permanent, friendly naval presence would “render enormous aid” not only to U.S. efforts to
forge productive inter-American cooperation, but to nascent U.S. efforts to expand trade and
roll back European commercial and strategic influence in South America.20 Coming as it did
at a moment when State Department leaders were eager to expand U.S. strategic and
commercial influence beyond the Caribbean to all of South America, Caperton’s
recommendation met with “unhesitating” agreement when it arrived at Foggy Bottom.
Policymakers in the U.S. Navy, on the other hand, swiftly rejected it. Officers of the Navy’s
Planning Committee did not want to detach any significant amount of the service’s overall
force for permanent diplomatic duty. Instead, they decided, it was better to maintain the bulk
of the service’s capable fighting vessels in a single battle fleet whose sole focus was
preparing for war.21
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Although wary of making a broad, global commitment to diplomatic duty of the sort
envisaged by Caperton, Navy leaders did come to recognize the special demands placed on
their institution by the nation’s policy toward Latin America. For years the Navy had made a
practice of responding individually to U.S. diplomats’ frequent calls for vessels to assist in
crises in Caribbean and Central American countries. By 1920 those calls had become so
numerous that they made the old case-by-case method of coordination unworkable. As one
officer in the Office of Naval Operations characterized it, the State Department’s seemingly
constant demands for naval assets in the Caribbean rose to the level of “abuse” with
diplomats and consular agents seeming to demand ships “simply on the basis of alarmist
rumors.”22 Accordingly, in May of 1920 the Navy relented and agreed to establish a small
squadron with the diplomatic role of patrolling and keeping order within the American
empire in the Caribbean.23 The unit was designated the Special Service Squadron to reflect
both its unique role outside the Navy’s preferred line of business (preparing for war), as well
as the close association it would have with the State Department. As Charles Freeman
(Captain, U.S. Navy), a staff officer intimately involved in its establishment, later noted, the
Squadron’s creation was something of a defensive bureaucratic move by Navy leaders: they
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hoped that having a dedicated unit in the Caribbean would give the Navy an independent
means of “evaluating the relative necessities in disturbed areas” while 1) eliminating the need
to detach vessels from other units for tours of unspecified duration and, 2) limiting the total
number of ships engaged in diplomatic activity.24 Nevertheless, it was a unit established for
the sole purpose of helping to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Its creation signaled that,
however haltingly, the Navy was moving away from the kind of outright opposition its
leaders had expressed to Admiral Caperton’s proposal for permanent diplomatic naval
stations abroad.
The Special Service Squadron’s official charge at its creation was to “promote
friendly relations and contribute to the growth of a better understanding between the United
States and the other republics of the Western Hemisphere.”25 Not surprisingly given the
conditions that spawned it, however, the Squadron was most often called upon in subsequent
years not to show the flag or foster goodwill, but to protect American citizens and interests in
the Caribbean region. Indeed, this gunboat diplomacy mission eclipsed that of goodwill
cruising for most of the Squadron’s existence, even though its commanders at different times
sought to emphasize the goodwill diplomatic function. According to historian Donald Yerxa,
from its creation in 1920 until 1934, vessels of the Squadron responded to State Department
calls for crisis assistance some fifty-one different times. On several occasions, such in
Nicaragua between 1926 and 1933, and in Cuba from 1933 to 1935, the assistance it
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provided was both large-scale and long-term in nature. When commanders of the Special
Service Squadron found time to engage in goodwill cruising in the Caribbean, they often met
with stiff resistance from diplomats who did not want the Squadron straying from what they
viewed as its interventionist raison d’être. In their view the Squadron should remain firmly
under State Department supervision because the Caribbean was too delicate a region to
permit naval officers to freelance as diplomats. While the State Department saw merit in
conducting goodwill naval diplomacy further south, in South American waters, and had
supported Admiral Caperton’s proposal for a permanent goodwill naval presence there, in the
Caribbean U.S. foreign policymakers wanted naval power was to play a narrower, more
remedial role.26 Indeed it seemed throughout most of the 1920s that, although they agreed
that naval power had an important role to play in carrying out U.S. policy in Latin America,
Navy and State Department leaders could not see eye to eye on the specific roles naval assets
should play and where.
HERBERT HOOVER’S GOODWILL TOUR

The gulf between U.S. foreign policymakers and naval leaders on the utility of
goodwill cruising narrowed considerably after President-Elect Herbert Hoover made a sevenweek swing through Central and South America in late 1928, and it began to disappear
altogether when, after assuming power, he moved the United States away from its
longstanding policy of armed interventionism in Latin American nations. Sailing aboard
several U.S. Navy vessels, Hoover’s seven-week visit – deemed his “goodwill tour” – was a
catalyst for this major shift in American foreign policy. It represented a meeting of the
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minds between Hoover and Leo S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan American Union, who,
confident of Hoover’s victory, had proposed it to the then-Republican nominee more than a
week before the 1928 presidential election.27 Latin America was the only region of the world
that the well-traveled president-elect had never visited, and before leaving, he remarked that
the trip represented an opportunity to pay “friendly calls upon our neighbors to the south”
and get acquainted with them.28 Six of the ten nations Hoover visited on his tour were on the
South American continent, marking the first time a U.S. president (although he had yet to
take office) had set foot on that continent; in total, the trip marked only the third time a U.S.
president had visited a Latin American country.29 In that sense it was a grand gesture, one
that American foreign policymakers hoped in and of itself would demonstrate the credibility
of U.S. desires for more positive, productive inter-American relations.30 For his part, Hoover
saw the trip as a first step in the broad reorientation he hoped to effect in U.S. policy toward
Latin America.31
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At each of its eleven stops throughout Central and South America, events on the
goodwill tour were carefully orchestrated to reinforce the president-elect’s public message.32
Civilian personnel accompanying Hoover were reminded en route, for example, that all
individuals in the party – whether trained as diplomats or not – had “more power than they
realize[d]” to affect Latin American perceptions of the United States because of the
“psychological moment” at which the visit was occurring. Hoover’s designs for Latin
America policy were already well-known, and, the traveling party’s instructions said, the
moment was ripe for Latin Americans who held unfavorable views of the United States to
begin to change their attitudes. As a tour intended to shift public perceptions about the
United States, the mission was to communicate Washington’s good intentions. Accordingly,
members of the traveling party were further encouraged to “forget your reticence when
handing out complements” to the Latin American peoples they encountered; to “leave out of
your conversation all...mention or suggestion of the relative importance, degree of progress
or even scenic value” of the United States; to either forget or “at least have the decency to
hide” any “nigger-white man attitude of superiority” toward darker-skinned Latin American
peoples; and to take care to refer to themselves as “norte-Americano” rather than as
“Americans.” (Latin Americans were “also Americans and proud of it,” members of
Hoover’s party were reminded.) Displays of “courtesy and tact” by each member of the
party would go a long way toward demonstrating respect for Latin America at the individual
level, it was hoped, and would help reinforce Hoover’s broader point that the United States
desired to be thought of as a good neighbor to Latin America. Moreover, good conduct
32
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would help underscore that North, Central, and South America shared “identical interests
along many lines.”33 This awareness that each person in the traveling party had a critical role
to play in helping to carry Hoover’s (and by extension, the United States’) message to Latin
American peoples at an individual level foreshadowed a central premise of U.S. goodwill
cruising in Latin America throughout the “good neighbor” years: individuals outside the
traditionally narrow realm of “diplomacy” could and would assume roles critical to the
success of foreign relations.
As highly visible symbols of American power, U.S. naval vessels and personnel were
also expected to do more on the tour than merely offer the president-elect a safe and reliable
form of transportation. Naval assets – both vessels and personnel – were to play an active
role in communicating his good neighbor message, just as civilian personnel were. It was a
remarkable turnabout for the Navy, considering that over the years, in Latin American eyes,
American ships had become symbols of U.S. heavy-handedness. Nevertheless it was a role
that Navy leaders, responsive to the direction of national policy, quickly embraced. Just as
Hoover was preparing to leave California, Navy Secretary Curtis D. Wilbur issued a change
in departmental policy that for the first time recognized the “cultivation of friendly relations
with foreign peoples” among the major objectives of U.S. naval operating forces.34 It was a
recognition that while Hoover and his civilian entourage would seek to foster goodwill and
33
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change Latin American attitudes at the individual level, the Navy would reinforce the “good
neighbor” message at the macro level. Its large, grey ships were among the most modern and
powerful in the world, and, U.S. foreign policymakers believed, in delivering Hoover rather
than landing parties of U.S. Marines, they would do much to help change Latin American
attitudes conditioned by years of heavy-handed U.S. armed interventionism. Similarly, the
ships’ uniformed crews were well-positioned to play a symbolic part. Unlike the menagerie
of civilian individuals who accompanied the president-elect, U.S. sailors were, quite literally,
uniformly clothed in the garb of American power. Naval vessels and personnel would both,
therefore, form a nice complement to the president-elect by visibly reinforcing his good
neighbor message.
The Navy’s unique diplomatic attributes made it well-suited to the task of boosting
what U.S. foreign policymakers repeatedly referred to as American “prestige” in the
hemisphere. To understand the symbolism of naval power, and its linkage to national
prestige, it is again useful to turn to the work of naval theorist Ken Booth. “Prestige,” Booth
argues, is “the sex appeal of politics among nations.” Booth’s conception is apt because it
recognizes that prestige is a difficult thing to quantify or discuss in absolute terms. The only
evidence of its existence is, as he suggests, the behavior of nations under its sway. A nation
possessing prestige, he argues, is “listened to [by other nations] with more than diplomatic
courtesy,” and its words are “invested with a special credibility and authority.” Respect of
this sort cannot be demanded or accrued under threat of force, Booth cautions. Rather, it
must be painstakingly cultivated by repetition of friendly activities that build confidence. 35
Hoover’s goodwill tour depended on the U.S. Navy to do exactly that: to be seen by large

35

Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, 50-51.
194

numbers of Latin American peoples in port after port as a symbol of U.S. goodwill as it
delivered the chief spokesman, Hoover, for Washington’s new approach to Latin America.
As the tour’s planners recognized, the Navy’s role would be to help the United States gain
“additional prestige through the showing of a smart naval force” in ports throughout Central
and South America.36
As Hoover’s tour progressed from early stops in Central America to the west and east
coasts of South America, observers including the president-elect himself spoke glowingly of
the benefits of having the Navy engage in such goodwill visits. For example, having
witnessed the enthusiastic receptions given Hoover by large crowds in port after port,
Chicago journalist Edward Bell Price (who accompanied Hoover on the entire journey) asked
a rather straightforward question in a column published the U.S.S. Utah’s ship newspaper,
The Big U: “Why not consciously make the United States Navy an arm of American
diplomacy?” Allowing that the Navy existed first and foremost “for the purposes of war,”
Price argued that naval vessels and personnel had nonetheless rendered valuable assistance to
the changing U.S. policy in South America, and had helped “reinforce the influences of
peace.” The Navy had, so far, borne Hoover through Latin American waters “with dignity”
and had provided “invaluable” assistance in making the “great enterprise” of the goodwill
tour a success. Its personnel were, in Price’s view, perfect candidates for diplomatic duty.
The Utah’s officers were “splendid,” he wrote – both educated and refined – and they
commanded “magnificent” vessels. “Is this not sea power – war power – active beneficently
in the spheres of diplomacy and peace?” he asked. It was just the kind of activity that the
Navy should be conducting “systematically and regularly,” Price believed. Were it up to
36
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him, he concluded, U.S. naval vessels and personnel would be seen “carrying the Stars and
Stripes frequently into the harbors of sister nations, big and little, and using all their
disciplinary efficiency and culture in spreading acquaintance with the United States of North
America and its ideals of democracy in politics, social equality, and that doctrine...which sets
a common value upon the prosperity of every country on the globe.”37
Price’s sentiments about the promise of goodwill naval diplomacy echoed those
expressed by another American reporter, Harry W. Frantz, in the Christmas Day 1928 issue
of The Catapult, the ship newspaper of the U.S.S. Maryland, which had borne Hoover from
San Francisco to Central America and then down the South American west coast. The
president-elect and his party had left the Maryland for the overland trip from Chile to
Argentina with “a keen realization that the Navy’s handclasp of friendship had been as warm
and genuine as Latin America’s ‘abrazo’ of affection,” Frantz wrote. Although Hoover’s
goodwill tour had taken place “in the shadow of sixteen-inch guns and other amazing
contrivances of modern warfare,” he wrote to all on board, the Maryland “seemed essentially
a ‘peace ship’, a meeting place of men capable of fighting their country’s battles with bighearted hospitality and friendly words as well as, when necessary, with gunpowder and
steel.” To the proud history of the Maryland’s exploits in battle must be added, Frantz ,
accounts of its quarterdeck “as the scene of friendly international luncheons, as a center for
[the] amicable conversations of diplomats, and as a peaceful haven for newspaper
correspondents.”38
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It was a conclusion shared by the Maryland’s crew. Goodwill cruising was indeed a
fruitful endeavor for the Navy, the Catapult editorialized in the same issue. It cost the Navy
“only the trouble of expressing it,” and returned benefits for the nation that had “a value
beyond conversion to material terms.” It helped foster respect and “national prestige” – both
diplomatic necessities that “each country must earn for itself.” The respect and prestige of
the United States throughout Latin America could only be earned, the editorial continued, by
a “genuine friendliness of outlook coupled with fairness toward other nations.” Such work, it
concluded, was “not a matter for the State Department alone” but was a shared responsibility.
Goodwill diplomacy was the work of “every citizen,” the idea being that individuals owed it
to their country “to represent it well” in contacts with foreigners by demonstrating courtesy,
tact, and respect. To this end, the editorial urged, the U.S. Navy had a vital, ongoing role to
play. In the new age of good neighbor diplomacy, the work of the Navy must range far
beyond its traditional vocation of preparing for war. Each sailor was “something...of an
unofficial diplomat” who, when abroad, garnered “somewhat closer observation” than
civilians or diplomatic personnel. Unlike traditional diplomats, Navy personnel were
“labeled” by their uniforms and mode of transport as representatives of American national
power, the Catapult concluded. In practice this meant that naval personnel were routinely
“seen seen more by foreigners than the average [American] citizen.”39
Just as the journey alerted the U.S. Navy to the productive role it could play in the
nation’s policy toward Latin America, so too did it open Hoover’s eyes to the utility of
goodwill naval diplomacy. According to reports filed by newspaper reporters traveling with
him, the president-elect’s choice to make the trip on board naval ships rather than
39
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commercial vessels was a strategic one intended, in part, to boost the Navy’s peacetime
diplomatic mission.40 From early in his voyage, Hoover often expressed satisfaction that,
through greater engagement in goodwill cruising, the Navy could help the United States
foster closer, more cooperative relations with foreign countries. On numerous occasions, the
New York Herald Tribune reported, the president-elect expressed the hope that, with this goal
in mind, goodwill naval cruises abroad would be “more heavily emphasized in the future.”
Hoover’s enthusiasm reached its peak as his tour wound down and began its homeward
voyage to Hampton Roads, Virginia. At a banquet with the captain and crew of the U.S.S.
Utah on Christmas night, 1928, Hoover told his hosts that his goodwill tour had been “a
revelation in many ways of the versatility and skill of naval men in a thousand things not
pertaining to war.” Such goodwill diplomatic activity had far-reaching benefits that were
difficult to overestimate, he continued. In his view, goodwill cruising of the sort that had
occupied the Navy during his tour was the “highest peace-time function of the fleet.” They
were the types of activities in which the Navy should “always will be engaged.”41 In more
specific terms, Hoover acknowledged the diplomatic value of having naval personnel carry
out such duty. The role played by “naval men” ashore was one of the “main factors” in the
goodwill tour’s success, the New York Times quoted Hoover as saying.42 During his stop in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the president-elect trumpeted the importance of personal contacts

40

Edwin S. McIntosh, “Hoover Favors Use of Navy in Peace Missions: Tells Utah Officers Ships Can Give
Invaluable Aid in Promoting Friendships,” New York Herald-Tribune, December 28, 1928.
41

No copy of Hoover’s remarks aboard the Utah exists in either the Campaign and Transition Files or the Lou
Henry Hoover Papers at the Hoover Presidential Library. I have had to rely on press coverage to reconstruct his
remarks. Hoover’s remark on far-reaching benefits comes from Edwin S. McIntosh, “Hoover Favors Use of
Navy in Peace Missions: Tells Utah Officers Ships Can Give Invaluable Aid in Promoting Friendships,” New
York Herald-Tribune, December 28, 1928. Hoover’s expressed hope that the Navy would continue engaging in
goodwill cruising comes from L.C. Speers, “Messages to Utah Forewarn Hoover,” New York Times, December
27, 1928.
42

L.C. Speers, “Hoover Extols Part of Navy in Mission,” New York Times, December 28, 1928.
198

between peoples of different nationalities as the key to achieving a “better understanding”
among nations. Only through such one-to-one contacts, he urged, could one country “gain a
real insight into the character of the people of the other.”43 Edwin McIntosh, the Herald
Tribune reporter who publicized Hoover’s remarks, wrote further that Hoover’s vision met
with the approval of naval officers who were “eager to have their field of service to the
nation broadened.” “Perhaps no body of men represents a fairer cross-section of North
American intelligence, education and integrity,” McIntosh concluded, “than the officers and
men of the United States Navy.”44
Hoover’s pre-inaugural embrace of the concept laid the groundwork for the active
goodwill cruising regimen the U.S. would pursue in the 1930s. After expending years of
effort trying to impose order in Latin America through gunboat diplomacy interventions, in
the late 1920s and early 1930s under Hoover and his successor, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Washington sought instead to cultivate order through conciliatory actions. As the Christian
Science Monitor concluded near the end of Hoover’s goodwill tour, the task for U.S. policy
during these transitional years became one of turning the page on the interventionist past and
“selling” the United States anew to Latin America. For years, the Catapult noted, Latin
Americans had come to the conclusion – not unjustifiably – that their norteamericano
neighbors were “materialistic” and “imperialistic,” while, for their part, Americans were all
too content to let those perceptions develop unchallenged. What Hoover’s trip demonstrated,
the paper argued, was that there were dividends to be earned by disseminating what it called
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a “truer conception” of the United States throughout the hemisphere – one that minimized
economic factors and instead sought to shine the spotlight on U.S. values and cultural
achievements while at the same time demonstrating a sincere American interest in those
emanating from Latin America. It was “vital” that the work begun by Hoover be expanded
and continued, the paper concluded, if the United States hoped to change Latin American
attitudes.45
UNDER FDR: THE U.S. NAVY AS A GOOD NEIGHBOR

The economic calamity of the Great Depression hijacked Hoover’s presidency and
relegated foreign policy to the periphery of his overall policy agenda. By extension, it
dashed any hopes for an active program of goodwill naval cruising in support of changing
U.S. policy toward Latin America. The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the presidency
in 1932 breathed new life into U.S.-Latin American relations, as the new president embraced
the idea of selling U.S. good neighbor intentions to Latin America. To Roosevelt, a former
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, it was only natural to employ the Navy in this capacity. In
May 1933 Roosevelt’s new Navy Secretary, Claude Swanson, approved a change to U.S.
naval policy more sweeping than the one put into effect by his predecessor, Wilbur, before
Hoover’s goodwill tour. Where the policy under Hoover had made “cultivation of friendly
relations with foreign peoples” an objective of the U.S. Navy’s operating forces, Swanson’s
45

In making the case for continuing the work of Hoover’s goodwill tour, the paper quoted Dr. Francisco
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change made an explicit commitment “to make foreign cruises to cultivate friendly
international relations” (emphasis added).46
Under Roosevelt the U.S. Navy quickly became a fixture in Latin American waters,
engaging in numerous cruises aimed specifically at bolstering a “good neighbor” image of
the United States. The pattern began to emerge clearly in 1934, when, in response to the
administration’s new emphasis on Latin America and in recognition of the Navy’s own
peacetime mission of “showing the flag” in foreign ports, Navy leaders began routinely
sending newly constructed ships on their trial voyages (known in Navy parlance as
“shakedown cruises”) to Latin American ports. The seminal event in this regard was the
launch of the U.S.S. Ranger, the first U.S. naval ship designed and built from the keel-up as
an aircraft carrier.47 When the Ranger departed Hampton Roads, Virginia for a lengthy
shakedown to Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Montevideo (Uruguay)
in August 1934, its itinerary was packed not only with the full battery of on-board equipment
trials and qualifying tests that were routine for such journeys, but with a full complement of
public diplomacy activities as well. Navy leaders had initially expressed concern at sending
the Ranger on such a long proving voyage, preferring instead to have the vessel remain closer
to home in the Gulf of Mexico.48 But the ship’s newly appointed commanding officer,
Arthur L. Bristol (Captain, U.S. Navy), who had served in the U.S. naval mission to Brazil
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earlier in his career and was familiar with Latin American affairs, prevailed upon the Navy’s
Bureau of Aeronautics to let the vessel venture further south. A shakedown cruise down the
east coast of South America, he argued, would allow the ship to undergo more extensive tests
of its mechanical systems while at the same time affording the ship’s crew a valuable
opportunity to visit “a large foreign port south of the Equator.” As Robert Cressman has
argued, the Bureau’s approval of the more ambitious itinerary, including stops in Argentina
and Uruguay as well as Brazil, signaled that the Navy had a desire to help the State
Department promote the president’s Good Neighbor Policy.49
Upon its completion, leaders in both the Navy and State Departments applauded the
Ranger’s shakedown cruise as an unqualified success. Not only had ship and crew been
successfully put through their technical and training paces, officials in the two departments
noted approvingly, the cruise’s three stops had also “created a favorable impression and [had]
been of benefit to American prestige.”50 So impressed were State and Navy Department
leaders that they sought to replicate the Ranger’s success. In three key ways its itinerary
became a blueprint for future goodwill cruises in Latin American waters. First, as they had
done during President Hoover’s goodwill tour, during the Ranger’s shakedown cruise naval
personnel engaged in highly public demonstrations of respect for the sovereignty of the
visited nations. For example, at Rio de Janeiro, Captain Bristol sent a small detachment of
sailors and Marines ashore, including a marching band, to participate in a parade honoring
Brazil’s Independence Day – a move that, after the fact, occasioned a formal note of thanks
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from the Brazilian Foreign Office.51 During the ship’s stop in Buenos Aires, Bristol laid
wreaths at a monument to José de San Martin, a hero of Argentina’s war for independence
from Spain, and at a monument to the nation’s foremost naval hero, Almirante William
“Guillermo” Brown, whose naval victories during Argentina’s war for independence won
him acclaim as a founding father of the Argentine Navy.52 And in Montevideo, Bristol again
paid public homage to a Latin American national hero by laying a wreath at the tomb of
General José Gervasio Artigas, a key figure in the history of Uruguayan independence. The
wreath he laid at the Artigas monument featured a ribbon consisting of the intertwined colors
of the U.S. and Uruguayan flags, and bore an inscription reading “Homage of the Navy of the
United States of America.” It was just the kind of good neighbor message Roosevelt’s larger
policy was designed to send, and it was no doubt reinforced by the salute Bristol and six of
his officers rendered at the tomb “for an appreciable period of time” in the presence of “a
large number” of Uruguayan military personnel and civilian observers.53
Also foreshadowing the standard practice of future goodwill cruises, at each stop U.S.
authorities sought to maximize the Ranger’s visibility and that of her crew before the public.
By the early 1930s, after more than three decades of active U.S. intervention in Central
America and the Caribbean, U.S. naval vessels had become symbols of a gunboat diplomacy
reviled throughout Latin America. Thus changing Latin American perceptions of U.S. naval
power would be central to cultivating warmer feelings in Latin America toward the United
51
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States. From the itinerary the Navy and State Departments drew up for the Ranger’s
shakedown cruise, it was clear that leaders in both agencies believed it necessary to expose as
many people as possible in each port to U.S. naval vessels and personnel engaged in friendly
missions. The executive officer of the Ranger, for one, recognized the nature of the task.
“We now have before us another job, a harder and more exacting one than those which have
gone before,” Commander Charles Pownall wrote to his crew in the first edition of the ship’s
newspaper: “The job is a diplomatic one in which we meet people of other lands and
tongues.” Demonstrating a firm grasp of the performance aspect of the Ranger’s business, he
beseeched his men to remember that “we are on parade before their [Latin Americans’] eyes
and are required to inculcate confidence and respect not only to us but as representatives of
American citizenship at its best.”54 It was a message almost identical in spirit to the one that
had guided the Hoover goodwill tour in late 1928: each individual was an emissary of the
United States as a whole, and had to act accordingly.
While exposing locals to the Ranger’s crew on an individual level would be important
to the goodwill mission, planners recognized, it was also essential to maximize locals’
contact with the ship itself. Accordingly, in all three ports the Ranger’s crew made
arrangements to permit the general public to come aboard. To manage the crowds they
distributed a large but limited number of visitor passes, as American ships had long done on
visits to large U.S. ports such as New York, where naval vessels were often objects of great
public curiosity. In Rio de Janeiro, the first port visited, the crowds were small. Out of an
abundance of caution, Captain Bristol had ordered the Ranger to anchor more than a mile
from shore – out in the middle of the city’s deep natural harbor. While this minimized the
54
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risk of damage from moving in shallow water closer to shore, it also made public access to
the ship – and hence, public diplomacy – a difficult proposition. In practice this meant that
throughout the Ranger’s eleven-day stay in Rio, the only locals who got to visit the ship were
invited VIP’s and those few general visitors who either owned their own boats or could catch
a ride in one of the small boats ferried back and forth by the ship’s crew from ship to shore.55
It was a situation that raised the ire of U.S. Ambassador Hugh Gibson, who decried Captain
Bristol’s decision to decline an urban, pier-side mooring. It was an unfortunate decision, he
wrote to Secretary of Cordell Hull, one that ensured that the Ranger’s visit was “little
noticed” by the Brazilian press and public.56
It was an error that the State Department, eager for the Ranger to make a positive
impact in South America, would not allow to be repeated. To have a shot at moving public
opinion in favor of the United States, the ship would have to be close and accessible to the
local populations. At the State Department’s insistence, in approaching its next port, Buenos
Aires, the Ranger would traverse the narrow, shallow Indio Channel in order to reach a berth
close to one of the city’s open plazas where thousands had gathered to witness its arrival.57
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An estimated twenty-five thousand visitor cards were issued in Buenos Aires and another
twenty-thousand during the Ranger’s subsequent visit to the nearby Uruguayan capital of
Montevideo, where the Ranger also sidled up to an urban pier in full view of large crowds.
In each case, Bristol wrote in his after-action report, bringing the ship so near the crowds
presented an “extremely difficult” situation in which crowd control was “difficult to
exercise.” Not all who wanted to visit the ship could be accommodated, and in both cities
high demand led to the appearance of counterfeit visitor passes as well as the emergence of
shadow market in which passes (which were originally distributed free of charge) were
bought and sold in the streets. In both ports the ship’s proximity to the public made the
Ranger’s crew’s job more difficult. Yet from a policy point of view, the State Department
judged the rewards of the added effort to be worth the trouble. American diplomats in all
three countries praised the conduct of the Ranger’s crew in port and underscored the
diplomatic value of the ship’s visit. The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Uruguay, Leon
Dominian, wrote to Washington that the Ranger’s visit marked the first occasion in which
such a large contingent of American sailors (numbering more than nine-hundred) spent six
successive days in port in the heavily-touristed city of Montevideo “without giving rise to a
single case of disorderliness.” And Captain Bristol, despite misgivings about the wisdom of
forcing the Ranger to enter the port of Buenos Aires through the Indio Channel, concluded
that its visits to all three cities had “created a favorable impression and have been of benefit

channel.” In the end, he concluded, it was his “considered opinion that the visit should not be repeated by a
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to American prestige and indirectly to American business.”58 Had he tried, Bristol could
scarcely have written a clearer statement of Roosevelt’s goals for the Good Neighbor Policy.
While they emphasized public displays of respect and sought to maximize the
Ranger’s visibility and that of her crew, American foreign policymakers had a third purpose
in mind in routing the Ranger’s shakedown cruise to South America: they wanted the
Ranger – the newest, most complex, most modern ship in the U.S. inventory (and the
technological marvel of its day) – to serve as a shining example of the ingenuity,
development, and strength of the United States. Ultimately, it was this line of thinking, as
well as the availability of a steady stream new American ships in need of testing (courtesy of
President Franklin Roosevelt’s new naval building program), that led U.S. policymakers to
expand the use of shakedown cruises for diplomatic purposes throughout the “Good
Neighbor” era.59 Routinely sending its newest, most advanced ships to Latin America to
foster goodwill, they believed, could do much to help the United States put its best foot
forward there. In 1934, the hope was that as the Ranger and her crew advertised
58
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Washington’s “good neighbor” bonafides, it would also showcase the vitality of the
Depression-ridden United States and garner all-important “prestige.” A cutting-edge tool of
the still relatively new field of naval aviation, the Ranger was particularly well-suited for this
purpose. Before the Ranger even left the United States, the State Department had expressed
the hope that its commander would put the ship’s raison d’etre on public display by staging
regular aviation demonstrations at each point along its journey. Showcasing its aviation
capabilities would be such an important part of the Ranger’s public diplomacy mission in
South America, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Hugh Gibson thought, that he asked Secretary of
State Cordell Hull to press the Navy Department to permit the vessel to sail with a “full
complement” of airplanes for just that purpose. However, as they had been more generally,
Gibson’s hopes for this particular aspect of the Ranger’s visit to Rio were dashed. The Navy
dispatched the ship with only seven planes on board, and those planes saw very little flight
time in Rio owing to “almost continuous fog or haze with low ceiling.” It was a stark
contrast to the recent visit of a British aircraft carrier to Rio, during which its airplanes
“carried out flying operations which made a deep impression and are still talked about.”
Gibson characterized the Ranger’s lack of planes as a missed opportunity.60
Although aviation operations were impossible in the close, urban confines where the
Ranger moored in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, U.S. diplomats still believed the ship
succeeded in sending a message of American ingenuity, development, and strength. In
Montevideo, U.S. chargé Dominian wrote, the “novel aspect” of the Ranger created “unusual
60
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interest” among the crowds who gathered nearby. The pier to which the carrier was moored
was “constantly lined with thousands of spectators who stood for hours looking at the ship.”
Particularly gratifying was the fact that the British cruiser docked nearby, a smaller, nonaircraft carrying vessel, “created no such display of interest” among the locals. The crowds
that gathered and gravitated to the Ranger provided evidence, he concluded, that “an
admirable impression of American technical progress was left in this city.” Importantly for
the fostering of good neighborism, Dominian noted that the public impression seemed
entirely “unconnected with the thought that the ship was a man-of-war.” Rather, he wrote,
the public interest was attributable to “admiration for the marvellous (sic.) technical progress
exhibited by the aircraft carrier.”61 It was the kind of message that the State Department’s
Latin America hands no doubt welcomed.
The Ranger’s shakedown cruise was a turning point in U.S. policy in that it confirmed
to both State Department and Navy leaders the wisdom of using naval vessels and personnel
to cultivate goodwill in Latin American waters. Their upbeat analysis was amplified by the
autumn of 1934 by evidence that the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to sell its “good
neighbor” intentions in Latin America had begun to pay dividends. Delegates to the Seventh
International Conference of American States in Montevideo, Uruguay (December 1933) had
welcomed, for example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s surprising declaration that the
United States would adhere to the assembly’s agreement that “no state has the right to
intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.”62 Latin Americans also welcomed
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Washington’s abrogation of the 1903 Platt Amendment that had long given the United States
the right to intervene on the island and which, together with the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine, had long been a flash point for anti-U.S. resentment throughout the
hemisphere. In Peru, U.S. Ambassador Fred Dearing reported hearing “enthusiastic
commendation” for the Roosevelt administration’s move. “Even the most distrustful of our
illwishers,” he noted, “are beginning to believe the Good Neighbor is a reality.”63 That same
year, President Roosevelt accelerated the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Haiti, ending a
nearly two-decade long occupation, and signaled his intent to find a new basis for
cooperative relations with Panama, where, like Cuba, the United States had insisted upon a
right of intervention since 1903.64
BALANCING GUNBOATS AND GOODWILL: THE SPECIAL SERVICE SQUADRON

The Ranger’s South American cruise also confirmed for U.S. policymakers the
specific wisdom of using shakedown cruises for goodwill purposes. Not only were new
vessels such as the Ranger the best exemplars of American technological progress, they
believed, but as brand new additions to the fleet they were also untainted by any association
with the nation’s interventionist past in Central America and the Caribbean. Therefore, it
was thought, they could serve more credibly than others as emissaries of good neighborism
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throughout Latin America. This emerging partiality toward shakedown cruises was in part a
response to efforts by two commanders of the Special Service Squadron, Clark H. Woodward
(Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy – formerly head of the U.S. Naval Mission to Peru) and Charles S.
Freeman (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy), to expand the geographical and substantive scope of
that unit’s operational responsibility. Upon assuming command of the Squadron in early
1933, Woodward appealed to the State Department to approve an ambitious schedule of
goodwill cruising that would take its vessels far beyond their traditional Caribbean confines,
to ports not only in nearby Colombia and Venezuela, but “down the west coast of South
America” as well.65 Coming as it did during some of the deepest, darkest days of the Great
Depression, and more than two months before Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed the “policy of
the good neighbor” during his inaugural address, Woodward’s proposal met with the same
swift rejection that Ambassador Dearing’s similar recommendation would the very next
month. For the remainder of his brief tenure as its commander, the Special Service
Squadron’s ships would only venture from their base at Balboa, in the Panama Canal Zone,
on brief excursions to other Panamanian ports.66
Weighing against any growth in the Squadron’s mission throughout 1933 and 1934
was the fact that it was heavily committed in gunboat diplomacy pursuits as the United States
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moved to contain revolutionary unrest on the island of Cuba.67 During those two years the
Special Service Squadron was expanded to more than thirty vessels (up from an average of
between four and six) and engaged in patrol duty around Cuba. This duty represented the
operational peak of the Squadron’s gunboat diplomacy mission even though the United
States never had to use its ships to land troops or engage in hostilities at sea. As stability
returned to Cuba following the emergence of strongman Fulgencio Batista, permitting the
United States to conclude the treaty abrogating the onerous Platt Amendment, it became clear
to Navy leaders that, with interventionism in decline and good neighborism on the rise, the
most active days of the Special Service Squadron’s gunboat diplomacy were behind it. Still,
a small movement emerged within the Navy dedicated to maintaining the Squadron’s new
high profile in U.S.-Latin American affairs.
As Washington’s embrace of good neighborism grew, Woodward’s successor,
Freeman, who had played an active role in the Special Service Squadron’s creation in 1920,
began arguing that it should be given a broader role in the nation’s diplomacy in Latin
America beyond the Caribbean.68 In March 1934, well before the Cuban operation began to
wind down and five months before the Ranger’s shakedown cruise to South America helped
crystallize the nation’s new policy on goodwill naval diplomacy in Latin America, Freeman
urged that the Squadron be used to conduct goodwill cruises in South American waters. It
was important, he argued, that the U.S. Navy make efforts to counteract the British warships
that routinely cruised there, and that the United States secure the long-term commercial

67

For more, see Louis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, 2nd ed., Latin American Histories
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 256-75.
68

Special Service Squadron’s founding mission quoted in Chief of Naval Operations to Commander, Special
Service Squadron (COMSPERON), September 25, 1920. RG 80, Entry 13, Box 682, National Archives.
212

advantages that were rightly the province of the United States.69 In January 1935, in the final
days of operations around Cuba, Freeman pressed the Chief of Naval operations to give the
Squadron a broader mission. Its role was “intimately tied up with our national policy,” he
wrote, and the question of its future was a basic one: should its assets continue to be confined
to “such operations as emphasize their minatory function,” as had been its “general practice”
since its establishment? Rather than draw the unit down to pre-Cuba levels (four to six
ships), as the Navy Department was contemplating doing, Freeman argued, Navy leaders
should further boost its size and broaden its mission. The “single function” he had in mind
was “showing the flag in Latin-America” and “improving prospects for U.S. commerce.”
Again he pointed to British efforts to make his case. The “American Squadron” of the Royal
Navy was routinely engaged in Latin American cruises aimed at fostering goodwill, he
cautioned. With its unique founding charge and the Roosevelt administration’s emphasis on
good neighborism, Freeman concluded, the Special Service Squadron was uniquely
positioned to “parallel and neutralize” British efforts by taking on an ambitious schedule of
goodwill visits throughout the Americas.70
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For the most part, Freeman’s appeals for a much broader role for the Special Service
Squadron went nowhere. Throughout 1935 and 1936 he made numerous requests for
permission to expand the Squadron’s goodwill cruising beyond the Caribbean into South
American waters. With only a few exceptions, the State Department denied each one. In
1935 Freeman received approval to take his flagship, the U.S.S. Trenton, on one cruise to the
Colombian port of Cartagena, on the Caribbean, as well as a limited number of ports on the
Pacific side of the isthmus of Panama: Buenaventura, Colombia, Guayaquil, Ecuador, and the
Galapagos Islands. In each, the Admiral reported engaging his crew in goodwill activities
such as public musical expositions, sporting competitions ashore, and a host of social
functions.71 But that would be the extent of the Squadron’s South American cruising on
Freeman’s watch.72 This is not to say that, under the Good Neighbor policy, the State
Department was opposed in principle to the kind of broader goodwill cruising Freeman and
his predecessor, Woodward, had proposed to undertake beyond the Caribbean. In the wake
of the USS Ranger’s highly successful shakedown cruise to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay,
the State Department had clearly started getting on board with the idea. What diplomats
objected to was using a unit so closely associated with past U.S. interventionism to do the job
of cultivating goodwill in the hemisphere. As historian Donald Yerxa has argued, the Special
Service Squadron suffered from an acute perception problem: its effectiveness as an
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instrument of gunboat diplomacy undermined its usefulness in doing goodwill naval
diplomacy. In the end, the State Department judged, the Squadron could not easily shed its
image and remake itself as an agent of good neighborism.73 The Navy had an important role
to play in promoting the Good Neighbor Policy, but that role would be better filled by new
vessels.
Following the Ranger’s successful cruise in South American waters, the use of
shakedown cruises for goodwill diplomatic purposes accelerated in South American waters.
Almost immediately after the Ranger’s return to the United States, the State Department
approved the shakedown voyage of a new cruiser, the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, with the same basic
itinerary the aircraft carrier had followed.74 And in the wake of that cruise, officials from the
State Department and Navy collaborated to send nine new ships on shakedowns to seventeen
South American ports over the next three years.75 In each instance, the ships’ itineraries
were packed with activities of a highly public nature, and uniformly, U.S. foreign
policymakers deemed the cruises successful in spreading the good neighbor message. All the
while, the Special Service Squadron remained confined to the Caribbean.
GOODWILL CRUISING IN PERU
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By 1936 goodwill naval cruising had become a central feature of the Roosevelt
administration’s Good Neighbor Policy, and the U.S. Navy was becoming the public face of
the United States in Latin America. The agenda soon expanded beyond shakedowns and ad
hoc visits to include regular cruises by active elements of the U.S. Fleet. To policymakers in
the Roosevelt administration, the growth of goodwill naval diplomacy was particularly good
news for U.S. relations with Peru, which had been strained since Leguía’s 1930 overthrow.
In an effort to boost ties with Peru and other nations on the South American west coast, in
early 1936 Roosevelt proposed sending elements of the Scouting Force (a component of the
U.S. Pacific Fleet) to visit ports on the west coast of South America following that year’s
annual training maneuvers off the Pacific coast of Panama. Navy Secretary Claude Swanson
quickly signaled his agreement, informing the president that the Navy was prepared to send
two divisions of heavy cruisers to Valparaiso, Chile, and two cruiser divisions and one
destroyer squadron visit Callao, Peru in late May. As if to forestall the possibility of
interagency disagreement, Roosevelt then forwarded Secretary Swanson’s reply to Secretary
of State Cordell Hull along with the somewhat loaded note asking “What do you and Sumner
Welles think of this suggestion? It seems satisfactory to me. F.D.R.”76 In terms of total
numbers of vessels and personnel, the visits that were taking shape at Roosevelt’s initiative
were part of the largest goodwill cruise yet undertaken in Latin American waters under the
Good Neighbor: four ships of Cruiser Divisions Four and Five would visit Chile, while
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fourteen vessels of Cruiser Divisions Six and Seven, along with Destroyer Squadron Twenty,
would visit Peru.77
Upon learning of the makeup of the naval contingent set to visit Chile, the U.S.
Ambassador to that country, Hoffman Philip, expressed concern to the State Department that
the visit could enflame Chilean sensitivities stemming from a violent altercation in 1891
between American sailors of the cruise U.S.S. Baltimore and locals in Valparaiso. The
dispute had quickly ignited a diplomatic crisis that nearly led to war.78 But there was no
stopping the planned visit, which was being made at President Roosevelt’s personal
insistence: the ships’ visits to Valparaiso, and especially to Callao-Lima, were designed to
publicly showcase the Navy as a shining messenger of good neighborism. As it had during
Hoover’s goodwill tour and in numerous cruises since, in both cases Washington relied on
sailors to serve as de facto diplomats. The crews’ agendas were packed with activities
intended to show respect for the host countries’ national sovereignty, and to maximize the
visibility of the American ships and personnel.79 The visit to Valparaiso was the smaller and
more modest of the two visits. Its focal point came when, before a large crowd of Chilean
naval personnel and civilians, the two ranking U.S. officers, Thomas Hart and Harry Brinser
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(both Rear Admirals, U.S. Navy), laid a wreath at a monument to Captain Arturo Prat, a
Chilean naval hero who died in battle with the Peruvian fleet during the War of the Pacific.80
By design, enlisted sailors from the four American vessels spent considerable time with the
local population, touring Valparaiso and the capital, Santiago, while also participating in a
recreational “field day of sports” organized by the local American expatriate community at
the local Sporting Club. All four ships were open to visitors for two of their three full days in
port. And one evening, at Admiral Hart’s instruction, the Cruiser Divisions’ combined band
also staged a public concert ashore.81 Chilean press coverage of the visit was positive, but
not effusively so. Santiago’s largest daily, La Nacion, saw the U.S. Navy as an appropriate
emissary of norteamericano good neighborism, given Chile’s longstanding status as one of
South America’s preeminent naval powers. “A country of sailors, such as ours, which has in
its history distinctive acts and deeds of extraordinary heroism,” it concluded, “has always
found in the American Navy Men special motives for admiration.” It was a sentiment echoed
by another Santiago daily, El Diario Ilustrado, which on the American ships’ last full day in
port commended American personnel for rendering homage to the nation’s naval hero, Prat,
and concluded that such displays would help “guarantee the good neighbor relations which
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President Roosevelt cultivates with such determination for the welfare of America and of the
world.”82
The concurrent visit to Callao-Lima was considerably larger and more diplomatically
significant for the United States because the stakes were higher in Peru than they were in
Chile. Although the Depression had put a damper on trade between the two countries, the
United States still carried on more extensive trade with Peru than with Chile throughout the
1930s, while American companies had invested in Peru at a far greater clip than they did in
Chile.83 But, as noted earlier in this chapter, since the demise of Leguía, relations had
become considerably more difficult. Anti-American sentiment ran high in Peru during the
depression’s early years. And since Sánchez Cerro’s April 1933 assassination, Peru had been
ruled by a military man, General Oscar Benavides, with fascist leanings who held the United
States at arm’s length while seeking ever-closer ties with Germany and Italy. Clearly, the
timing of the U.S. Navy’s visit to Callao-Lima was significant. To U.S. foreign
policymakers, it was important that the fourteen ships and the more than six thousand crew
that arrived on May 28th perform their diplomatic roles ably and serve as emissaries of good
neighborism. The Roosevelt administration, including the president himself, was counting
on the Navy to score victory for its good neighbor diplomacy.84
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During the Navy’s four-day stay in Callao, American naval personnel engaged in
public demonstrations of respect for Peruvian sovereignty that were larger than those the
Navy conducted on any other goodwill visit to date. The “biggest single event of public
interest” during the Navy’s visit, the U.S. embassy reported afterward, was the parade on
Saturday, May 30th of more than eleven-hundred American sailors and Marines through the
streets of historic central Lima. It was a spectacle witnessed by thousands of Peruvians along
the narrow, crowd-lined streets of the old city, culminating in the historic Plaza de Armas
with a pass-in-review (complete with military salute) before President Benavides and his
cabinet, who were assembled with U.S. dignitaries on a balcony with a commanding view
high above the procession.85 The review in front of the presidential palace was the
exclamation point on a several hours-long demonstration choreographed to publicly unite, in
true good neighbor fashion, the American Navy men’s observation of their own nation’s
“Decoration Day” (later known as Memorial Day) holiday with shows of respect for Peru’s
national history and institutions. The parade was preceded by a public ceremony at the tomb
of Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario, Peru’s naval hero from the War of the Pacific, with all
eleven-hundred of the U.S. personnel who would later march in the parade participating (see
Appendix 1, Photo 4). During the ceremony Charles Snyder (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy),
commander of Cruiser Division Six, laid an arrangement of white roses in the shape of a
ship’s anchor at the foot of the Grau sarcophagus and, addressing the assembled crowd,
pronounced himself proud, as a sailor and as an American, to pay respects to Admiral Grau,
the Peruvian Navy, and the Peruvian nation. Snyder’s remarks were followed immediately
by a smart salute, in unison, from the assembled ranks of American sailors and Marines, and
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then by remarks from the Chief of the General Staff of the Peruvian Navy, José M. Olivera.
Olivera expressed the appreciation of all Peruvians for the honors their visitors had rendered.
The country had welcomed periodic U.S. naval visits with “true joy” in the past, he
continued, but “never until today have American sailors disembarked and presented honors
in such irreproachable form to our national warriors.”86
An ambitious schedule of sporting competitions between American and Peruvian
teams complemented the formal, ceremonial displays of respect. Held “practically every
day” during the American ships’ visit, they were organized to be larger and more diverse
than those held during other goodwill naval visits to Latin American countries
(encompassing baseball, basketball, target shooting, boxing, and tennis), on the idea that
displays of good sportsmanship would reinforce the visit’s broader goodwill message.87 The
games and matches pitted American athletes against teams composed of Peruvian naval and
military men, university students, and even foreigners from Lima’s vibrant international
community. Unlike those held during the Navy’s concurrent visit to Chile, which were held
at a sporting-country club, the events were held in public venues throughout the Callao-Lima
area. This public visibility ensured that the competitions were covered heavily by Lima’s
newspapers. The city’s most influential daily, El Comercio, for one, devoted a special
section of its June 1st issue to coverage of the games, and reported that high spirits prevailed
throughout the competitions. It noted with satisfaction the triumph of the Peruvian pistol
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team from the local Club Internacional Revólver Lima over “los marinos yanquis” (the
Yankee sailors), a victory it called “a new and resounding success” and an “unequivocal
demonstration” of the Club’s (and the sport’s) development in Peru. Although Peruvian
baseball teams were not so fortunate against more experienced U.S. teams in several games
at Lima’s National Stadium, El Comercio reported, the Peruvian players played “determined”
baseball in defeat. The American basketball team from the cruiser San Francisco lost a
spirited contest to a team from the local Circolo Sportivo Italiano (Italian Sports Club) by a
score of 44 to 28, while sailors from the Minneapolis narrowly defeated a local university
team in a follow-on match before an enthusiastic crowd that erupted in generous applause for
both teams. Dozens of photographs of the action were published alongside the game
synopses, action shots depicting athletes in the flow of competition as well as posed shots of
the American and local teams, smiling, arm in arm. They were the kind of images that might
have permeated the dreams of the Good Neighbor’s architects back in Washington. In total,
hundreds of U.S. sailors participated, and were lauded by American and Peruvian officials
for their good sportsmanship.88 From the large number of clippings embassy staff sent to
Washington, it is clear that the events were intended to be far more than recreational
diversions for the American sailors who took part. They were an integral part of the visit’s
diplomatic agenda.
The Navy’s warm reception by the Peruvian public and press represented a marked
change from the early post-Leguía years, and suggested to U.S. foreign policymakers an
acceptance of the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to turn the page on the United States’
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interventionist past in Latin America. On the day the American vessels arrived, an editorial
in the newspaper El Universal welcomed the “Yankee sailors” as “ambassadors of the
country which is a leading representative of human progress,” and concluded that old fears of
American imperialism were unfounded in the face of “new tendencies of North American
policy” shaped by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. La Noche echoed the sentiment, also
referring to the visiting U.S. naval personnel as “Ambassadors of a nation which constitutes
the exponent of human progress” and predicting that the visit would “strengthen even more
the bonds which unite Peru with the powerful Republic of the North.” El Comercio lauded
Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy as “a diplomatic principle worthy of frank stimulation,”
and called the Navy’s visit a “fruitful opportunity of Americanist cooperation” and a chance
to start realizing “the wishes of the continent and solve the material and moral problems of
humanity.”89 The generally positive outlook of the Lima press was quickly noticed by staff
in the U.S. embassy. In a report to Washington, the embassy noted that during its stay the
fleet “evoked a more cordial and friendly press comment toward the United States than has
been evident here for many years.” That was especially true of El Comercio, which had been
at best “non-committal” toward Washington in years past, and “unfriendly” generally.
During the Navy’s visit, however, the paper “led all of the other newspapers” in the city in
the amount of space it devoted to covering the American sailors’ activities. Its pages were
filled with photographs of the American sailors’ activities, official and unofficial. The May
30th issue, for example, featured a collage of images depicting U.S. sailors and Marines on
the streets of Lima – one of marine talking with a group of local businessmen; another of a
marine and sailor politely examining a book, perhaps in response to a sales pitch delivered by
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the expectant-looking children next to them; and one of a sailor, smiling broadly, walking
down a sidewalk hand in hand with a Peruvian child.90 To the delight of U.S. diplomats, the
Navy’s visit enjoyed such “unanimously” cordial coverage across all the city’s major dailies.
One reason, it appears, that local coverage was so positive was that both press and
public expected the presence of six-thousand U.S. naval personnel to be a boon to the local
economy. During the four-day visit, advertisements trumpeting diversions for U.S. sailors
filled the local papers. On the day the ships pulled into port, May 28th, El Comercio ran an
ad (in English) for “Cock Fights – with Steel Spurs – In honour of the American Fleet,”
announcing seven fights “to the death” that night and the next, as well as the availability of a
“bar and lunch counter on the premises.”91 Another, also in English, announced a “Maritime
Bar and Cabaret” (claiming to be the “Best Place in Callao”) just one block from the naval
docks, complete with an in-house money exchange and English-speaking staff.92 American
sailors did their part to oblige, evidently spending liberally during their stay. On the
Americans’ second day in port, La Prensa noted a considerable uptick in commercial activity
in Callao and Lima, driven by U.S. sailors and Marines buying everything from shoes to
clothing to blankets and toys, and frequenting cafes, restaurants, and engaging in “significant
drinking” in local bars.93 (Interestingly, there appeared to be no major incidents of
unruliness, as the embassy reported approvingly of the “excellent behavior of the men while
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on shore” and noted that it was “highly commented upon” by Peruvian officials and
newspapers throughout the Navy’s stay.) And on the day the ships departed, El Universal
lamented the departure of the sailors of “Tio Sam” (Uncle Sam), who had spent freely during
their stay.94
As the three divisions pulled out of Callao and headed for their home port of San
Diego, California, U.S. diplomats in Lima declared their visit a resounding success.
American personnel had demonstrated Washington’s respect for Peruvian institutions, and
had carried themselves in a manner befitting a good neighbor. The early returns seemed to
indicate that the visit had “inspired conspicuous goodwill and cordiality amongst all classes
of Peruvians.” The largest U.S. Navy goodwill cruise to date had achieved exactly what
Roosevelt intended: the Navy had demonstrated, in a highly public way, the good neighbor
bonafides of the United States. And importantly, that victory had been scored in Peru, where
relations had been difficult for a number of years.
The success of the 1936 goodwill visit to Peru was important for several reasons in
the years that immediately followed. First, it further validated naval cruising as an
instrument of good neighbor diplomacy, and set the stage for the Navy to undertake an even
more ambitious schedule of goodwill visits throughout Latin America. In 1937, 1938, and
1939, by mutual agreement the State Department and the Navy dispatched even more cruises
to Latin American countries for the purposes of generating goodwill. Second, it gave the
Roosevelt administration a considerable boost in its efforts to rebuild U.S. influence in Peru,
which had been in tatters since the end of Leguía’s Oncenio. And third, it underscored that
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while conveying messages of good neighborliness, American naval ships could also clearly
communicate the strength of the United States.
This last factor grew in importance as Roosevelt administration became increasingly
concerned throughout 1936 about German and Italian aggression in Europe and the
possibility that another devastating war could engulf the European continent. In 1935,
Benito Mussolini’s Italy had invaded the East African nation of Ethiopia in an attempt to
establish a new Italian empire. In March 1936 German Chancellor Adolf Hitler had ordered
his powerful army, the Wehrmacht, to occupy the Rhineland, a demilitarized zone on the
German-French frontier that had been established in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles.95
Fearing that war in Europe would invariably threaten the Western Hemisphere, in early 1936
Roosevelt pressed the other nations of the Americas to gather in the near future “to determine
how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded”
amid the growing danger.96 Out of that initiative came the Inter-American Conference for
the Maintenance of Peace, which convened in Buenos Aires in December of 1936.
Determined to forge an inter-American consensus to confront the growing threat, Roosevelt
decided to lead the U.S. delegation to the conference himself. Making the twelve-thousand
mile roundtrip journey aboard the cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis, along the way he used stops in
Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo to conduct some goodwill naval diplomacy of his own. As
Robert Dallek notes, in Rio “huge throngs gathered” to greet Roosevelt at the city’s pier,

95

Historian P.M.H. Bell notes that before Hitler’s order of March 7, 1936 to occupy the Rhineland, it had been
“the fixed intention of all German governments” since the First World War to “do away with the demilitarized
zone when it became possible to do so, partly because it was an affront to German sovereignty and self-respect,
and partly because it left the Rhineland exposed to attack.” For more on Hitler’s decision, as well as
Mussolini’s move to invade Ethiopia, see P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe,
Origins of Modern Wars (London; New York: Longman, 1986), 228-33.
96

Quoted in Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945: With a New Afterword,
122.
226

shouting “Viva la democracia! Viva Roosevelt!” And in Buenos Aires, crowds estimated at
more than two million people “packed in every conceivable point of vantage” greeted
Roosevelt “with wild acclaim and showered him with flowers as he passed.”97 By now
accustomed to seeing naval ships as emissaries of U.S. good neighborism, Latin Americans
for the first time since Hoover’s goodwill tour saw an American president personally
engaged in good neighbor diplomacy on their soil. That Roosevelt, ever the naval man, was
doing it from the deck of a modern cruiser only seemed natural. Moreover, his efforts at
Buenos Aires bore fruit: as he had hoped at the outset, delegates to the conference agreed to
consult one another should a clear threat to peace emerge in the Western Hemisphere.98
GROWING CONCERNS OVER HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

With a guarantee of some measure of inter-American cooperation in the event of
extra-hemispheric aggression, the Roosevelt administration turned its attention in the late
1930s to combating what it saw as the growing influence of Germany and Italy in Latin
America.99 Not surprisingly, heightened concern about European encroachment in Latin
America drove another clear shift in the tenor of the goodwill naval diplomacy Washington
practiced there. Although public displays of U.S. respect for Latin American sovereignty
remained important, they were increasingly complemented by efforts to publicly showcase
the strength and technological prowess of the United States. In the late 1930s the emerging
goal of American naval visits to Latin American ports was to send the clear message that not
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only was the United States a good neighbor, but was capable of leading an effective defense
of the hemisphere. This transformation is most clearly visible in U.S. participation in the
Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference held in Lima in September 1937. Convened
with the goal of promoting and standardizing commercial aviation as a means of expanding
commercial and communications exchanges among nations of the Americas, the Conference
was an outgrowth of aviation discussions that had been held on the periphery of earlier interAmerican conferences.100 As an active participant in past inter-American conferences and as
a key player in the development of commercial aviation in South America (most notably in
Peru during the 1920s), the United States quite naturally wanted a clear voice in deliberations
over future inter-American aviation links.
But the issue took on new urgency when word began to filter through Washington
that, at the invitation of the Peruvian government, Italy would be sending a large delegation
to participate in the conference as well. That the Italians would be the only participants from
outside the Americas gave Washington pause. As early as April 1936 the State Department
had expressed concern about the “disadvantage” that U.S. aviation interests (manufacturers
of planes and equipment as well as builders of landing fields and airport facilities) would
face should Latin American nations standardize their commercial aviation establishments
along European lines.101 Those fears were only amplified by the word filtering into
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Washington in early 1937 that the Peruvian President Oscar Benavides (who had studied in
European military schools earlier in his career, and whose fondness for Italian-style fascism
was well-known) was considering asking the Mussolini government for an Italian aviation
mission, as well as a group of mining experts from Italy to help develop his nation’s iron
reserves. Such experts, Benavides was reported to have told Rome, would release Peru from
its “mining vassalage to the United States.”102 It was part and parcel of the growing volume
of intelligence flowing into Washington in 1937 that seemed to confirm that European
powers were increasingly intent on expanding their strategic and commercial influence in the
Americas.
Italy’s participation in the conference set the stage for a public diplomacy showdown,
as the Italian delegation planned a series of high-profile public events during the proceedings
aimed at expanding the appeal of Italian aviation in Latin America. In late May 1937, little
more than three months before the conference was to begin in Lima, the U.S. naval attaché
there relayed word to Washington that during the conference the Italian government would
present the host nation with a monument to Peruvian aviation pioneer Jorge Chávez, who had
died in Italy in 1910 in an attempt to become the first aviator to traverse the Alps. The
unveiling of the monument on Peru’s national dia de aviación (aviation day) would be one of
the conference’s main events, one celebrated by aerial demonstrations put on by flyers
invited from all participant nations. Along with the monument, the report noted, Italy
planned to send “a mass flight of military planes” to Lima to participate in the unveiling
ceremony. To offset the effects of that public demonstration of Italy’s aviation prowess, the
attaché concluded, it was “highly essential” that the United States send “as large a group of
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planes” as possible to make an aerial demonstration during the conference as well.103 When
a formal invitation to send a delegation of planes arrived from the Peruvian government,
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, the Roosevelt administration’s point man on Latin
America and a believer in the efficacy of naval power for goodwill purposes, agreed. In
early June he wrote to Navy Secretary Claude Swanson that “as a matter of policy” it would
be “highly desirable” to not only send American aircraft to participate in the unveiling
ceremony, but aircraft “of the latest type.” Sensing the opportunity to gain an upper hand in
the public eye over the Italian contingent, Welles further recommended that a modern aircraft
carrier be sent to Lima “to cooperate with the planes” and to serve as a visible indication of
American naval prowess.104 Navy officials concurred, designating the U.S.S. Ranger – the
darling of the State Department since its 1934 shakedown cruise to South America – for the
job. “The presence of aviation representatives of many South American countries” at the
conference, Ernest J. King (Admiral, Commander of Aircraft, Base Force, U.S. Fleet) noted
in agreement, “appears to present an excellent opportunity to advance the prestige of
American Aviation and promote general goodwill and friendliness toward our South
American neighbors.”105
By the time the Ranger arrived in Callao on September 15, 1937, the conference had
developed into the competition for influence that U.S. diplomats had expected. The Ranger’s
commander, John S. McCain (Captain, U.S. Navy), called it “a contest for supremacy [in
South America] between American methods and equipment, and European, of which those of
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Italy were strongly supported.” But upon arriving in Lima, American officials discovered
that the detachment of Italian aircraft at the conference totaled only twelve stunt planes, a far
cry from the “mass flight” of planes that prior intelligence had anticipated.106 But the Ranger
arrived ready for a public diplomacy showdown on a grand scale nonetheless, with a full
complement of seventy-eight planes: eighteen bombers, eighteen fighters, thirty-seven
scouting aircraft, and five utility planes.107 Wasting no time, McCain ordered the Ranger’s
planes to make their first demonstration flights almost immediately, on September 17th, six
days before the larger exhibition that would accompany the unveiling of the Chavez
monument. Flying at low altitude due to “mediocre” weather conditions, sixty-six of the
Ranger’s seventy-eight planes carried out a practice flight in which four large open
formations passed over the Limatambo airfield (in the San Isidro section of Lima) before
dividing into what the influential Lima newspaper El Comercio called “eight large and
perfect” V-shaped formations, which then “paraded in magnificent form” back over the
airfield before returning to the Ranger. It was a “brilliant demonstration of capacity, power,
efficiency, and safety,” El Comercio reported, an impressive spectacle attended by “a large
number of people” who “applauded the North American pilots’ precision enthusiastically
from start to finish.”108 As the paper noted, this warm-up performance was far more
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successful than the first sortie of the smaller-than-expected twelve-plane Italian contingent,
in which two of its craft “cracked up in a cross-wind” before they could make it into the air.
On the day the Italian delegation unveiled and dedicated the Jorge Chávez monument,
as Welles had hoped, the Ranger’s planes stole the show. As the largest and most heavily
publicized contingent participating in the event, the American aircraft were the first to parade
overhead following the formal speeches of the dedication ceremony. El Comercio reported
that, flying in four “perfectly formed” formations as they had days earlier, the American
planes “offered a unique and impressive spectacle” to the thousands of spectators assembled
near the new Chavez monument. Flying from the Ranger’s position in the waters just off
Callao, the planes proceeded in a north-to-southeasterly direction, passing directly over top
of the dignitaries assembled near the monument and, upon completing their initial pass,
executed a broad left turn along Lima’s seacoast before dividing (as they had on the 17th)
into eight “large and perfect” V-shaped formations. In tight new formations they passed a
second time over the assembled crowd “in magnificent form,” the paper noted, with the apex
of each formation pointed forward and with the aircraft arrayed so tightly that, to some
observers on the ground, it “appeared as if the wings were touching.” The precision with
which American pilots carried out their maneuvers sent the clear visual message that the U.S.
State Department no doubt intended: in the realm of aviation, the United States was a world
leader. Amplifying that message quite literally was the sound of the demonstration. “The
engine noise of the American planes was powerful and isochronous,” El Comercio noted, and
“enveloped the field with a deafening noise” that reflected the “strength and number of
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planes involved.”109 It was precisely the kind of display that Sumner Welles and the State
Department had envisioned: outnumbering those of every other nation in attendance,
American planes assumed a central, high-profile place in the festivities, were warmly
received by the locals, and garnered favorable coverage in the local press.
To U.S. foreign policymakers, the Ranger’s visit was a resounding success. It had
been a rousing demonstration of the capabilities of American aviation, Captain McCain
concluded while sailing back to California. The flights had given U.S. goodwill cruising,
which up to that time had centered around ships and sailors, a dynamic new dimension.
Echoing the local reporting by El Comercio, McCain noted that the “mass flights” launched
from the Ranger’s flight deck had been “cheered enthusiastically by the populace,” and that
“the disciplined precision of the Squadrons’ maneuvers” had been “complemented highly”
by officers of the other military establishments in attendance. The chief of the U.S.
delegation to the conference, Dr. Harry Block, expressed his approval as well, noting that the
Ranger’s presence and the displays put on by its airplanes had “measurably strengthened” the
American position in the conference deliberations and “materially furthered” the cause of
U.S. civil aviation throughout South America.110 U.S. Ambassador to Peru Laurence
Steinhardt agreed, reporting to the State Department in Washington that the “coordination,
perfect discipline and fine formations evoked the loudest praise among Peruvian Government
officials” as well as the gathered public.111 The most satisfying assessment of the visit’s
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effectiveness, however, came from President Benavides himself, who had lunched aboard the
Ranger during its visit and who, in the days after the ship’s departure, wrote to Roosevelt
expressing gratitude “for the cordial attitude of the good neighbor, with which the Navy and
Aviation corps of the United States of America have associated themselves in glorifying the
Peruvian Aviator, Jorge Chavez.”112
Proof of the demonstration’s effectiveness, however, came only after the initial
exchange of niceties. In the weeks that followed, the Peruvian Government began to signal a
growing sensitivity to the Roosevelt administration’s concerns about Italian influence in
Peru. On November 22, the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington, Manuel de Freyre y
Santander, wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull conveying his government’s special
thanks for the participation of U.S. planes in the dedication of the Chavez monument, and
announcing that President Benavides had awarded La Orden El Sol del Peru (the Order of
the Sun), the highest award the nation could bestow, on Dr. Block, Captain McCain, and the
commanders of the two naval vessels that had accompanied the Ranger to Peru. Employing
the language of hemispheric solidarity that was coming increasingly into vogue with a
Roosevelt administration concerned about European threats to Latin America, Freyre wrote
that the actions of these men, and of the American pilots who participated in the unveiling,
were evidence of “a solid continental unity” and of “a true American solidarity” that existed
among the nations of the Americas.113 It was the first time that the Benavides government
spoke in such terms.
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Yet the success of the Ranger’s aerial public diplomacy did not extinguish
Washington’s fears of growing European encroachment in Peru and throughout Latin
America. Rather, the United States emerged from the Inter-American Technical Aviation
Conference with a heightened sense of concern about Italian and German ambitions in South
America. Although the performance of the Italian aviation contingent had been marred
mechanical failures, U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt reported to Washington that the
Italian representatives to the conference itself “attempted – and were partly successful – in
dominating the whole picture” of the gathering. From the opening to the closing day of the
conference, he noted, the Italian delegation had held high-profile events (in addition to the
dedication of the Chavez monument) that were intended to highlight the Italy’s and Peru’s
shared interests in aviation, including an exhibition of works by the designer of the Chavez
monument at a local Italian-owned gallery in Lima, a wreath-laying ceremony
commemorating Peruvian aviators lost in service, a gala honoring President Benavides held
at Lima’s country club, and a private dinner for the president and his wife held at the Italian
legation – the last being an event to which “no foreign diplomats or representatives of any of
the visiting delegations were invited.”114 Acts of public diplomacy in their own right, these
events were well-covered by the Lima press. At the gala, for example, El Comercio reported
that the country club’s main hall was elegantly decorated with gold ornamentation and a host
of Peruvian and Italian flags, and that, upon Benavides’ arrival, a band played the Peruvian
and Italian national anthems, along with the fascist hymn Giovinezza favored by Italian
leader Benito Mussolini.115
114

U.S. Ambassador to Peru to Secretary of State, September 27, 1927, RG 59, File 811.3310/974, National
Archives.
115

“El baile de anoche en el country club,” El Comercio, September 22, 1937 – contained in RG 59, File 579.6
AC, National Archives.
235

All signs pointed, Steinhardt warned, to the possible establishment of an Italian
aviation mission in Peru – a development that, if it came to pass, could open the door for the
creation of Italian naval and military missions in Peru as well. The Benavides government
had “unquestionably been much impressed” by the Italian public relations offensive during
the recent conference, he cautioned. Because of this, the time was right to consider sending
another U.S. naval mission to Peru.116 The Peruvian Navy had made a number of overtures
about a new U.S. naval mission in the years since the old mission’s withdrawal. With
memories of the complications that had attended that earlier naval mission still fresh in its
collective mind, Washington had rebuffed each attempt.117 Steinhardt argued that the time
had come for the United States to reconsider. A majority of the mid-level officers on duty in
the Peruvian Navy in the later 1930s had been trained during the previous U.S. naval
mission’s tenure, Steinhardt noted, and regretted its departure. This meant that Peruvian
Navy’s favorable disposition toward the United States presented Washington with an
opportunity to arrest the expansion of Italian influence in Peru.118 The “net result” of the
Ranger’s visit during the aviation conference, he stressed, had been to make the Peruvian
government even more determined to secure a new naval mission from the United States.
However, he cautioned, Peruvian enthusiasm for a U.S. naval mission was not inexhaustible.
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Any “unreasonable delay” in reciprocating the Peruvian Navy’s interest in a new U.S.
mission now could well “result in the Italians making such favorable proposals as to induce
the Peruvian Government to turn over to them” the Navy as well as its aviation
establishment.119 Time was of the essence.
CONCLUSION

The 1930s was a transformational decade in U.S. policy toward Latin American
nations, and in U.S. relations with Peru. Beginning under Herbert Hoover and gaining
momentum under Franklin D. Roosevelt, it was a time when a “good neighborism” founded
on non-interference and cooperation eclipsed armed intervention as the basis for relations.
U.S. credibility and prestige in the Hemisphere began to rebound after reaching an all-time
low in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Central to that process was Washington’s recognition
that its policy had to shift from its emphasis on trying to impose order in Latin America, an
approach that bred intense resentment, to a more hands-off approach aimed at fostering or
cultivating order. To cultivate order effectively and bury the interventionist past once and for
all, U.S. foreign policymakers recognized, Washington would have to systematically
demonstrate conciliation – and in a highly public, highly visible manner. Popular attitudes
would be the focus. From Herbert Hoover’s pre-inaugural goodwill tour onward, the United
States Navy proved indispensible in this pursuit. Time and time again, American naval
vessels and personnel served as emissaries of good neighborism, communicating U.S. respect
for Latin American nations’ sovereignty and institutions, discharging the duties of uniformed
“diplomats,” and showcasing American technological progress. Those contributions would
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become all the more important as the objectives of U.S. policy changed yet again in the late
1930s, and focused on securing the Western Hemisphere from external threat. Just as it had
helped prove the nation’s bonafides as a good neighbor, the Navy would again prove pivotal
as U.S. foreign policy sought to reassure Latin American nations that it would be a good ally,
as well.
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CHAPTER 5: NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE, 1937-1942

By the late 1930s, as the threat of war in Europe and the Pacific grew, United States
relations with the nations of Latin America became dominated by concerns over hemispheric
security. Long preoccupied with European commercial and strategic influence in the
hemisphere, American officials during these years grew especially worried that the growing
military might of Nazi Germany might embolden that nation’s leader, Adolf Hitler, to make
aggressive moves in the Western Hemisphere. In particular, they feared possible threats to
the strategically vital Panama Canal and possible subversion of Central and South American
governments. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had sounded the warning bell as early as
December 1936, when he led the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace in Buenos Aires, Argentina. U.S. concerns grew steadily through
1937 and 1938, and intensified further in 1939, when European efforts to appease Hitler
collapsed and Germany resorted to open warfare to achieve its expansionist goals. As the
full force of the Nazi threat to Europe came into focus, intelligence flowing into Washington
seemed to confirm Roosevelt’s fears of Nazi aggression in Latin America.
The Roosevelt administration responded by accelerating its efforts to unify the
hemisphere and bring Latin America firmly under the umbrella of Washington’s strategic
reach. Key to these efforts was convincing Latin American nations that the United States
was capable of leading an effective defense against extra-hemispheric threats. As it had
earlier, naval power played a central role in this new incarnation of good neighbor
diplomacy. After having backed away from utilizing naval missions earlier in the decade, in
the late 1930s the United States again began dispatching teams of naval advisers for the
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stated purpose of helping Latin American governments build the capacity to both defend
themselves and contribute to an effective hemispheric defense. Although in 1937-1938 there
was some division within the U.S. government as to what the exact relationship between the
U.S. advisors and their Latin American counterparts should be, as American officials’ fears
of outside threats to the security of the Western Hemisphere grew, a consensus emerged that
the U.S. had to send such missions. At the same time that such missions sought to strengthen
Latin American defense establishments from within, Washington continued to send naval
vessels on cruises and port visits throughout Latin America to publicly demonstrate U.S.
strength and resolve to defend the hemisphere. These two threads of U.S. naval diplomacy,
conceived to meet different needs at different times, became braided during the years of
World War II. Both were integral components of a single, intensive U.S. effort to build and
maintain inter-American solidarity in the face of a global war that, at several points, seemed
poised to engulf the Western Hemisphere.
REESTABLISHING THE U.S. NAVAL MISSION TO PERU

Peru would prove to be a fertile test-bed for the new, more urgent good neighbor
naval diplomacy the United States practiced in the late 1930s and early 1940s. First,
Peruvians had a long history with U.S. naval advising, having been the first recipients of a
U.S. naval mission following the First World War. Many of the Peruvian Navy’s mid- and
junior-level officers, who had come of age under the tutelage of U.S. officers during the
1920s, lamented the fact that it had been withdrawn. They lobbied through the mid-1930s
for its reestablishment. Moreover, Peru had played host to a number of American naval
visits in the 1930s that had emphasized the importance of naval ties, convincing U.S.
policymakers that continued engagement in the naval realm would pay diplomatic dividends.
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Add to that the fact that by the late 1930s Peru was beginning to occupy an important place
in emerging U.S. designs for hemispheric defense, and its importance to American naval
diplomacy begins to come more clearly into focus. Geographically, Peru was not as vital a
U.S. ally as Colombia, whose shores guarded both the northern and southern flanks of the
Panama Canal, or Brazil, whose protrusion into the South Atlantic represented the
easternmost point in the Americas. But Peru’s geographic proximity to the Canal’s southern
end made its cooperation essential in U.S. eyes, as did its significant populations of Germans,
Japanese, and Italians, as well as its large stores of militarily useful raw materials such as
rubber, vanadium, copper, and oil.1 Finally, in the late 1930s, Peru was beginning to prove
itself a willing U.S. partner. The United states had enjoyed a closer, more cooperative
relationship with Peru throughout the first three and a half decades of the twentieth century
than it had with many other Latin American nations, and the record of meaningful naval
cooperation between the two was longer than the United States enjoyed with any other Latin
American nation. Although tensions had run high between Washington and Lima for a time
in the early 1930s following the overthrow of former Peruvian President Augusto Leguía, the
relationship improved by the decade’s closing years.
When Peruvian officials stepped up efforts in 1937 to obtain a new U.S. naval
mission “to ensure the progressive development of the Peruvian Navy,” though, American
officials at first responded cautiously.2 Willard Beaulac of the State Department’s Division
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of Latin American Affairs expressed concern that another mission could get dangerously
entangled in Peru’s domestic affairs, and could replay the unfortunate saga of Commander
Harold Grow, whose intimate association with President Leguía while a member of the U.S.
naval mission to Peru had given Washington headaches in the late 1920s. Citing the “Grow
case” as evidence, Beaulac advised, the United States “should defer action in the matter [of a
new naval mission] as long as possible” while offering “no encouragement” on the Peruvian
government’s request. “From a policy standpoint,” another official argued, the United States
should send a naval mission to Peru only if “another country would do so in case we did
not.” It would be better, he agreed, for the United States not to involve itself again too
deeply in Peru’s sovereign affairs. By holding out on a naval mission, the United States
could not only avoid possibly replaying the embarrassing Grow saga, but could avoid
becoming too closely identified with “what may be an ambitious naval program of the
Peruvian Government” – just as it had when naval mission chief Clark Woodward proposed a
large expansion of the Peruvian fleet in the early 1920s.3
However, such voices of caution were in the minority. The main debate within the
State and Navy Departments in late 1937 and early 1938 was not whether the United States
should send a mission. Given the interest Italy had demonstrated in Peru’s aviation and naval
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establishments, most officials in both departments agreed, that was a settled issue.4 At the
time, the State Department’s Latin America hands were recommending increased naval
assistance to Latin American nations across the board, a move they believed would
strengthen relations, generate further goodwill, and, in “times of emergency,” permit those
nations to lend meaningful assistance to the United States in defense of the Americas.5
Rather, the debate revolved around how a new naval mission should operate once it was in
place. The central question quickly became whether U.S. officers should exercise full
command of the Peruvian naval establishment, as they had in the 1920s, or whether they
should act in a strictly advisory capacity. The Peruvian officials most keenly in favor of
reestablishing the mission, including Roque A. Saldías (Captain, Peruvian Navy), a senior
naval officer who had worked closely with the Americans during the Leguía years, wanted
officers of the mission to have “full executive authority” just as they had before.6 By the
time Peru’s formal request made it to Washington, President Oscar Benavides had been
convinced of the merits of such an arrangement, too, and had weighed in in favor of a
mission with full command authority.7 Although they agreed on the wisdom of sending
another naval mission to Peru, the consensus in both the State Department and Navy
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Department was that, in part because of past experience, U.S. personnel should not again
assume command of Peru’s naval establishment. In fact, Director of Naval Intelligence R.S.
Holmes (Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy) informed the U.S. Naval Attaché in Lima, Frank Loftin
(Commander, U.S. Navy), by then it had been “definitely established as policy not to send
any more Naval Missions abroad in an executive capacity.”8
It was more than memories of the Grow and Woodward incidents that weighed on
U.S. officials. As Holmes noted to Loftin in his detailed explanation of U.S. policy on the
matter, allowing a U.S. mission to exercise command over a foreign navy would be “unwise
from the point of view of American continental solidarity” as well. Getting involved in the
“actual command” of the military forces of any one Latin American country was bound to
“arouse hostility” toward the United States in other countries “that might feel a rivalry
toward any one of the countries to which our missions were attached.” Moreover, he
stressed, by allowing American officers to assume rank in and take command of a foreign
navy, the United States would run the risk of aligning itself too closely with particular
political factions within those countries. The previous U.S. naval mission to Peru had run
into problems on both counts. Now, Holmes intimated, given the potential of European
subversion in Latin America, the stakes were higher than they had been in the 1920s. In the
interests of hemispheric security the United States could not run the risk of fanning any
regional tensions and having them flare up into armed conflict. As long as a credible
European threat to the Western Hemisphere existed, no risk to inter-American unity could be
tolerated. Beyond such diplomatic considerations, he further stressed, there was the simple
question of whether allowing U.S. officers to have command authority was the best
8
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prescription for the countries receiving assistance. A naval mission operating in an executive
capacity would no doubt bring its host navy to “a high state of efficiency more rapidly than
one operating in an advisory capacity,” Holmes explained. But whether such a mission could
effect lasting change was another issue. The best solution appeared to be a strictly advisory
naval mission for Peru, he argued, because more permanent results could be obtained only if
the mission focused its efforts on developing Peruvian officers proficient in the exercise of
command and technical functions. “If the Peruvians desire to learn to be competent naval
officers,” Holmes stressed, “they will cooperate fully with our naval advisors” by accepting
their instruction and implementing their recommendations. If, however, they were
“congenitally unable to cooperate,” even a grant of executive powers to the mission could not
improve matters permanently.9
With regard to Peru, Washington’s desire to keep regional tensions under wraps was
more than theoretical. Of the many border disputes Peru had confronted during the Leguía
years, only the one with Chile, which stemmed from the War of the Pacific, had been
resolved peacefully. The dispute with Colombia over the Amazon River port of Leticia had
escalated into a brief armed conflict, the result of which was a tactical defeat for Peru.10 The
border that remained an open question in the late 1930s was the northern one Peru shared
with Ecuador, a frontier the two countries had disputed almost since independence on
account of the inexact colonial boundaries drawn by Spanish authorities. The first concerted
efforts to resolve the situation occurred in the 1880s and culminated in the García-Herrera
Treaty of 1890, an agreement the Peruvian Congress failed to ratify out of a belief that the
arrangement denied Peru all the land it was due under the old colonial demarcations. The
9
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situation remained unresolved for decades, into the late 1930s, despite numerous mediation
attempts by Brazil, Argentina, Spain, and eventually the United States. Throughout this
lengthy period of limbo, Peruvian and Ecuadorian military units skirmished occasionally
along the disputed frontier. Out of frustration with the lack of progress on a permanent
settlement, the Peruvian delegation would pull out of U.S.-brokered negotiations in
Washington in September 1938, accelerating the longstanding tensions even further.11 It was
in part out of a desire to save these ultimately ill-fated negotiations and achieve a peaceful
settlement that the United States had been reluctant to grant Peru a new naval mission
following the withdrawal of the Leguía-era mission in 1933. In 1937, as the exigencies of
hemispheric defense tipped the scales in favor of finally sending a new mission, U.S.
policymakers had to weigh the border situation carefully as they considered whether or not to
accede to Peruvian desires for a naval mission equipped with command authority.
Washington had already agreed to send a strictly advisory two-man naval mission to Ecuador
the year before.12 The fear was that if the mission sent to Peru could in any way be construed
as more than advisory in nature, it could enflame the already very delicate situation.
Peruvian officials were persistent in the face of American reluctance. The Peruvian
Navy, which was the driving force behind the nation’s renewed push for a U.S. naval
mission, was insistent on the issue of executive authority. Captain Saldías, one of the main
advocates for reestablishing the mission (and a man that U.S. officials expected to be
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appointed Minister of Marine once a new U.S. mission was in place), gave the previous U.S.
naval mission “unstinted credit” for all the advances that had been made in the Peruvian
Navy since 1920, and believed that a new mission would need to be equipped with similarly
broad powers in order to continue moving the institution forward.13 Because of this, word
that any new U.S. mission would act in a strictly advisory and consultative capacity came as
a “keen disappointment” to Peruvian naval authorities. “Unless the definition of what
constitutes advisory and consultative capacity can be given a liberal interpretation” that
would ensure it had some supervisory authority, U.S. Naval Attaché Frank Loftin reported in
August, the Peruvians would rather have no mission at all. As a practical matter, they feared
that a number of the roles they wanted U.S. officers to fill, such as a “naval constructor” to
operate the nation’s dry docks and a supply officer to oversee the Navy’s expenditures, could
not function properly without the authority to make command decisions.14 Beyond this,
though, was a more deeply-seated problem that had roots in the Leguía era. As Loftin
reported in October, a “peculiar situation” existed in the Peruvian Navy whereby a majority
of the officer corps (junior to mid-level officers) had been “brought up” either under the
direct tutelage of the previous U.S. mission or under the influence of the practices that that
mission had left in place. Among these officers, the “great influence and high standards” of
the earlier U.S. mission were still felt. The Navy’s highest ranks, though, were filled with a
number of officers whose training predated the Leguía-era mission, and some who had seen
that mission as an unwarranted intrusion. Peruvian authorities up to and including President
Benavides feared, Loftin noted, that any “advice” an advisory or consultative naval mission
13
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might offer to these senior officers “would not fall on very fertile ground.” Again, he
stressed, Peruvian advocates of a new naval mission expressed that they would rather have
“no mission at all” rather than one ill-prepared to deal with this hard reality.15
As it appeared unlikely in the waning months of 1937 that they would get a U.S.
naval mission that conformed to their desires, Peruvian authorities resorted to a negotiating
tactic that Leguía had often employed to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis the United States in the
1920s: playing on U.S. fears of growing European influence in Latin America. The
difference was that now, in the late 1930s, the Peruvian hand was stronger because
Washington saw European encroachment in the hemisphere as more than an abstract
commercial or strategic challenge, as it had in Leguía’s day. The presence of German or
Italian naval, military, or aviation missions in Peru or any other South American country
could imperil inter-American unity and open the hemisphere to the threat European
aggression. Given that, Loftin’s mid-October report was especially alarming. It seemed to
confirm what U.S. officials had feared coming out of the Inter-American Technical Aviation
Conference: the Peruvian government had concluded a contract with Italy for a five-member
aviation mission – a development, he noted, that “naturally bodes no good” for the prospect
of a U.S. naval mission in Peru.16 At the same time, word filtered into Washington from
Captain Saldías that the British government had recently offered Peru a naval mission. The
U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Laurence Steinhardt, saw the timing of this latest information as
suspicious. As he wrote Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the fact that the Peruvians revealed
the British offer at the very time that a “hitch” over executive authority had emerged in the
15
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negotiations for a U.S. naval mission “cast grave doubt on the truthfulness” of the report.
However, he noted, the recent “intense and open” efforts of Italy to penetrate the Peruvian
aviation establishment, and President Benavides’ well-known affinity for European military
practices, created a “basis for the remote possibility” that the report of a British offer was
true.17 Despite the apparent transparency of the Peruvian maneuver, the prospect of another
non-American mission to Peru – even a British one – on top of the newly contracted Italian
aviation mission amounted to an unacceptable challenge to U.S. leadership in hemispheric
security. In that sense, the Peruvian tactic had the effect its architects had desired. As Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles noted while bringing naval mission negotiations with Peru
to a successful close that December, naval missions were “an increasingly important factor”
in U.S. inter-American policy, and it would be exceedingly unfortunate should Peru or
Ecuador “for lack of ability on our part to meet their wishes, decide to engage either Italian
or German missions.”18
Finalizing an agreement to send a naval mission to Peru therefore became a high
priority in Washington by the end of 1937, so much so that officials in the State Department
reconsidered their reservations about allowing naval mission members to assume some form
of “executive authority.” The Peruvian position remained unchanged. As Peruvian
Ambassador to the United States Manuel de Freyre y Santander wrote to Welles in midDecember, officials within Peru’s Navy felt deeply that the overall usefulness of a U.S.
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mission would be “seriously curtailed” if its officers lacked the authority to ensure that their
recommendations were followed. Given the division that existed within the Peruvian Navy’s
officer corps, the mission needed to be well-positioned to deal with the prospect that its
suggestions – which could run “counter to the interests or bias of certain interested parties”
within the institution – would be ignored by more senior leaders if all the U.S. personnel
could do was “advise.” In the naval mission agreements concluded during the Leguía years,
Freyre noted, no formal mention had been made of the terms “advisory” or “executive” even
though U.S. officers were empowered with command authority. Would it be possible to find
a formula to obviate the “current difficulty,” the ambassador wondered?19
Washington’s concerns about allowing U.S. personnel to assume command of Peru’s
Navy, as expressed earlier by ONI Director Holmes, had not gone away: such an
arrangement could still potentially enflame tensions with Ecuador, and could stunt the
longer-term development of the Peruvian Navy as an institution. Moreover, memories of the
complications such an arrangement had wrought during the Leguía years remained.
Unwilling to accede completely to Peruvian wishes but recognizing that Washington had to
give ground in order to get the mission underway, Welles proposed a compromise. To
ensure that the advice they dispensed had the necessary degree of authority, mission
members’ contracts with the Peruvian government should be worded so as to make them
“responsible solely to the Minister of Marine of Peru.” And unlike the Leguía-era
arrangement, in which U.S. officers were granted a higher rank in the Peruvian Navy than
they held in the U.S. Navy and were accorded seniority over all Peruvian officers of equal
rank, Welles proposed that in the new mission, each American officer’s “precedence with
19
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respect to Peruvian officers shall be according to seniority.” In other words, U.S. personnel
would have a line of authority that came directly from the Minister of Marine, but would not
automatically have seniority over their Peruvian counterparts. The net effect of such an
arrangement, he believed, was that mission members would be able to exercise “a substantial
amount” of executive authority “without raising the awkward situation resulting from placing
a foreign officer in actual ‘command’ of Peruvian units.” The decisions and
recommendations made by U.S. personnel would therefore have the weight of executive
authority, even though the orders carrying those recommendations to fruition would be
issued through the Navy’s senior Peruvian officer.20
This arrangement underscores two important realities about U.S. efforts to foster
inter-American solidarity and ensure a sound hemispheric defense in the late 1930s. First, it
demonstrates that while the United States was eager to send missions to Latin American
nations, it wanted to ensure that those missions would be seen as helping hands rather than as
intrusions into their internal affairs. In this way the American approach to sending naval
missions in the late 1930s had been clearly conditioned by the State and Navy Departments’
shared desire to avoid the types of complications posed by the Leguía-era mission to Peru, as
well as by the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to principles of non-interference in the
internal affairs of Latin American “good neighbors.” Among the clearest expressions of this
is the fact that all naval mission contracts the United States signed with Latin American
nations in the late 1930s specified that American personnel would retain their rank in the
U.S. Navy and wear only their own nation’s uniform. At the same time, the contracts the
United States and Peru concluded reflect the fact that, in the interests of securing Latin
20
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American cooperation, the United States was willing to tailor the security assistance it
offered to meet the needs identified by partner nations – even if, as in the Peruvian case, that
meant treading on slightly uncomfortable ground.21 Whereas naval mission agreements with
such nations as Colombia and Brazil clearly identified mission members’ duties as strictly
advisory in nature, the Peruvian contract was written in a more open-ended manner that
allowed the “question of exactly how much command may be exercised in an advisory
capacity” to be, as State Department Latin America chief Laurence Duggan recognized, “left
for adjustment” when members of the U.S. mission arrived in Peru.22
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THE NAVAL MISSION AND HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

From the point of view of substantive naval reform, the naval mission’s
accomplishments in Peru during the two year period covered by the initial contract (19381940) disappointed both Americans and Peruvians. However, from the U.S. perspective, the
mission’s real value during those years was not the work it did (or did not do) to overhaul the
Peruvian Navy. Its real value was political – in terms of building inter-American solidarity,
the important thing was that the mission was there, serving as a clear indication of U.S.
resolve.23 Cognizant of the successes their predecessors in the first naval mission had had in
Peru between 1920 and 1930, members of the mission nevertheless had high expectations for
their work. Those expectations were dashed by reality. Early in the mission’s tenure its
chief, Bruce L. Canaga (Captain, U.S. Navy), wrote to his superiors in ONI that members’
lack of fluency in the Spanish language hampered their work. Only one member of the
mission, Emory D. Stanley (Captain, U.S. Navy) was proficient in the language, having
served in the Leguía-era U.S. naval mission.24 It was “a darned big handicap,” Canaga
wrote, and a marked departure from that earlier mission, many of whose officers, if not
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completely fluent, were sufficiently competent in the language to carry out their work
effectively.25
The larger problem confronting the mission, Canaga believed, was the Peruvian
Navy’s seemingly chronic shortage of funds. It was the constant theme of Canaga’s
communications to Washington. The age and relative disrepair of Peru’s naval ships, which
limited all-important training at sea, was a source of great frustration to mission members
and Peruvian personnel, as was the Peruvian Navy’s inability to accept a 1938 invitation
from Washington to send officers and cadets to study at naval schools in the United States.
“These people have no money to send students to the U.S.,” Canaga wrote to ONI
disappointedly, “and they can’t find it so it is just a plain pain in the neck.” The situation
was so frustrating that in a moment of exasperation Canaga concluded that “when another
comes along looking for my job they can have it – 6 hours notice is all I need.”26 The Navy’s
funding problems represented a marked departure from the Leguía years, when, because of
plentiful foreign loans and the president’s own fondness for the Navy, the institution had
enjoyed relatively plentiful budgets. For Canaga and his colleagues, the legacy of that earlier
mission’s successes, aided substantially as they had been by abundant resources and direct
presidential support, seemed to obscure any memory of the problems that had often attended
its work. The achievements of the Leguía-era mission hung over the new U.S. naval mission
in 1938, and caused its members to become frustrated with their inability to produce
similarly impressive results.
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The lack of results was frustrating also to Peruvian authorities, who continued to push
Washington to permit the mission to assume broader authority over their naval establishment.
When Duggan, the State Department’s Latin America chief, visited Lima for the Eighth
International Conference of American States in December of 1938, the issue of executive
authority was the first thing the Peruvian delegation wanted to address with him. Captain
Saldías, by then Peru’s Minister of Marine, pushed him on the issue during a face-to-face
meeting, and shortly afterward addressed a detailed aide-memoire pressing his case even
further. There was a consensus among Peru’s president, cabinet ministers, and a majority of
the Navy’s officers, he stressed, that it was “most necessary” that the U.S. naval mission be
clothed with executive authority. For them, as for Canaga and his naval mission colleagues,
the “past experience” of the Leguía-era mission had set a high standard for success. “With
the old equipment we have and with the changes in regime” that were expected with
Benavides’ decision not to seek reelection in 1939, it was “most necessary” that Peru’s naval
policy be “fixed so it cannot be altered by a new government.” This could only be done, he
insisted, if obstinate senior-level officers were cut out of institutional decision-making and
replaced by U.S. personnel. The assumption by U.S. officers of executive authority was
particularly necessary at the Escuela Naval, the Minister argued, where in years past Captain
Charles G. Davy’s leadership had effected a far-ranging transformation in Peruvian officer
education. Peru wanted to see such innovative work resume, including the importation of
curriculum, texts, and practices from the U.S. Naval Academy. Such reforms could only be
assured of success if an American officer was again placed in charge at La Punta. Saldías
augmented his case for executive authority by again demonstrating his government’s
willingness to play on U.S. fears of growing European influence in Peru. His government
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desired greater cooperation with the U.S. Navy in aviation, he noted, both by sending
Peruvian pilots to train in the United States and by contracting for an American naval
aviation mission to undertake education and training in Peru. Saldías wrote that he was
“most anxious” to conclude agreements with Washington on both fronts, but took care to
note that the Italian government, which already maintained an aviation mission in the
country, had recently offered to expand the number of Peruvian pilots invited to train in
Italian military aviation schools. It would be most embarrassing, he stressed, for Peru to
refuse the Italian offer if it did not have a compelling American alternative. At the same
time, he concluded, there were no doubt significant efficiencies to be gained by having both
naval and naval aviation missions from the same country.27
Peruvian persistence helped carry the day. In early 1939 the State and Navy
Departments began to seriously entertain the idea of allowing the naval mission to Peru to
assume broader authorities over the Peruvian Navy. But the larger force moving
Washington’s hand was growing concern over hemispheric security. As historian Max P.
Friedman has noted, by late 1938 the Roosevelt administration believed “the most immediate
security threat” facing the United States was the possibility of German destabilization of
Latin American governments.28 Reports to that effect aroused considerable concern within
the State Department and the White House. In November of that year Breckinridge Long,
Roosevelt’s former ambassador to Italy, reported finding strong evidence of active Nazi
efforts to foment “political insurrection” in Brazil and Argentina during a regional fact27
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finding mission for the White House.29 Among the evidence Long collected was a German
dispatch that the Brazilian government had intercepted between a retired German General
living in Brazil and Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in Berlin. The message
was that “preparation for the armed movement is already well initiated,” and informed Berlin
that “a good network of resident agents” existed in the southern Brazilian states of Minas
Gerais, Sao Paulo, and Paraná. In Sao Paulo alone, the general estimated, the network’s
“effectives” comprised more than 35-percent of the population and included Germans,
Japanese, Italians, and Brazilians. Should those agents be successful in fomenting a civil
war, he assured, the pro-Nazi presence meant that “everything will take care of itself.”30 This
report was particularly alarming to Roosevelt, who received it on December 15th and brought
it to the attention of his cabinet the very next day. Subsequently he had Welles cable
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, already in Lima for the Eighth International Conference of
American States, instructing him to pursue a declaration of all states in attendance that they
“shall not permit any non-American state to assist or abet in the fomenting of internal
disorder in any American republic.”31 U.S. efforts at Lima to secure such a wide-ranging
inter-American commitment were stymied, as they had been at Buenos Aires two years
earlier, by Argentine resistance. The Declaration of Lima produced by the conference
contained a weaker statement of inter-American solidarity than Roosevelt had hoped.32 But
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in the wake of the disappointment, the alarming reports that continued to emanate from South
America moved the administration to step up its efforts at military and naval cooperation on
the continent. The next month, as 1939 dawned, the inter-agency working group of the State,
War, and Navy Departments that the administration had formed to coordinate the
government’s hemispheric defense efforts (an entity known as the Standing Liaison
Committee, or SLC), discussed the apparent acceleration of Nazi efforts to subvert South
American governments and began weighing options to combat it.
Chaired by Sumner Welles, the committee was especially worried that large German
populations in South America, especially in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, could be pushed
into cooperating with Nazi military efforts to overthrow established governments on the
continent. Welles believed that such prospects were “unfortunately not remote
possibilities.”33 It was against this backdrop that, at the same January meeting, the
committee weighed options for expanding U.S. naval and military cooperation in South
America. The priority in such cooperation went to countries such as Peru that, like the
countries in question, also had substantial European populations. Accordingly, the first issue
the SLC took up after discussing the recent revelations of German subversive efforts in
binding declaration...to defend the principles of American continental solidarity against all foreign threats:
should the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American Republic be threatened, the Conference
announced, the American states would share a ‘common concern’ and would ‘make effective their solidarity’.”
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Brazil was the granting of executive control to the U.S. naval mission in Peru. In their
deliberations, committee members were impressed by the case made by Minister Saldías in
his aide-memoire to Laurence Duggan. Allowing U.S. officers to assume command of the
Peruvian Navy could certainly put them “in a very difficult position,” Chief of Naval
Operations William Leahy noted, but the rewards of such an arrangement could be worth the
risks – especially if it paved the way for the establishment of a U.S. naval aviation mission to
replace the Italian aviation mission whose contracts would expire later that year. The other
SLC principals, Welles and Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig, agreed, provided that such
expanded authority be accompanied by a broad “escape clause” protecting U.S. personnel
from the kinds of entanglements that beset the Leguía-era naval mission. U.S. officials
remained insistent that American personnel not become involved in any foreign war or civil
disturbance during their duty in Peru. Yet given the prevailing threat to the Western
Hemisphere, they were now open to assuming some risk in that regard.34 In retrospect it was
a bold move because a war between Peru and Ecuador remained a reasonable possibility. A
settlement of the two countries’ border dispute remained elusive and tensions still simmered.
Nevertheless, after two years of near-constant pressure from the Peruvian government, the
United States seemed poised to accede to the Peruvian desire to grant the naval mission
executive powers.
It was a change supported by mission members themselves, though U.S. Navy leaders
in Washington viewed it with skepticism. For naval mission chief Bruce Canaga, executive
authority held the promise that U.S. personnel could achieve more successful outcomes in
their work. In March 1939 he had voiced opposition to the idea, writing to ONI that “it
34
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doesn’t make any difference how hard one works” in Peru – “if you turn your back they go
back to type and there is no money for the Navy.”35 But throughout that year his mounting
frustration with the mission’s lack of results, which he blamed on chronic budget shortfalls
and the intransigence of resentful senior-level officers, convinced Canaga that having greater
control could yield better results. In August he wrote to ONI that the persistence of the
situation in Peru had “very much changed” his view. In order to fulfill the mission’s original
charge of “fending off the European powers,” he wrote, mission personnel needed to be in a
position “to force our ideas” because, as advisors, mission members’ recommendations often
did “not get a whole long ways” through Peru’s naval bureaucracy. The reasons for this, in
his estimation, were as clear as ever: a scarcity of money made it impossible to operate with
more than the “really vital necessities,” he argued, while senior officers consistently failed
cooperate in carrying out the mission’s recommendations. Behind Canaga’s frustration,
though, were doubts that Peruvians could effectively manage their own affairs. Explaining
his change of heart on the issue of executive authority, he wrote that “As long as I thought
that it would be possible to teach these people anything I was against that [assuming
executive authority].” But now, after nearly a year and a half on duty in Peru, Canaga
concluded that Peruvians were incapable of ever improving their Navy on their own. Having
Americans assume control of Peru’s Navy was, in his view, “the only way to get real
efficiency.”36 Yet Canaga’s superiors in ONI were not convinced. By then the State
Department had already withdrawn its opposition to letting the mission assume executive
authority. In the face of the threat of Nazi aggression in the hemisphere, U.S. policy deemed
35
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the rewards of closer naval cooperation with Peru to be worth the risks. But the concerns
ONI Director R.S. Holmes had raised nearly two years earlier remained valid, ONI leaders
insisted. Placing Americans in command of a Peru’s naval establishment could enflame the
Peru-Ecuador border situation, they cautioned, and could unwittingly align the United States
too firmly with one or more particular political factions within Peru. While it was the U.S.
Navy’s job to help carry out American foreign policy and not to make it, ONI leaders
believed, it seemed distinctly within the realm of possibility that a grant of executive
authority could lead to a replay of some of the significant challenges posed by the Leguía-era
mission.37
Yet in the face of a growing threat to hemispheric security, foreign policy
considerations outweighed the kinds of concerns expressed by ONI. At the same time that it
embraced executive authority for the U.S. naval mission in Peru for political reasons, the
Roosevelt administration was busy expanding the number, size, and scope of its naval and
military missions throughout Latin America. For example, in its February 1939 meeting the
SLC discussed the desirability of expanding the U.S. naval mission to Brazil. The hope was
that that mission, established in 1936 mainly to advise the Brazilian Naval War College,
could get involved in making more substantive improvements to the Brazilian Navy.38 In
April the Committee fielded a request from the Colombian government to send up to twenty
additional personnel to the U.S. naval mission there, with an emphasis on officers expert in
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aviation.39 Chief of Naval Operations William Leahy feared such developments. If the
mission in Colombia were expanded, he argued, then other Latin American nations would
undoubtedly demand similar treatment. Welles, however, citing Colombia’s “special
position” in the Americas, expressed unhesitating approval.40 Deeper naval-military
cooperation with South American nations, he believed, would yield both practical benefits
and political benefits for Washington’s inter-American policy.
In key cases like Brazil and Colombia, such aid could help improve navies that the
Roosevelt administration believed could make real contributions to a U.S.-led defense of the
Americas, while closer naval and military links with other South American nations, whose
militaries were less likely to contribute operationally, would nevertheless burnish
Washington’s political efforts to build solidarity among the American republics. The
political imperative became even more important after the outbreak of war in Europe in early
September 1939. That month the SLC decided the United States should offer naval and
military missions to all Latin American nations that were losing European missions to the
exigencies of the war.41 One such nation was Peru’s southern neighbor, Chile, part of the
continent’s “southern cone” that had historically maintained close naval and military ties
with Great Britain and Germany.42 At the September meeting of the SLC, Welles reported
that the Roosevelt administration had just received a request for “assistance of a practical
kind” from Chile to improve its Navy and Army. It was the first time Chile had sought such
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assistance from Washington, he noted, and he recommended that the Committee do
everything within its power to respond favorably to the request. Underscoring the political
value of assistance to such nations, Welles called Chile “the last link in our South American
chain.”43
The outbreak of war in Europe and subsequent developments in inter-American
affairs confirmed the essentially political function of the U.S. naval mission in Peru.
Members of the mission continued to judge their progress against the advances made by their
Leguía-era predecessors, and focused on making substantive improvements to the Peruvian
Navy. However, they found their efforts held in check when they ran counter to the thrust of
U.S. hemispheric policy. In late September, just weeks after Hitler’s Wehrmacht had
stormed into Poland, representatives of all the American republics gathered in Panama to
assess the war’s impact on the Americas. Delegates to the meeting unanimously approved a
general statement of neutrality, established mechanisms to boost inter-American trade, and
most importantly, created an offshore buffer zone of between three hundred and one
thousand miles around the Americas that was to be “free from the commission of any hostile
act by any non-American belligerent.”44 The zone was to be patrolled jointly by the navies
of the American republics. However, most Latin American nations lacked the naval power to
make meaningful contributions to its enforcement.45 It was a problem that many Latin
American nations, interested in improving their military establishments, would aim to
address during the war years.
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Many nations, Peru among them, saw in the war an opportunity to gain U.S. support
for their military and naval plans under the banner of hemispheric defense. In late 1939
Captain Canaga, whose frustrations with the mission’s lack of impact throughout its first year
and a half were well known in Washington, gave voice to the Peruvian Navy’s aspirations by
drafting a reform program calling for new ships and equipment as well as substantial
increases in annual appropriations. Even though the U.S. mission was equipped with
executive authority, his memorandum stated that it would be a waste of Peruvian resources to
maintain the naval mission without giving the Navy the resources required “to justify the
work of the mission.” The plan specified appropriations of four to five million dollars per
year as the minimum needed to achieve a meaningful overhaul of the Peruvian fleet. Mindful
of the diplomatic difficulties that had attended naval mission chief Clark Woodward’s
proposed naval buildup in 1923, the State Department put an end to Canaga’s effort before
the officer could even present his recommendations to Peru’s Minister of Marine. Such high
naval expenditures would place an undue burden on the already strained finances of Peru’s
government, embassy staffer George Butler wrote to Sumner Welles in Washington. Beyond
that, he continued, permitting the U.S. naval mission to guide a buildup of the Peruvian Navy
at that moment could endanger American aims for hemispheric defense. Outside of perhaps
Brazil and Argentina, Butler argued, U.S. assistance to South American navies could only
serve to improve their effectiveness against neighboring countries and would yield no real
benefits for a broader U.S.-led defense of the Americas. The risk was that by extending such
help, the United States could embolden countries with longstanding grievances against
neighbors to resort to force. To the Roosevelt administration, peace and tranquility
throughout the hemisphere was essential to ensuring that the Americas could withstand a
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possible assault by Germany. Tensions among Latin American nations, such as those that
lingered between Peru and Ecuador, were seen as possible threats to inter-American unity.
Butler’s memorandum underscored the administration’s position that American naval
and military missions should do nothing to raise tensions in South America. Such missions
had “a distinct political value apart from their technical work,” he stressed, and in countries
like Peru, whose Navy operated under “serious handicaps,” the “political aspect…may be
more important than [the naval mission] doing the best professional job.” Certainly it was
“most desirable to maintain the mission and to do the best possible job under existing
conditions,” he added, for mission members could “do much toward assuring discipline,
good organization and honesty in administration” in the Peruvian Navy without jeopardizing
Washington’s inter-American policy. But in Peru as in so many other Latin American
countries, the “political aspect” was of overriding importance.46 Sumner Welles and
Laurence Duggan, the State Department’s leading voices on Latin American issues, agreed.47
In short, Butler’s message confirmed, the work of naval and military missions in Peru, and
throughout Latin America, was fundamentally diplomatic. Appearances were key.
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Within the bounds set by the State Department, U.S. naval cooperation with Latin
American nations intensified as the perceived threat to the Americas grew throughout 1940.
At the beginning of that year, the U.S. goal was to signal inter-American unity by renewing
all existing naval and military mission contracts that were set to expire, and to secure new
mission agreements in as many Latin American countries as possible. In Peru, this meant
negotiating a longer-term contract to keep the U.S. naval mission in place and, in accordance
with Peruvian wishes, formalizing its executive powers over that nation’s Navy.
Deliberations over the naval mission’s renewal dragged on from January through April with
little in the way of concrete progress, though, as American officials weighed Peruvian
requests that the United States defray its costs by picking up a substantial share of the
mission’s overall tab.48 Meanwhile, the original two-year contract concluded in 1938 expired
in March. At that point, military developments in Europe intervened and imparted a new
sense of urgency to the negotiations. In the span of little more than six weeks in May and
June 1940, German armies overran the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg en route to
conquering France. By the end of June, only Britain stood between Hitler and total
domination of Western Europe.49 To the Roosevelt administration as to much of the world,
the Nazi military machine looked invincible, and the threat it posed to the Western
Hemisphere loomed larger than ever.50 Worried that continued military success in Europe
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might lead Hitler to unleash a strike against the Americas, in July representatives of all the
American republics gathered in Havana, Cuba, and agreed that no “new world” European
colonies should be allowed to fall into German hands as a result of military developments in
Europe. In inter-American naval and military cooperation, time was of the essence.
In the face of what it saw as a grave and growing threat to hemispheric security, the
Roosevelt administration was increasingly anxious to conclude the Peruvian naval mission
agreement along with a host of others.51 In short order U.S. officials agreed to shoulder a
larger share of the financial burden not only for its mission in Peru, but for its missions
throughout Latin America.52 In June 1940 the U.S. Congress passed and President Roosevelt
signed legislation expanding the government’s authority to “assist the governments of the
American republics in increasing their military and naval establishments.”53 At the same
time, the Roosevelt administration hastened to wrap up an agreement to finally send a naval
aviation mission to Peru – something that Peruvian officials, anxious to reconnect with the
aviation successes achieved under Commander Grow and the Leguía-era mission, had first
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raised in late 1938.54 The signing of naval mission and aviation mission contracts with Peru
at the end of July 1940 ensured that one of Washington’s longest-running military-to-military
relationships in the Americas, and one that in many respects had been the test bed for the
system of naval and military advising on which U.S. designs for hemispheric defense
depended, would continue until the external threats to the Western Hemisphere subsided.55
Although its work had often fallen short of the expectations set by the Peruvian Navy and
officers of the mission itself, from the point of view of U.S. efforts to build inter-American
solidarity, the naval mission’s work was a success.
GOODWILL CRUISING AND HEMISPHERIC DEFENSE

As the Roosevelt administration re-established the U.S. naval mission in Peru and
expanded its naval and military advising efforts throughout Latin America in the interests of
hemispheric security, it continued to employ the other component of its “good neighbor”
naval diplomacy” – goodwill naval cruises and port visits – for the same purpose.
Dependent as its inter-American policy was on communicating U.S. strength and cultivating
inter-American accord, it is not surprising that the Roosevelt administration made public
demonstrations of American naval prowess in Latin America a priority as hemispheric
security concerns began to dominate. The success of naval visits to Latin American ports in
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the earlier years of Roosevelt’s presidency had made them an indispensable part of his
administration’s “good neighbor” diplomacy, and the U.S.S. Ranger’s 1937 visit to Lima
during the Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference had signaled the utility of such
cruises to U.S. efforts at building hemispheric unity. The latter underscored an emerging
consensus in the Roosevelt administration: U.S. naval vessels and aircraft plying the waters
and skies of Latin America could not only send messages of friendship and good
neighborliness, but could also send an undeniable message of U.S. strength and resolve to
lead a defense of the Western Hemisphere from external attack. From that point forward,
such cruises had a clear role in Roosevelt’s efforts to build inter-American solidarity.
As he had earlier in his presidency, Roosevelt himself emphasized the importance of
goodwill cruises to his administration’s inter-American policy in the late 1930s. The subject
of goodwill naval cruises to Latin America was among the first items discussed by the
Standing Liaison Committee, for example, at its first meeting in April 1938. During that
meeting, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles advised SLC members that “the President
has agreed that part of the fleet should visit the east coast of South America this summer,”
and that Roosevelt would be taking the issue up directly with the Navy Department.56 When
the Committee weighed the specifics of that cruise, the centerpiece of which was the aircraft
carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, Welles made a clear connection between that carrier’s impending
visit to South America and the past Latin American cruises of the U.S.S. Ranger, which in
his view had set the standard for how such visits should be conducted. In view of the
Ranger’s successful visit to Lima the year before, Welles noted, a visit to Brazil by the
Enterprise without aircraft “might be seen as disappointing” to its Brazilian hosts. Moreover,
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memories of the performance given by the Ranger’s aircraft in the skies over Lima during the
Inter-American Technical Aviation Conference were still fresh. It would be better from an
inter-American policy point of view, Welles concluded, for the Enterprise to embark with a
full complement of aircraft and carry out aerial demonstrations wherever practicable.57
Roosevelt continued to stress the importance of naval cruises in Latin America into
1939, as U.S. concerns about German subversion in South America grew. In September
1938 he had directed the Navy and State Departments to begin coordinating a springtime
visit of a division of cruisers to South America. The president’s stated intent was to have the
vessels visit ports that he himself had not visited during his own trips to Latin American
waters, meaning a great deal of its emphasis would be on west coast ports such as Valparaiso,
Chile and Lima, Peru.58 In November, as planning for the cruise was just getting underway,
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles alerted the Standing Liaison Committee to yet
another “German plot to create trouble in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina.” It was the kind of
information that U.S. intelligence assets had been reporting to Washington with increasing
regularity in the latter months of 1938, and to Roosevelt, seemed like confirmation of the
assessment provided by special emissary Breckinridge Long.59 Administration officials,
including the president himself, were more and more consumed with what they saw as a
gathering Nazi threat in South America. In such a climate, public displays of naval strength
in Latin American waters took on even greater importance to U.S. policy. Accordingly,
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Roosevelt reiterated his desire to send a division of heavy cruisers to South America
following springtime naval exercises in the Caribbean. Now, however, for the first time U.S.
vessels would circumnavigate the entirety of South America and make a “goodwill” cruise a
show of force for the whole continent to behold – beginning at La Guaira, Venezuela, and
continuing southward along the east coast before passing through the Straits of Magellan and
proceeding up the west coast for large stops in Chile and Peru.60
In some respects, the six-week cruise of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Cruiser Division that
took shape in April and May 1939 was little different than the goodwill cruises that had come
before it. At each stop the Division’s commander, Husband E. Kimmel (Rear Admiral, U.S.
Navy), his staff, and enlisted crew engaged in public diplomacy activities intended to burnish
their nation’s good neighbor credentials. In large measure these activities conformed to
what, by then, had become a familiar pattern in America’s naval diplomacy in Latin
American waters: there were highly public displays of U.S. respect for Latin American
nations’ sovereignty, along with efforts to maximize the visibility of the ships and their crews
before the local public. At Buenos Aires and in the Peruvian port of Callao, for example,
Kimmel laid wreaths at monuments to national heroes – gestures that, as the U.S. Chargé
d’Affaires in Argentina noted, had become “traditional” for U.S. naval crews during the good
neighbor years. And during the vessels’ four-day anchorage in the Argentine capital, their
decks played host to “no fewer than” fifteen thousand local visitors while throngs of others
gathered at the pier.61
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But along with these established elements of good neighbor naval diplomacy
appeared other features that betrayed both the depth of the threat that officials within the
Roosevelt administration perceived in South America and the sense of urgency they felt
about confronting it. During the ships’ stay in Argentina, a nation that had proven itself a
thorn in the side of Roosevelt’s efforts to unify the hemisphere at inter-American meetings in
1936 and 1938, public remarks by U.S. officials stressed the shared history and heritage of
the Americas and sought to contrast their history of peaceful, cooperative coexistence with
the turbulent international situation prevailing in Europe. The American desire to influence
Argentina’s hemispheric policy was palpable. Addressing a gathering of Argentine and
American officials during the ships’ visit to Buenos Aires, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires S. Pinkney
Tuck noted that the world had recently witnessed a “collapse of the forces which modern
civilization has developed to resolve international problems,” and emphasized that, in an
increasingly dangerous world, it was important that “no shadow of misunderstanding or
suspicion” exist between the American republics.62 In Peru, which had been more
cooperative with U.S. efforts despite being led by a Europhile President, Oscar Benavides,
who was reserved toward the United States, U.S. officials reinforced such rhetoric with
gestures designed to underscore the two nations’ comparatively deep naval ties.63 Their hope
was that the bonds between the two nations’ navies could help inspire Peruvian officials to
make public statements of solidarity with U.S. aims for hemispheric security, and in doing
so, help further built inter-American solidarity. On the Division’s third day in the port of
62

Remarks of U.S. Chargé d’Affaires, May 9, 1939, enclosure to U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Buenos Aires to
Secretary of State, May 12, 1939, RG 59, File 811.3310/1372, National Archives.
63

Lawrence Clayton notes that Benavides “was not a fan of the United States, its people, or its institutions. He
had spent many years in Europe, especially in France and Italy, in various military and diplomatic missions, and
was disposed to favor Germans and Italians equally with Americans in Peru’s relations with foreigners.” See
Clayton, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle, 160.
272

Callao, after a full schedule of sporting competitions, receptions, and ceremonies, Admiral
Kimmel took the extraordinary step of welcoming President Benavides and a host of highranking officials aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. San Francisco, as the three vessels of the
Division embarked for a brief demonstration of “simple maneuvers” at sea. Just beyond the
waters of Callao harbor, as the ships demonstrated high-speed movements, their crews
launched two aircraft each, which subsequently flew in formation with Peruvian planes in a
visual representation of inter-American naval cooperation. The demonstration had the
desired effect. During the on-board lunch that followed, Benavides remarked that he saw in
the U.S. ships far more than a mere display of raw naval power. Rather, their presence in
Peruvian waters represented “the strength of the historic ties of friendship and mutual regard
which have always existed between our countries and of moral strength and integrity in a
troubled world.”64
While officials in the Roosevelt administration welcomed such sentiments as
evidence that Benavides and his government were moving more clearly into the U.S. fold,
they were no doubt more encouraged by Peruvian press retrospectives on Cruiser Division
Seven’s visit.65 On June 1st, the day after the American vessels departed for Panama, an
editorial in La Cronica concluded that the six days when “the flag of the United States flew
in Callao together with the bicolor of Peru” had been far more than “a simple expression of
protocol.” The visit represented a “sincere and fruitful” renewal of “expressions of fraternal
camaraderie and continental solidarity” between the longtime partners at a time when South
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American nations had to be guardians of their unity. The friendship between Peru and the
United States had been founded more than a century earlier on shared ideals, the paper stated,
and would endure as an expression of “true americanism” in the face of gathering danger.66
The positive reports flowing from Peru were “typical” of the news flowing into Washington
about Cruiser Division Seven’s South American tour, reported the State Department’s
Division of the American Republics. It gave momentum to the Roosevelt administration’s
efforts, and was entirely satisfactory to the president himself, the architect of the voyage.67
The visit of the Seventh Cruiser Division to Peru in May 1939 underscored that
nation’s value to U.S. naval diplomacy at a critical juncture. Peru had been the test bed for
the system of U.S. naval and military advising that Washington was deploying throughout
Latin America in an attempt to stiffen hemispheric defense. At the same time, Peruvian
shores had long been among the friendliest and oft-visited in the hemisphere for U.S. Navy
goodwill cruises. Indeed, Admiral Kimmel noted in his after-action report that there seemed
a “casual” attitude and “a tendency to take things for granted” among Peruvian officials
during the visit – developments he chalked up to the Peruvians’ comfort with a long-term
U.S. naval presence in their country. The naval mission had been reestablished after a fiveyear absence, he noted, while American naval vessels had been “no uncommon sight” in
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Peruvian waters throughout much of the decade.68 Such intimate naval ties made the U.S.
task of keeping Peru within the inter-American hemispheric defense network considerably
easier than it otherwise might have been.
A DEEPENING SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Aided in no small measure by both strands of American naval diplomacy, U.S.Peruvian security ties, which had grown tighter as the external threat to the Americas grew in
the late 1930s, entered their closest period since the Leguía years with the election of Manuel
Ignacio Prado y Ugarteche to the Peruvian presidency in late 1939. Prado, the son of a
wealthy, politically active family from the Peruvian aristocracy, proved to be a willing
partner who supported U.S. and Allied aims to a degree that Benavides, who had done more
to support American aims for hemispheric security than U.S. officials had expected, never
entertained. Prado’s father had been President of Peru at the outset of the War of the Pacific
against Chile, and in the eyes of many Peruvians had tainted his family’s name by fleeing the
country during that conflict’s opening months. His patriotism in question because of his
father’s actions, the younger Prado had much to prove to his countrymen both as a candidate
and as president. He rode the promise of a broad middle-class tax cut to victory over the
ineffective José Quesada Larrea in the November elections, and as Daniel Masterson notes,
set out to govern as a “conservative modernizer” once in office. In practical terms, that
meant Prado would pursue a more intimate economic relationship with the United States,
which, for its part, was preparing to significantly expand its Latin American trade in order to
capitalize on the inevitable collapse of Latin America’s European trade as a result of the war.
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Prado’s would be Peru’s most pro-American administration since Leguía (19191930), something that was politically possible because of the unique alignment of political
forces within the country at the time. Most significantly, the Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the leftist party founded in the 1920s in opposition to
Leguía’s brand of export-led development, and which had fought a pitched battle against the
government of President Luis M. Sanchez Cerro in the early 1930s, was no longer staunchly
opposed to such cooperation. By the later part of the decade APRA, which had been forced
underground in the later years of the Benavides administration, was busily moderating its
core ideology in an attempt to regain its lost public standing. Accordingly, Aprista leaders
opted not to oppose Prado’s candidacy in the 1939 election, as they no doubt would have
done under more normal circumstances, in the hope that he would support the party’s
legalization once in office.69 Moreover, in an effort to curry favor in the United States,
APRA founder and longtime U.S. critic Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre had even taken to
praising both the Roosevelt administration’s Good Neighbor Policy and U.S. aims for
hemispheric security.70 Such acts would have seemed incomprehensible just a few years
before, and represented a sea-change in Peruvian politics. Thus, by the late 1930s APRA no
longer enjoyed the prominence it once had as the leading voice of Peru’s political left. It also
toned down its vocal criticism of Peru’s capitalist development, recognizing that the
country’s improved economic fortunes had done much to undermine such appeals in the eyes
of Peru’s voting public. As a result, Prado faced no real political threat on his left as the
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1939 election approached. Nor did he encounter any real opposition from Peru’s politicallyminded military establishment. The Army, which had played the decisive role in Leguía’s
1930 ouster, had just come through a decade of unprecedented growth and was flush with
resources, the product of 1) having an Army man (Benavides) as president for much of the
time, and 2) facing a possible ground war with Ecuador. Enjoying the higher profile that
came with a 300-percent increase in troop strength, Peruvian Army leaders looked to Prado,
Benavides’ hand-picked candidate, to keep the good times rolling.71 At the same time, the
Navy, whose budgets were consistently lean under Benavides, was nevertheless satisfied
both with Benavides’ embrace of a U.S. naval mission as well as Prado’s more
enthusiastically pro-U.S. outlook, which optimistic naval officers believed could only
portend good things for their institution.72
As President, Prado was a stalwart friend of the Allied cause and a staunch supporter
of U.S. aims for hemispheric security. It was his administration that concluded the
agreement that brought a U.S. aviation to Peru in mid-1940, closing the Italian mission
Benavides had favored and opening Peru even further to U.S. military influence.73 That
same year, the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began issuing clear statements, pleasing
to Washington, that were supportive of “the unity and general neutrality of the Pan-American
system.” And, also satisfactory to the Roosevelt administration, at the July 1940 meeting of
American republics in Havana, Peruvian representatives signaled the Prado administration’s
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willingness to prohibit the dissemination of potentially damaging “warlike propaganda”
within Peru.74
Peru’s cooperation with Washington under Prado only accelerated after the United
States entered the war in late 1941. Peru broke diplomatic relations with the Axis powers in
January 1942, only weeks after the Japanese attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii.75 It also cooperated very closely with controversial Roosevelt administration efforts
to round up and isolate persons of suspect nationalities (principally Japanese and German)
during the war. Between 1942 and 1945 Prado’s government arrested and deported nearly
two thousand Peruvians of Japanese descent to the United States, where they were held in
internment camps for the duration of the war. It was a measure of collaboration that historian
Lawrence Clayton calls a “tragic persecution” of a vibrant and ultimately unthreatening
minority of the Peruvian population.76 It also served as a clear indication of Prado’s devotion
to the Allied cause.
Prado also put Peruvian resources at the disposal of the United States and the Allied
war effort. At his direction, the Peruvian Navy supported U.S. naval units guarding southern
approaches to the Panama Canal. In 1942 he cleared the way for the United States to build a
new airfield, El Pato, near the northwestern coastal city of Talara, to further assist with Canal
security and to provide protection to the nearby Talara oil fields.77 Perhaps most
significantly, though, Prado ensured that Peru offered steadfast economic support for the
Allied war effort. Throughout the war years, Peru maintained steady exports of critical war
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materials to the United States, including rubber, copper, vanadium, petroleum, cotton, and
cinchona bark – the last an essential ingredient in the anti-malarial drug quinine needed by
U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines fighting in the Pacific.78 As Jorge Ortiz Sotelo and Daniel
Masterson note, although Peru made an indispensible contribution to the Allied war effort by
continuing to ship these materials, its cooperation came at a significant cost. Under Prado’s
leadership the Peruvian economy, which like most Latin American economies was wellpositioned to parlay intensified wartime exchange with the United States into a sustained
industrial and commercial boom, failed to implement a “coherent development strategy” and
ended up becoming more dependent on U.S. assistance and foreign direct investment than
ever before. A sustainable development strategy could have taken shape, they argue, had
Peru been successful – as other Latin American countries during the war were – in
accumulating a substantial base of foreign exchange reserves. However, in his effort to lend
the greatest possible assistance to the Allied war effort, Prado made the fateful decision to
maintain price controls on the war-critical raw materials Peru sent to the United States. As a
result, Peru’s foreign exchange reserves grew at a rate of only 55-percent during the war – far
less than countries such as Brazil (635-percent), Colombia (540-percent), and Mexico (480percent), all of which let prices keep pace with market rates and whose economies derived
greater long-term benefit from their wartime cooperation.79 In short, perhaps more than any
other Latin American country, Peru embodied the ideal of wartime good neighborism
envisaged by the Roosevelt administration.80 It offered unflinching support for Washington’s
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aims before the United States became a belligerent, and only intensified that support
afterward – at considerable cost to its own longer-term economic well-being.
It is important to note, however, that as one-sided as the wartime economic
relationship between the United States and Peru ultimately turned out to be, Peru was
successful in leveraging its broader relationship with Washington to secure other vital
interests. The Prado administration succeeded, for example, in securing more than $18
million in U.S. military assistance under the 1941 Lend-Lease Act. That assistance made the
construction of the El Pato air base possible, and enabled to Peru to acquire a small number
of military aircraft. It was but a small share of the total amount of Lend-Lease aid the United
States distributed to Latin American countries at approximately four percent, and certainly
was not as much as Peruvians desired, but it did provide the Peru’s armed forces with a
noticeable boost in strength.81
More significantly, Peru was able to leverage its relationship with the United States to
effect a favorable settlement of its long-simmering border dispute with Ecuador. The dispute
had been especially heated dispute since Peruvian delegates walked out of U.S.-brokered
negotiations in Washington in September 1938. Emboldened by a military buildup
undertaken by President Benavides and continued under Prado, Peruvian Army authorities
made two critical strategic calculations in June 1941 aimed at resolving the longstanding
stalemate. First, as historian Robert Scheina notes, they determined that with the German
Army penetrating deeply into the Soviet Union and with the Roosevelt administration
undertaking a crash rearmament program to prepare the United States for war, Washington
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would view the outbreak of any war in the Americas in 1941 as an “unwelcome distraction”
and would do everything possible to settle it as quickly. Accordingly, the Peruvian General
Staff, confident of Peruvian Army’s superiority over Ecuador, devised a plan to rapidly
invade, occupy, and hold the disputed areas of the frontier until Washington, desperate to put
an end to inter-American discord, swooped in to facilitate negotiations that confirmed Peru’s
gains. Peruvian Army units in the contested border regions went on alert in June 1941 after
American mediation efforts broke down entirely.
It was at this point that General Eloy Ureta, the Peruvian Army commander in the
region, made a second critical strategic calculation: he bet that President Prado, who up until
that point had taken a firm but solidly diplomatic approach to resolving the crisis, would be
politically unable to stop the Army from taking military action given that his family name
was still tainted by his father’s actions during the War of the Pacific. The president could not
risk further sullying his family name by disavowing a military operation against Ecuador
once it was underway, Army leaders concluded. Their calculations were correct. General
Ureta ignored President Prado’s order that on-alert Army forces stand fast and avoid
offensive action, and in late June informed the commander-in-chief that he would
imminently be ordering units under his command to attack. On July 5th the Peruvian assault
went forward on two fronts – in a small disputed area near the Pacific coast and in a much
larger area in the eastern interior. Militarily, it was a rout for Peruvian forces. The smaller,
poorly equipped and ill-prepared Ecuadorian forces were no match for Peruvian ground units
that had benefitted from years of favorable budgets and an influx of modern equipment. The
military campaign was over in a matter of weeks. By mid-August, for all intents and
purposes, the Ecuadorian Army ceased to exist as a viable field army. Under intense
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international pressure to halt the fighting, in October the two governments agreed on terms
for a ceasefire. Peruvian Army units halted active combat operations and became an army of
occupation in the disputed areas. For the Peruvian Army and the Prado administration, the
wait for Washington’s diplomatic validation began.82
As Peruvian Army leaders had suspected they would, Peru’s territorial gains received
quick validation. The settlement was accelerated considerably by the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7th, which raised the stakes for the United States and filled the
Roosevelt administration with a new resolve to forge anti-Axis unity in the Americas. A
settlement of the Peru-Ecuador dispute, the only ongoing international conflict in the
hemisphere, thus became an even more urgent matter than before. It was a major concern of
inter-American delegates who gathered at an emergency meeting in Rio de Janeiro in January
1942 to address hemispheric security challenges stemming from U.S. involvement in the war.
The meeting fell short of expectations in some respects, as Argentina and Chile, coastal
nations that had longstanding ties with Germany and feared the prospect of military invasion,
refused to break relations with the Axis nations. But agreement proved easier to achieve on
the issue of making peace between Peru and Ecuador. Encouraged by the U.S.
representative, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and by the foreign ministers of
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Peruvian delegate Alfredo Solf y Muro and Ecuadorian
representative Julio Tobar Donoso signed a Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Limits on the
conference’s last day. The agreement broadly affirmed Peru’s complete military success and
upheld Lima’s claims to most of the disputed areas. As a result, the territorial area of
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Ecuador was reduced by nearly one-half. Included in the lost territory were tributaries of the
Marañón River, which had given Ecuador access to the Amazon River and a means of
accessing the Atlantic Ocean. In that sense, Ecuador was a transcontinental nation no more.
Given the highly charged diplomatic environment, however, there was little the Ecuadorian
government – although bitterly disappointed – could do to resist. For the United States, the
overarching imperative was ensuring the peace and unity in the Americas. Peru had proven
itself a willing partner in that pursuit, and had demonstrated an ability to leverage U.S.
concerns on behalf of its own interests. The quick settlement of the boundary question on
terms highly favorable to Peru underscores just how far the U.S.-Peruvian relationship had
come since the difficult years just after the fall of Leguía. As Lawrence Clayton concludes, it
stands as a testament to the depth of friendship between the United States and Peru during the
Prado administration.83
CONCLUSION

For the United States, the close cooperation Peru provided before and during World
War II served as an example of what was possible in inter-American relations, and helped
facilitate broader inter-American collaboration in hemispheric security. During World War
II, few Latin American nations had stronger, more cordial diplomatic ties with the United
States than did Peru. Although its significance to U.S. military designs for hemispheric
defense lagged behind that of nations like Colombia and Brazil, Peru’s history of close,
cooperative naval relations with the United States recommended it to the Roosevelt
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administration as a useful partner and ally in securing the Western Hemisphere from external
threat. The close relationship that the U.S. and Peruvian navies had developed during the
1920s and early 1930s served as a foundation for the strong bilateral ties that bound the
United States and Peru during the World War II years. Moreover, it helped pave the way for
broader naval and military cooperation that has characterized inter-American relations ever
since. Although the substantive accomplishments of the U.S. naval mission sent to Peru in
1938 were comparatively modest in real terms, its presence served an important political
purpose, and helped anchor that productive wartime relationship. At the same time, goodwill
visits by U.S. Navy vessels to Peruvian waters gave that cooperation a highly visible public
dimension. Together, both threads of U.S. naval diplomacy served as a springboard for
broader inter-American military cooperation during the war years.
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CONCLUSION

Peru offered staunch support to the United States and the Allies even after its
territorial gains from Ecuador were confirmed at the January 1942 meeting of American
Republics at Rio de Janeiro. Throughout World War II, Peru continued to export critical raw
materials to the United States at below-market prices. The Peruvian and U.S. navies jointly
patrolled the waters of the southeast Pacific Ocean. And the administration of Peruvian
President Manuel Prado carried on arresting and detaining persons of Japanese descent well
into 1945. In all respects, Peru was a stalwart ally of the United States, cooperating in
strategic, economic, and diplomatic matters in equal measure.1 Although relations between
the two nations had been cordial and generally cooperative before 1919, it is hard to imagine
Peru offering such strong support to the United States and the Allied war effort during World
War II in the absence of the interwar developments that drew the two nations together. The
most important of those developments, this dissertation contends, took place in the realm of
naval affairs.
In the early 1920s, the naval relationship the United States developed with Peru
enabled it to integrate the Andean nation into its expanding empire. The key development in
this regard was the sending of the U.S. naval mission to Peru in 1920, which gave
Washington a substantial degree of strategic and economic influence within that country at a
time when political conditions, both within the United States abroad, made the use of armed
intervention in South America unthinkable. At the invitation of Peruvian President Augusto
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Leguía, naval mission members assumed positions of formal command within the Peruvian
Navy, and quickly became key members of the president’s inner circle. Their extraordinary
access to the center of power gave U.S. foreign policymakers and naval leaders in
Washington a tool with which to advance American interests in Peru and in the region. U.S.
Navy leaders, for example, saw the mission’s efforts to develop Peruvian naval education as
a long-term good, believing that American security interests would be well served by having
compatible, like-minded naval establishments in as many Latin American countries as
possible. This is visible also in the mission’s work to establish a modern submarine force as
the cornerstone of the Peruvian fleet. At the same time, U.S. diplomats looked favorably on
mission members’ efforts to develop a national aviation system in Peru, believing that that
nation’s need for foreign expertise in flight would create a valuable opening for American
aviation concerns to enter the lucrative South American market. All the while, both foreign
policymakers and businessmen viewed the U.S. naval mission as a stabilizing influence in
Peru. The remarkable political stability that prevailed under Leguía, with the assistance of
the U.S. naval mission, increased the confidence of American investors, who in turn
showered that country with more than $100 million in loans – infusions of capital that,
although they increased Peru’s indebtedness, fostered economic growth that further solidified
Leguía’s grip on power. By the late 1920s, the United States maintained no closer, more
cordial relations with any nation in Latin America than it did with Leguía’s Peru. The U.S.
naval mission was integral to the development of that relationship, and helped pave the way
for Peru’s integration into the American empire in the Western Hemisphere.
It is important to stress that, in casting the U.S. relationship with Peru during the
interwar period in imperial terms, this dissertation is not suggesting that Peru stood passively
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by as the United States dictated the course of the bilateral relationship. Rather, it recognizes
that Peruvian leaders retained a significant degree of agency in the relationship, and
exercised considerable control over their nation’s relations with the United States. In no
aspect of the bilateral relationship was this more apparent than in naval affairs. In the 1920s,
for example, President Leguía proved quite adept at pushing American foreign policymakers
further than they wished to go in lending support to his naval designs. He pushed the United
States to sell Peru modern naval hardware (especially submarines) early and often in his
presidency. When he ran into opposition, Leguía resorted to manipulating the American
bureaucracy, playing Navy and State Department leaders against one another to create
openings through which he could achieve his objectives. And, as in the case of the
Woodward imbroglio of late 1923, the dictator used the naval mission’s executive authority
over the Peruvian Navy to give his designs the appearance of American approval.
Throughout his reign, Leguía strengthened his hand by using flattery and public
professions of fondness for American values to ingratiate himself to Washington. For
example, he declared the Fourth of July a Peruvian national holiday, and hung a large portrait
of U.S. President James Monroe – father of the “Monroe Doctrine,” the cornerstone of U.S.
hemispheric policy since the 1820s – in the presidential palace.2 Moreover, rarely did Leguía
or his representatives speak publicly of the United States without referring to it as the “Great
Republic of the North.”3 Over time, moves such as these caused U.S. foreign policymakers
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to see Leguía as an enlightened leader worthy of their nation’s full support. Each adoring
superlative Leguía lobbed at the United States reinforced American diplomats’ deep-seated
belief (conditioned by racial attitudes) that the mestizo Leguía was uniquely suited to lead the
heavily indigenous, “ignorant” nation to a brighter, more prosperous future.4 Leguía’s highly
public, freely expressed admiration for the United States had the desired effect. U.S. support
for his government grew consistently stronger throughout the 1920s, and by the end of the
decade, Washington was deeply invested in his rule.
Another way Peruvian leaders throughout the interwar period exercised control over
their relationship with the United States was by playing on U.S. fears of European
encroachment in South America. Leguía, for one, employed this tactic again and again –
first, to secure a U.S. naval mission in 1920, and later, in an attempt wither U.S. resistance to
the idea of sending his government a mission of Army officers to complement the work of
the naval mission. As proficient as he was in deploying the boogeyman of European
meddling to get what he wanted from Washington, however, Leguía’s accomplishments in
this regard were surpassed by those of President Oscar Benavides (1933-1939), whose
Europhilic tendencies gave American foreign policymakers fits in the late 1930s. In late
1937 Benavides’ government dangled the prospect of accepting a British naval mission in
order to press ongoing naval mission negotiations with Washington toward a productive end.
To U.S. officials preoccupied with inter-American solidarity and hemispheric security, the
prospect of Europeans (even the British) gaining sway over a Latin American military
establishment was unacceptable. The move had the effect the Peruvians desired, as the U.S.
the North never yet fired a single cannon shot in South America.” See Report on General Conditions
Prevailing in Peru During the Previous Month, August 21, 1926, RG 59, File 823.00, National Archives.
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State Department moved quickly to close the deal and dispatch a new naval mission to Lima.
In another shrewd, well-timed move, at almost the same moment Benavides contracted with
the Mussolini government of Italy for a mission of aviation officers to advise the Peruvian
Navy and Army. Coming on the heels of the successful naval mission negotiations, this put
the Roosevelt administration on edge. The net effect was that from late 1937 until it
ultimately succeeded in securing an agreement in 1940, the United States made sending a
U.S. naval aviation mission to Peru to displace the Italian one a priority of its policy toward
Peru.
Also visible in the naval dimensions of the U.S.-Peruvian relationship in the interwar
period is a clear divergence, persistent in U.S. foreign policy, between professed ideals and
actions. In the years immediately following World War I, the United States under President
Woodrow Wilson championed the principles of democracy and national self-determination in
the world, and led international efforts to build a new, permanently peaceful global order. If
American policy at the time had been consistent with the Wilson administration’s highminded progressive rhetoric, U.S. relations with Peru would certainly have proceeded along a
far different track in the 1920s. As it stood, though, postwar U.S. policy toward Peru, and
Latin America more broadly, turned on traditional strategic and economic concerns. A
strong desire to prevent European nations from reasserting their dominant influence over
South American military and naval establishments helped drive the Wilson administration’s
favorable response to Leguía’s request for a U.S. naval mission. Meanwhile, the keen
interest of American business in exploiting Peru’s rich natural resources led U.S. foreign
policymakers to quickly embrace Leguía’s open invitation for American investment in Peru.
Together, the prevalence of strategic and economic concerns left little room for progressive
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idealism in Washington’s approach to Peru.5 To U.S. foreign policymakers, Augusto Leguía
was the kind of leader who could protect and promote tangible American interests. As a
result, U.S. foreign policymakers in administrations from Wilson through Herbert Hoover
saw Leguía’s growing authoritarianism, and the stability it provided, as a net positive for
American interests.
The U.S. naval mission served as a guarantor of that prized stability. It gave Leguía a
measure of security from his domestic political foes. It helped strengthen the Peruvian Navy,
Leguía’s favored branch of national military power, and enabled it to serve as counterweight
to the politically active Peruvian Army, of which the dictator was wary. Without a doubt, the
U.S. naval mission aided Leguía in fashioning a stable, orderly, and repressive dictatorship.
More broadly it was a vital part of the large, direct, and ongoing support that the United
States extended to Leguía’s government for more than a decade. And in that sense, the U.S.
naval mission to Peru was an integral player making the 1920s a watershed period in U.S.Latin American relations: it was the first time the United States went to great lengths to
strengthen a Latin American dictator’s hold on power. Today, the history of U.S. support for
dictatorships in Latin America is well known. Most contemporary studies trace its origins
either to the Cold War or to the non-interventionist Good Neighbor Policy pursued by the
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration – a period when the United States embraced Latin
American strongmen as a way of maintaining regional order without having to wield the
threat of intervention. But in examining the naval dimensions of U.S.-Peruvian relations
during the 1920s, its true origins come more clearly into focus. In its dealings with Leguía,
the United States exposed itself as a nation willing to depart from its ideal of promoting

5

See Tulchin, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America.
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democracy and self-determination abroad when national interests could best be served, at
least in the short term, by embracing stable, non-democratic regimes.
The gulf between ideals and actions in U.S. policy toward Peru is visible in the postLeguía years, as well. In the late 1930s, as U.S. relations with Latin America became
dominated by hemispheric security concerns, foreign policymakers in the Roosevelt
administration redoubled their efforts to burnish the good neighbor image of the United
States throughout Latin America. Driving this effort was the belief that, whether or not they
were capable of contributing to a military defense of the hemisphere, all Latin American
nations had important roles to play in resisting both armed attacks and possible subversive
efforts mounted by external powers. Courting the maximum degree of cooperation, U.S.
officials used public statements to emphasize the common heritage of the Americas, North,
South, and Central: their experience throwing off European colonialism, their mutual
embrace of democratic institutions and republican government, and their shared belief in the
superiority of the “new world” over the old.6 Accordingly, U.S. naval and military assistance
to Latin American nations before and during World War II was billed publicly as an effort to
help improve their ability to make substantive contributions to the defense of shared
American ideals. Behind the scenes, however, it was a different story. As this dissertation’s
examination of the reestablished naval mission to Peru demonstrates, in Peru as throughout
much of Latin America, U.S. military assistance served the fundamentally diplomatic
purpose of keeping up appearances.7 With the exceptions of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico,

6

David Rock, "War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the United States," in Latin America in the
1940s: War and Postwar Transitions, ed. David Rock (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 19-20.
7

Brazil and Mexico eventually contributed troops to Allied military efforts in Europe, and were the two largest
recipients of U.S. military assistance under the Lend-Lease Act. In State Department correspondence from the
late 1930s, Colombia, because of its geographic location vis-à-vis the Panama Canal and its naval capabilities,
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each of which was viewed as capable of making a significant military contribution to
hemispheric defense, the priority of such assistance to Latin American nations was visibility.
It was important that the United States be seen as helping to provide for Latin America’s
defense needs. Less important was whether that assistance was significant in scope, or
whether it contributed materially to actual improvements in Latin American nations’ defense
capabilities.
Finally, the naval relationship the United States forged with Peru during the interwar
period demonstrates the centrality of non-coercive naval power to U.S.-Latin American
relations. The U.S. naval missions to Peru, first in the 1920s and later from 1938 into the
World War II years, represented a clear break from the gunboat diplomacy that had
characterized U.S. naval involvement in Latin America in the early twentieth century. Both
were of fundamental importance to the course of U.S.-Peruvian relations during challenging
times. For all the problems and challenges that flowed from the Leguía-era naval mission, its
achievements laid the foundation for a close, enduring naval relationship between the two
countries. Moreover, in the longer-term, the naval mission’s work demonstrated that interAmerican cooperation in the naval-military realm could achieve significant results. In that
sense the U.S. naval mission to Peru stands out as the forerunner to the extensive network of
naval and military advisers that the United States has maintained throughout Latin America
ever since World War II. Today, these advisory groups remain a cornerstone of interAmerican military cooperation, and of U.S. foreign policy in the region more generally.
Naval power has remained a central feature of U.S. policy toward Latin America in
another key respect, as well: since the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations first embraced
was often cited as an example of a Latin American nation that could make a meaningful contribution to
hemispheric defense. See Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978, 48.
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it as an instrument of policy during the interwar period, the United States has continued to
employ naval cruises for the purposes of directly reaching and convincing Latin American
peoples of its good neighbor intentions. That is, goodwill naval cruises have continued to
play a key role in U.S. public diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. Prior to Hoover’s preinaugural goodwill tour of Latin America in late 1928 and early 1929, U.S. naval vessels and
personnel had been agents of a long-term policy of armed interventionism which was reviled
throughout Latin America and increasingly unpopular at home. Following Hoover’s journey
through Central and South American waters, changes in U.S. naval policy reflected the
importance that U.S. diplomats and naval leaders began attaching to foreign goodwill cruises.
Such cruises, they increasingly thought, could help substantially improve U.S.-Latin
American relations. Indeed, changing the U.S. approach to Latin America was one of the
few things on which Hoover and his successor, Roosevelt, could agree.8 Despite their
myriad differences in other areas, both saw value in using the Navy to facilitate real change.
Upon assuming office, Roosevelt, who had served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy
during the Woodrow Wilson administration, took a personal interest in employing the Navy
as the face of good neighborism in Latin America. After some early successes, most notably
the 1934 shakedown cruise of the U.S.S. Ranger, Roosevelt dispatched active elements of the
U.S. Fleet on public diplomacy missions aimed at fostering goodwill. These missions
consistently featured activities intended to demonstrate a neighborly respect for the
sovereignty of Latin American nations, maximize the direct contact local populations had
with U.S. ships and naval personnel, and showcase the technological advancement and
strength of the United States. The high-profile goodwill cruises the Navy made to Peru in
8

DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin-American Policy. See also Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor
Policy. See also Pike, FDR's Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos.
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1936, 1937, and 1939 were particularly influential in helping to repair bilateral relations that
had been troubled since the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Leguía dictatorship. They
confirmed to key officials in the Roosevelt State Department, especially Under Secretary of
State Sumner Welles, that the Navy had an integral, ongoing role to play in the nation’s
public diplomacy. Goodwill naval cruises helped clearly align Peru and much of Latin
America with U.S. designs for hemispheric defense. And more broadly, they became key
components of U.S. public diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere in the longer term. Today,
more than seventy years later, ships of the U.S. Navy routinely cruise in Latin American
waters. Most often, as in the cases of the hospital ship USNS Comfort’s regular visits to
Latin America and the U.S. Navy’s participation in the annual inter-American UNITAS
naval exercise, their itineraries are packed with public diplomacy activities.9 That naval
cruises have continued to play important roles in U.S. public diplomacy in Latin America
further underscores the importance of the changes that took place during the interwar period.

9

For example, see “Grapple Crew Participates in Perry Memorial Gateway Rededication Ceremony [Trinidad
and Tobago],” U.S. Navy story #NNS120405-24, accessed April 8, 2012,
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=66332. See also “Underwood Crew Commemorates Chilean
Naval Hero,” U.S. Navy story #NNS120608-13, accessed June 10, 2012,
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=67707. See also Terri M. Cronk, “USNS Comfort Completes
Humanitarian Mission,” Armed Forces Press Service, accessed September 17, 2011,
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=65236.
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APPENDIX 1: PHOTOS

PHOTO 1: Augusto B. Leguía y Salcedo, President of Peru, 1908-1912, 1919-1930.
Source: Library of Congress

PHOTO 2: William O. Spears (Captain, U.S.
Navy) in Peruvian Naval Uniform, 1930.
Source: U.S. Naval Academy
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PHOTO 3: U.S. President-Elect Herbert Hoover with Peruvian President Augusto Leguía in Lima, 1928.
Source: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library and Museum

PHOTO 4: U.S. Sailors and Marines render honors at the tomb of Peruvian Almirante Miguel
Grau Seminario, 1936. Source: National Archives
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APPENDIX 2: MAPS

MAP 1: Map depicting the 1929 settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute stemming from the War of the Pacific.
Source: Foreign Affairs
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MAP 2: Map of Peru depicting its distinct regions: the costa (coastal desert), sierra (mountains),
and selva (rainforest). Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas
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